FROM EXCLUSION TO INCLUSION: THE EVOLUTION OF RACIAL POLITICS

IN THE PARTY SYSTEMS IN THE SOUTH

Stephen D. Shaffer

Mississippi State University

Prepared for delivery at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, the San Francisco Hilton and Towers, August 29-September 1, 1996. Copyright by the American Political Science Association.

A HISTORY OF RACIAL EXCLUSION

Any understanding of the evolution of racial politics in the South must begin with some theoretical framework that helps to explain the context for interactions between the races. Daniel Elazar's (1984) theory of political culture defining the South as having a "traditionalistic" culture provides such a framework that is particularly instructive for understanding the region's history. Grounded in the plantation-centered economic system of the Old South, this elitist culture sought to minimize public participation in politics in order to maintain the economic elite's dominance, as well as to strictly limit government expenditures on social programs. It also stiffled two party competition in order to prevent any effort to include the voices of the powerless and politically oppressed African-Americans (and some lower socio-economic status whites as well), preserving a one-party Democratic system that protected white supremacy as outlined so brilliantly in V.O. Key's (1949) Southern Politics. While the South as a whole shared this traditionalistic culture, "in no other southern state was white resistance to black political participation so total and so unrestrained as in Mississippi" (Bass and DeVries, 1977, 203), an observation warranting a special focus in this paper on the Magnolia State.

After Reconstruction Mississippi whites, who comprised less than half of the state's population, resorted to the stuffing of ballot boxes, the commission of perjury, and fraud and violence to maintain political power. The state constitutional convention of 1890, whose membership included only one African-American and 132 whites, instituted a two-year state residency requirement for voting, registration four months before the election, a poll tax payable two years before the election, and a requirement that a voter be able to read and understanding any section of the state constitution, or give a "reasonable interpretation" of it when it was read to them. When some delegates expressed a concern that this literacy and interpretation requirement would be used to disenfranchise poor whites, others responded that it would be enforced only against African-Americans, and the state legislature adopted the new state constitution without submitting it to voters (Krane and Shaffer, 1992).

Yet another device employed to disenfranchise African-Americans was the white primary, which was enacted in all southern states except Florida, North Carolina, and Tennessee. After the Populist movement had been crushed, the Democratic party was so dominant across the South that legislatures moved to primary elections to nominate party candidates, so that the actual choice of public officials would not be determined by the extremely limited numbers of party activists who attended nominating conventions. When Mississippi enacted a direct primary in 1902, the state Democratic party quickly passed a resolution that barred blacks from participating in its primary, effectively disenfranchising them from the political system given the weakness of a state Republican party that won only 10% of the vote in the 1900 presidential election. As the Supreme Court began its assault on the direct exclusion of African-Americans from a party primary solely because of their race, Deep South states moved to circumvent the spirit of the court decisions (Key, 1949; Coleman, 1993).

Mississippi provides an excellent example, as the legislature in 1947 passed a law requiring that people must be "in accord with the statement of the principles of the party holding such primary" in order to vote in the party primary. The Democratic State Executive Committee quickly enacted its party principles, which included a belief in states' rights, the poll tax, and opposition to any federal anti-lynching law and any Fair Employment Practice Committee. Some of the party's provisions echo the policies and rhetoric of today's Republican party, such as a belief in "free enterprise and private initiative" and opposition to "strong centralized government." Other 1947 Democratic party principles, such as support for "equal opportunities to all, with special privileges to none," and "laws to protect the general public from abuses by majority or minority groups," bear some resemblance to contemporary conservative Republican concerns over "reverse discrimination." In the final analysis, Mississippi local election officials generally did not enforce this new party rule, since other voting devices had been so successful at ensuring that few blacks showed up at the polls (Key, 1949).

The Mississippi state Democratic party's obsession with maintaining white supremacy was evident the next year as well, as its entire delegation (at the instruction of the state Democratic party convention) and half of the Alabama delegation to the 1948 national Democratic convention walked out of the convention after the adoption of a civil rights plank in the platform, spawning the Dixiecrat party with South Carolina and Mississippi governors Strom Thurmond and Fielding Wright as presidential and vice presidential running mates. The state Democratic executive committees of the four Deep South states of Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Louisiana listed the Dixiecrats on their ballots as the official Democratic party presidential nominees, a contributing factor to these being the only states carried by the Dixiecrats. As the federal government began its assault on racial segregation and disenfranchisement, the Mississippi state legislature which contained no black members as well as no Republicans responded. In 1960 it amended the state constitution to require that voters be of "good moral character" with local registrars making that determination, and in 1962 it passed a law requiring that local newspapers publish for two weeks the names of anyone who had applied for registration, thereby subjecting potential black voters to possible white retaliation. Such discriminatory tactics were so effective in oppressing African-Americans that as late as 1964 only 7% of voting age blacks were registered to vote in Mississippi, even lower than the 19-37% of blacks in other Deep South states who were registered (Shaffer, 1991a; Bass and DeVries, 1977).

Even more potent than legal devices in excluding African-Americans from the political system in the Deep South was the threat of physical violence. Mrs. Medgar Evers related her husband's experience of trying to register to vote in 1946 when none of the registered voters in his hometown were black. Whites and "their Negro message-bearers" visited the Evers home nightly with the same message, "Don't show up at the courthouse voting day." When Evers and five friends attempted to vote, they were ushered into the clerk's office and greeted by over ten armed white men, an experience that sent them home without voting. After Medgar Evers became NAACP field secretary in Mississippi in the 1950s, his wife recounted how fellow NAACP member and reverend George Lee had registered to vote and then died from gun blasts fired at his car. Another African-American, Lamar Smith, who had succeeded in voting and was distributing circulars to other blacks explained how to do so, was fatally shot during the day on the county courthouse lawn in Brookhaven. A local NAACP president, Gus Courts, suffered economic retaliation by white Citizens' Council members after registering to vote and was shot in his store by white men driving by in a car. In all three cases, white authorities either failed to fully investigate the shootings or grand juries refused to indict anyone. Medgar Evers himself was assassinated in 1963 in his own driveway by a white supremacist who was eventually convicted thirty years later by an integrated jury. Two trials in the 1960s had ended up with all-white juries (drawn from voter registration lists) being unable to deliver a unanimous verdict, with Governor Ross Barnett on one occasion entering the courtroom and shaking the hand of the accused assassin, Byron de la Beckwith. The summer of 1964, dubbed "Freedom Summer," was marked by intensified civil rights work in Mississippi, countered by white racists who "burned 37 black churches, bombed 30 homes, beat more than 80 civil rights workers, and made more than 1,000 arrests," as well as murdered three civil rights workers in Neshoba County (the subject of the film Mississippi Burning) (Evers, 1967; Krane and Shaffer, 1992).

Despite the threat of violence, many African-Americans in the South demonstrated courageous leadership in fighting for human rights and raising the national conscience. While some southern Democratic parties in states such as South Carolina began to include African-Americans in their state party relatively early (the 1960s), in South Carolina's case as a way of counteracting white flight to the Republican Party, others such as Mississippi resisted. After blacks were excluded as usual from Democratic Party precinct caucuses and county conventions, a coalition of civil rights organizations formed the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP), conducted precinct meetings, held county conventions in 35 of the state's 82 counties, and organized a state convention attended by 2,500 people. They elected a slate of 62 blacks and 4 whites to attend the 1964 national Democratic convention, where they challenged the seating of the all-white "regular" Democrats' delegation. FDP members were encouraged by a rule adopted at the 1956 national Democratic convention requiring delegates to give assurances that they would support the nominees of the Democratic party. African-American Fannie Lou Hamer testified before the stunned Credentials Committee about how she had lost her job after trying to register to vote, and then been beaten by agents of the highway patrol after seeking service at a lunch counter. The Credentials Committee sought a compromise, seating the Regulars if they signed a loyalty oath pledging to support the national Democratic party's candidates, and providing two at-large delegate slots to MFDP leaders Aaron Henry and Ed King. NAACP President Aaron Henry and a white chaplain from historically black Tougaloo College (Ed King) had run as governor and lieutenant governor in a mock 1963 "Freedom Election" in which 80,000 people voted, more than four times the number of black registered voters. Both sides rejected the committee's compromise and sat out the convention. But the most important aspect of the Credentials Committee's decision was their instituting a national party rule requiring that at future conventions state parties ensure that "all voters, regardless of race, color, creed, or national origin, will have the opportunity to participate fully in party affairs" (Bass and DeVries, 1977; Hy and Saeger, 1993).

In 1965 the MFDP fell under the influence of "young radicals" from the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee who articulated a "separatist" program of "Black Power," and Aaron Henry, Medgar Evers' brother Charles, and other NAACP leaders joined with white liberals and moderates in the Young Democrats and AFL-CIO to form a coalition of "loyalist Democrats," loyal to the national Democratic party. Some of these moderate blacks participated in the regular Democratic precinct caucuses and Congressional district conventions in 1968, and Charles Evers was one of three blacks elected to fill the 20 delegate seats chosen at the district level to attend the national convention. Blacks attended the state Democratic convention for the first time since 1890, as the 42 blacks comprised 5% of the 800 delegates. After segregationist governor John Bell Williams refused to appoint any blacks to fill the 24 at-large delegate slots, Charles Evers withdrew from the convention in protest. MFDP members joined the Loyalist coalition, and together they gathered evidence regarding the "irregularities" that characterized meetings of the Regular Democrats, and then held conventions in 72 counties to elect their own national convention delegates. After the U.S. Civil Rights Commission recommended that racially motivated state parties be excluded from national conventions, and all viable Democratic presidential candidates backed the Loyalists over the Regulars, the Credentials Committee voted to seat all of the Loyalists. Their offer of five at-large delegate slots to the Regulars was rejected by an organization that had now lost national party recognition, even though it controlled nearly all state and local elected positions in Mississippi (Bass and DeVries, 1977; Hy and Saeger, 1993).

In 1972 the Loyalists and Regulars again held separate party meetings to select delegates to attend the national convention. The Loyalists argued before the Credentials Committee that they had been recognized by the national party in 1968, that they occupied the state's two national committee seats, that they had supported the party's national ticket in 1968, and that they had complied with the party's delegation selection rules. They were again seated instead of the Regulars, who had argued that they were recognized under state law defining what constituted the Democratic party, and that nearly all Democratic officeholders in Mississippi were Regulars. Despite this dispute, relations had improved between the two Democratic factions after the election of racial moderate William Waller as governor in 1971. The Regulars had held more open meetings than in previous years, and some Loyalists had attended, though clashes between the factions grew more pronounced at the district and state conventions. After losing the Credential Committee fight, Governor Waller found himself battling for "inclusion" at the national convention, and offered the Loyalists 40% of the national convention slots and 40% of the state and county Democratic party positions. The Loyalists, requesting 50% representation, spurned Waller's offer after finding that he couldn't guarantee its implementation (Bass and DeVries, 1977; Hy and Saeger, 1993).

Mississippi African-Americans also protested against their exclusion by the Regulars by challenging the legitimacy of the state's congressional delegation. The MFDP had nominated four candidates for Congress in 1964, but their petitions were rejected by the secretary of state. After a mock election that fall, they lobbied the U.S. House of Representatives to not seat the contested Mississippi Congressmen and won a respectable 143 votes for their cause. Furthermore, the extensive record of discrimination compiled to support the challenge was instrumental in documenting the need for the 1965 Voting Rights Act. After segregationist Senator James Eastland's re-election in 1972, the persisting split between the Loyalists and Regulars led to Eastland being accepted into the Senate Democratic caucus by only a 4-vote margin. Even Eastland by 1975 was urging key state legislators to heal the split between the two Democratic factions (Bass and DeVries, 1977).

The Mississippi Republican Party was also split racially into two factions, but given the early participation of blacks in the party the split occurred much earlier than for the Democrats--in 1868. The "Black and Tans" was a biracial GOP organization led by respected black lawyer Perry Howard, and it was recognized by the national party in 1924. The segregated "Lily Whites" therefore organized themselves as the Independent Republican Party in 1928. After passage of a 1950 state law defining what a state party consisted of, the Lily Whites were the first faction to register with the state, thereby gaining state recognition as the official GOP party. Both factions backed Eisenhower, however, and the 1956 national convention saw a unified Mississippi GOP delegation. The national party soon viewed the Lily Whites as better able to attract white votes and began channeling federal patronage to them, so that faction dominated state GOP affairs by 1960 (Appleton and Ward, 1996). As African-Americans gained the right to vote with the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the Mississippi state legislature sought to dilute the black vote through such devices as the gerrymandering of district lines to split the black vote between different districts, and combining black majority districts with white districts to create larger, majority white, multi-member districts. Prior to 1962, the state legislature had maintained a Mississippi River "Delta" Congressional district, which in 1962 was almost 60% black in population. Responding to the Supreme Court reapportionment decisions, the legislature in 1966 redrew the districts' lines to provide population equality, but they also split the majority black Delta counties among three Congressional districts, so that none of the state's congressional districts contained a majority black voting age population. All three districts extended across the state from the Louisiana to the Alabama borders, with one district held together in the middle of the state by only one county. Only because of a court order rendered under the Voting Right Act was the majority black "Delta" congressional district finally restored in 1982, with the state's first African-American congressman since Reconstruction elected in 1986 (Parker, 1990).

The all-white state legislature was equally "creative" in redrawing its own boundaries and creating multi-member districts. Prior to a 1966 legislative session, most state legislators were elected from single member districts, but the new legislative districting plan provided that two-thirds of the House members (80) would be elected from 26 multi-member districts. In many instances majority black counties were now combined with majority white counties to provide a majority white multi-member district. In populous Hinds county housing the state capital of Jackson, blacks comprised 40% of the population, but rather than permit 4 of the 10 state house districts to have majority black populations, the legislature combined all 10 seats into a large, multi-member Hinds district where whites comprised 60% of the population. Needless to say, only one African-American, Robert Clark, a MFDP leader, was elected to the 174-member legislature in 1967, and he ran as an Independent. For eight years this lone African-American in the legislature served as a full-time legislator (despite a part-time salary) in the capacity of an "unofficial" governor for the state's blacks, as he helped blacks from across the state with their problems. It wasn't until 1979, after fourteen years of lawsuits filed by Mississippi African-Americans and nine trips to the Supreme Court, that the legislature under pressure enacted a single-member district plan. The number of black lawmakers dramatically increased from 4 after the 1975 elections to 17 after the 1979 elections. The lengthy litigation was a product of a three-judge federal district court in southern Mississippi unsympathetic to civil rights claims, all appointees of Kennedy and Johnson who had had to receive the approval of the Senate Judiciary Committee chaired by Mississippian James Eastland (Parker, 1990; Coleman, 1993).

That the 1960s and previous decades were periods of exclusion for the South's African-Americans is clearly reflected in the political campaigns of the era. Not only were blacks denied the opportunity to mount serious campaigns for elective offices, but white politicians made little effort to court their votes. Mississippi had a string of segregationist Democratic governors until 1971, such as Ross Barnett. The 1963 gubernatorial election symbolized the period, as Republican Rubel Phillips ran as a "staunch segregationist" who sought to outflank Democrat Paul Johnson, a fellow segregationist, on the race issue with a campaign slogan, "K.O. the Kennedys." Another illuminating election was the 1966 Senate race of chicken farmer Prentiss Walker, the first GOP Congressman since Reconstruction, who had been elected in the Goldwater year of 1964. Walker in his 1966 race unsuccessfully sought to "outsegregate" James Eastland, a truly impossible task. Running again for governor against John Bell Williams, a segregationist Congressman who had been stripped of his seniority for backing Goldwater in 1964, Rubel Phillips ran as the more moderate candidate, urging "change" so that Mississippi would cease being last in the nation in education and wealth. The Executive Committee of the MFDP endorsed Phillips over Williams, prompting Phillips to repudiate the endorsement as a "kiss of death" endorsement that would hurt him politically (Lamis, 1990).

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

The 1970s and early 1980s were characterized by growing white Mississippi acceptance of the changing state of race relations in the nation, but continued tensions within the Democratic party between the two races. The party unified itself as a truly biracial party that elected "new South" governors who appointed blacks as well as whites to government positions, and generally pursued such progressive programs as the Education Reform Act of 1982. But African-Americans, still alienated by the history of exclusion that they had experienced, sometimes backed black Independent candidates, thereby splitting the normally Democratic vote and helping to elect conservative Republicans. And many whites still refused to back black candidates, even if they had won the Democratic party nomination, thereby also contributing to GOP victories.

The 1971 gubernatorial election was important as race was not an important issue among the major candidates. The charismatic black leader Charles Evers ran as an Independent, espousing the long-neglected cause of African-Americans, and no Republican ran. Hoping to garner moderate white support, Evers had urged blacks to vote for an avowed segregationist in the first Democratic primary, and then urged a boycott in the runoff between two racial moderates, both of whom were promising to appoint blacks to state jobs. William Waller, the white who had aggressively prosecuted the accused assassin of Medgar Evers, defeated Lieutenant Governor Charles Sullivan, who was backed by Aaron Henry as a white who had "turned the corner" on race. While the 1971 race was beneficial in providing African-Americans with campaign experience, Evers' heavy television campaign stimulated white turnout as much as black turnout, and in some white precincts he garnered only 4% of the vote, leading to a 22% statewide vote (Bass and DeVries, 1977).

The 1972 re-election bid of Senator Eastland and the 1975 governor's race showed that the Republican party, unencumbered by the burder of association with the vicious segregation of the ruling party, had some hope of appealing to African-Americans. Indeed, the first black to enroll at Ole Miss, James Meredith, sought the 1972 GOP senatorial nomination, prompting GOP leaders to turn to progressive businessman Gil Carmichael. After Carmichael won the party nomination, he stunned many political observers by actually trying to win the election, and blasting Eastland as the leader of the old Democratic machine that had helped keep Mississippi on the bottom. The Nixon administration snubbed Carmichael, fearing that they would anger their southern Democratic allies, but Carmichael nevertheless won a respectable 42% of the vote. Carmichael also ran for governor in 1975 against Democrat Cliff Finch, and sought to build a broad-based biracial GOP party rather than to simply convert the Dixiecrats to the GOP as some conservative Republicans desired. Robert Clark even served on Carmichael's strategy committee, and urged black support for Carmichael as a way of destroying "Old Guard" control of the state Democratic party. In the mold of Arkansas Republican Winthrop Rockefeller, Carmichael backed such progressive measures as gun control, the ERA amendment, and openness in government (Bass and DeVries, 1977; Lamis, 1990).

Democratic gubernatorial nominee Cliff Finch was a former segregationist who had supported Ross Barnett's effort to resist integration at Ole Miss, but by 1975 he had been converted into a populist, workingman's candidate who carried a lunch pail with his name printed over it. Finch was supported by such notable African-American leaders as Aaron Henry and Charles Evers, and garnered about 80% of the black vote. In its first major test, the black-white Democratic coalition that was forming across the South held up even in the racially-conscious Magnolia state. At a time when only 6% of Mississippi voters called themselves Republicans, though, Carmichael received an impressive 45% of the vote. Governor Finch not only appointed blacks to state offices, but also performed the "minor miracle" of organizationally unifying the racially split Democrats. The Loyalists and Regulars called simultaneous precinct meetings for the selection of 1976 presidential delegates, resulting in a unified state party delegation under the leadership of Loyalist Aaron Henry and white Regular Tom Riddell. Both factions were enthusiastic in their support of centrist, fellow southerner Jimmy Carter, who narrowly carried the state. Henry and Riddell also served as co-chairs of the unified state Democratic party, and the party quickly adopted a quota system mandating an equal division of state party posts by race and gender (Bass and DeVries, 1977; Lamis, 1990; Appleton and Ward, 1996).

The 1978 Senate race illustrated how remaining black uneasiness over the historically segregated Democratic party could hurt the party's electoral chances and help elect Republicans. After suffering under the tenure of segregationist leader Senator James Eastland for 36 years, and buoyed by the civil rights movement which had culminated in a truly biracial Democratic party, some African-Americans were dismayed that the party nominated another white, Maurice Dantin, to succeed Eastland. Attempting to capitalize on his traditional Democratic party ties, Dantin ran as a "Democrat's Democrat," and both Eastland and Stennis campaigned for him. The changed nature of party politics in Mississippi had already been reflected by the theme of the 1977 Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner--How Good It Is To Dwell Together in Unity--where Senator Eastland introduced the keynote speaker, the Chairman of the National Democratic Committee. Eastland in his campaigning for Dantin stressed that "The Democratic Party is a big tent," while Stennis stressed the importance of the seniority system that had helped Mississippi's Democratic Senators. The charismatic and skillful African-American Charles Evers ran as an Independent, and despite taking conservative positions as did the two major party candidates he sought to mobilize the "left-outs" of both races--poor whites and poor blacks. Some white Democrats were angry that he had brought in "that glorified conscientious objector" Muhammad Ali to "interfere with the emotions of the black citizenry," and split the normally Democratic vote. Evers received a respectable 23% to Dantin's 32%, permitting Republican Thad Cochran with 45% to become the first Republican elected statewide since Reconstruction. Fourth district Congressman Cochran had been first elected in the Nixon landslide year of 1972, aided by another black Independent Eddie McBride, who won 8% of the vote to Cochran's 48% and conservative white Democrat Ellis Bodron's 44%. Some prominent African-American Democrats also denounced Evers' splitting of the party vote, with Aaron Henry sending letters to possible future black Independents reminding them that African-Americans in 1979 were "as much or more involved with the decision-making in this state's Democratic Party as they are in any place else in the country," and that "when you lay down with Independents, you wake up with Republicans" (Lamis, 1990; Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews, 1976, 1980).

Yet political scientists such as Frank Sorauf (1984) have long pointed out that a political party should be viewed not merely as an organization, but also as an electorate (voters who psychologically identify with that party) and as a party-in-government. The state Democratic party leadership was now equally divided by party rules between whites and blacks, and Democratic party identifiers were also very racially diverse with 42% in a 1981 poll being African-American (Shaffer, 1982). But all statewide elected Democrats and all Democratic congressmembers were white, and many African-American leaders felt that the "Loyalty given to the Democratic party by blacks had never been returned" and that white Democrats needed "to moderate their desire to dominate Mississippi politics..." (Coleman, 1993: 255). To further stir black discontent, governor William Winter, a genuine racial liberal, at the party convention in June 1980 urged abolishing the co-chairmanship of the Democratic party and instilling his white campaign supporter and former Loyalist Danny Cupit as the sole party chairman, because of his belief that white Mississippians were not yet ready to accept a black party chairman. The state Democratic executive committee backed the Democratic governor's move to shore up their party's electoral chances with white voters, and then sought to reunify the state party by enacting a party rule requiring that all standing committees' membership and chairs reflect the racial composition of the state (Appleton and Ward, 1996).

In the 4th Congressional District in 1980 where blacks made-up 45% of the district's population, African-American leader Henry Kirksey, a lead plaintiff in the state legislative redistricting lawsuit who had been elected a state senator the previous year, decided to seek the Democratic nomination to oppose Republican Congressman Jon Hinson. Kirksey led the first primary, garnering 43% of the vote to the runner up, 30-year-old white lawyer Brett Singletary's 28% in a 4-way race. Kirksey lost the runoff, unable to climb above his 43% vote total. His defeat was attributed to a divided black leadership, the lack of a district-wide organization, and inadequate media exposure. An African-American Jackson State University political scientist, Leslie McLemore, promptly entered the race as an Independent, and drew an impressive 30% vote to outpoll Democrat Singletary's 29%, permitting the scandal-torn Republican (who had been charged with attempted oral sodomy in a men's room) to squeak to re-election with 39% of the vote. Hinson, a former Cochran aide, had first been elected in 1978 with 53% of the vote when his boss was elected to the Senate. The 1978 House race had also contained a black Independent, Evan Doss, who had made history in 1972 by becoming the first black county tax assessor in Mississippi. Doss had drawn 20% in 1978, and the Democratic nominee, state legislator and son of Senator John Stennis, John Hampton Stennis, garnered 27%. By 1981 the state Democratic party was making additional moves to shore up its African-American support, as the state executive committee named African-American Ed Cole, a former Stennis and Eastland aide, as the party's Vice Chairman (Coleman, 1993; Appleton and Ward, 1996).

The 1982 2nd Congressional District race is a final case study of the transitional era of racial tensions between whites and blacks within the ruling Democratic party of Mississippi, which also illustrates disagreements among African-Americans of different philosophies. Harvard-educated moderate white Democrat David Bowen retired in 1982 after his 2nd district was redrawn to provide a black population majority. Robert Clark, a 15-year state legislative veteran and the first black legislator since Reconstruction, also became the first black Democratic congressional nominee, as he won 57% of the primary vote to defeat three whites. Clark had gradually won acceptance by the white establishment, gaining chairmanship of the House Education Committee, and he backed old guard Delta legislator Buddie Newman's election as House Speaker. Hence, some blacks saw him as too accommodating to whites, and he suffered in not being seen as a legitimate black leader by some. He also refrained from appealing to racial pride as a way of stimulating the African-American vote, given that the district had only a 51% black voting age population, and Clark needed the support of both races. His white conservative Republican opponent, a Democratic judge turned Republican, Webb Franklin, resorted to putting his opponent's pictures in fliers and newspaper supplements to point out their differences on issues. Democratic state chairman Danny Cupit blasted Franklin for trying "to inflame racial passion" with a television commercial that had Franklin standing in front of a Confederate monument and deriding "outsiders," and urging voters not to forget their "heritage that has been sacred through our generations." Democrats also blasted Franklin's initial slogan, "The One for Us," as a bid for white votes, while Republicans denounced a whispering campaign that identified Franklin's father-in-law as the lawyer who had defended Medgar Evers' accused assassin. Franklin won an extremely close 50-48% contest, and in a rematch two years later Franklin's incumbency helped him overcome a court-ordered redistricting plan in 1984 that increased the black population by 4%, as he again won a narrow 51-49% victory. A 1982 pre-election poll illustrated the racial divide, as 82% of African-Americans planned to vote for Clark, while only 37% of white Democrats backed him. Clark's support was especially low among lower socioeconomic status whites (Coleman, 1993; Lamis, 1990; Ehrenhalt, 1984; Shaffer and Feig, 1983).

While Democrats worked to unify their party racially, the overwhelmingly white Republican party sought to attract some black support. Clarke Reed had begun a decade long tenure as chairman of the state Republican Party in the 1960s, and he pragmatically fought for a more inclusive party organization. He recruited a few young black professionals, provided blacks with a fair share of federal patronage, and their voice in party affairs, which counseled moderation. But the overwhelming psychological identification of African-Americans with the more liberal party nationally--the Democrats--greatly limited the African-American presence in the GOP. A 1981 statewide poll found that less than 10% of Republican party identifiers among the adult population were African-American. As a result, all black state legislators were Democrats, as were nearly all other black officials (Bass and DeVries, 1977; Shaffer, 1982).

THE MODERN ERA OF RACIAL INCLUSION

By the mid-1980s a modern era of racial inclusion had arisen in Mississippi politics, and was especially evident in the formerly segregationist Democratic party. Pleased with having considerable influence within the Democratic party, most African-Americans provided loyal support to moderate white Democratic officeholders who appointed some blacks to public offices. African-American Democrats were elected to office in majority black areas, and even the Republican party began to offer black candidates.

One pioneer in forging a winning biracial Democratic coalition was McComb mayor Wayne Dowdy, who defeated conservative Republican Liles Williams in a special 1981 election after Hinson's resignation and then again in 1982, and was easily re-elected in subsequent years. Dowdy forged an impressive coalition of blacks, rural whites, and organized labor with his support for extending the Voting Rights Act, his populist themes, and his attacks on big business and big oil companies that had contributed to his GOP opponent. Turnout in the black community was high, and Dowdy also did well in his home base (rural areas) to gain office by less than 1,000 votes. Dowdy promptly appointed a black administrative assistant, and pursued a moderate agenda that included support for Social Security and Medicare. Though black Independent Eddie McBride also joined the race in 1982, African-American leaders rallied behind Dowdy and held McBride's support to less than 2%, as Dowdy's popular vote margin rose from 50% to 53% (Lamis, 1990; Ehrenhalt, 1984).

The biracial Democratic coalition was also victorious in the 1983 and 1987 gubernatorial races. Populist Democratic Attorney General Bill Allain won in 1983 with 55% to 39% for Delta planter, Republican Leon Bramlett. Charles Evers ran again as an Independent, asserting that the state was run by only 11% of its people, "mostly stuffy, redneck, old white men." But remembering how Evers' candidacy in 1978 had helped elect Republican Cochran, African-American leaders shunned him in 1983. David Jordan, a black politician from Greenwood, explained that he did not want a Republican to "come in the back door" and give Reagan a base in Mississippi from the governor's office. After a bizarre campaign in which the Republican's major issue was the charge that Allain was a homosexual, governor-elect Allain spoke at the state NAACP convention and thanked the delegates for helping to make the difference in his election and promised that he wouldn't forget them. Allain continued the Democratic gubernatorial practice of nominating blacks to state offices, including the first black state Supreme Court justice, Reuben Anderson, who had also been the University of Mississippi Law School's first black graduate. The preceeding Democratic governor, William Winter, had also promoted diversity in Supreme Court nominations, elevating Lenore Prather as the first woman on the court (Lamis, 1990; Wall, 1992).

Reuben Anderson's election to a full term in 1986 showed that an African-American could win election in a majority white district if his white opponent lacked credibility or was too ideologically extreme. Anderson was opposed in the Democratic primary by Richard Barrett, a white supremacist opposed by the state Bar Association and by most white businessmen who helped backroll Anderson's campaign. Anderson received over half of the white vote in his impressive 73% Democratic primary victory, and was unopposed in the general election (Coleman, 1993).

The year 1986 also saw the election of the first Mississippi African-American to the Congress since Reconstruction, Democrat Mike Espy representing the 2nd "Delta" district. Espy, a graduate of Howard Law School whose grandfather had founded the first hospital operated by and for black Mississippians, got his political start as Assistant Secretary of State and then Assistant Attorney General for white Democrat Ed Pittman. An articulate, mild-mannered, energetic, and businesslike individual, Espy gained greater support from the white Democratic establishment than had Clark, including Senator Stennis, the state party chair, two statewide elected officials, and several county sheriffs. Espy also reached out to farmers who had been hurt by that year's agricultural recession, and blasted GOP Congressman Franklin's laissez-faire policies. His excellent organization in the black community was extremely important in turning out the black vote, and Espy defeated the GOP incumbent by 52% of the vote. Yet despite biracial support among community leaders, Espy still received only about 10% of the white vote (Ehrenhalt, 1988; Coleman, 1993).

Espy's subsequent easy re-elections were a tribute to his effective constituency service work, which was applauded by people of both races. Espy in his first term aggressively promoted the district's interests, sponsoring the creation of the Lower Mississippi River Delta Development Commission to study the problems of the impoverished district, and boosting the district's catfish industry by establishing National Catfish Day and increasing the Defense Department's purchase of catfish. Early in 1988 over 30% of his campaign contributions were coming from white Delta farmers, and even Hiram Eastland, the second cousin to one-time segregationist senator James Eastland, hosted a fund-raiser for him at the Eastland plantation home. With biracial coordinators in each county, Espy found that prominent Republicans such as Senator Cochran declined to campaign with his GOP opponent. Espy won 66% of the vote, which included an estimated 40% of the white vote, defeating his conservative Republican opponent. Espy won an 84% popular vote victory in 1990, easily dispatching the poorly funded black Republican, Dorothy Benford, a disgruntled former Espy campaign worker (Shaffer, 1991b).

The 1987 gubernatorial race was a dream ticket for progressive Mississippians, as education reformer and Harvard-educated Democrat Ray Mabus faced progressive businessman and Chairman of the State Board of Education, Jack Reed, a strong proponent of a truly inclusive Republican Party. Reed's 47% showing was impressive for a Republican in a statewide race, but the unpopularity of Reagan in the black community as well as the heavily Democratic identifications of African-Americans prevented him from carrying any majority black county. As with previous Democratic governors in the modern era, Mabus aggressively appointed blacks to important state offices, including Fred Banks to the state Supreme Court to fill Anderson's vacancy. Banks, who had been second in his class at Howard Law School, had twice been unopposed for re-election to the 7th Circuit Court after his initial appointment by Governor Bill Allain. Mabus also truly diversified the vital State College Board, appointing two African-American men and one white female to his four positions on the 12-member body.

The 1980s also saw tremendous accomplishments for African-Americans within the state Democratic party as an organization. An estimated 48% of the delegates at the state Democratic party convention were African-Americans. While the state executive committee in 1984 backed Governor Allain's choice of white campaign worker Steve Patterson for the party chairmanship position instead of a former FDP leader, Patterson had successfully sought the backing of key blacks and had served as an aide to the respected Governor's Winter and Allain. More illustrative of the new state Democratic party was the elevation of the party's Vice Chair, Ed Cole, to the Chairmanship in 1987 by acclamation, making Cole the first African-American state party chairman in the nation. The state Democratic Executive Committee rebuffed Governor Mabus' 1988 effort to replace Cole with a white female campaign supporter after emotional debate that invoked the memory of Martin Luther King, and then reunified the party by installing the Mabus candidate as Vice Chair. Cole was then succeeded in 1994 by another African-American, state senator Johnnie Walls. While Republicans lacked the racial diversity of the Democrats, they did elevate two energetic and capable women to the state party chairmanship--Ebbie Spivey from 1982 to 1987, and Evelyn McPhail from 1987 to 1993 (McPhail currently serves as Co-Chairman of the Republican National Committee)(Appleton and Ward, 1996).

African-American gains in Democratic party positions below the state level, while impressive, by 1991 still did not reach the levels of black presence in the population, much less black support for the party. The 1990 census indicated that 36% of the Mississippi population was African-American, and 1990-1992 MSU polls showed that 48% of average adults psychologically identifying with the Democratic party were African-Americans. While sizable, the percentage of Democratic party county chairs who were African-American in 1991 was 26%, while the percentage of county executive committee members who were black was 34%. Given the higher socioeconomic status bias of political party activists across the nation and the generally lower socioeconomic status level of African-Americans, the smaller pool of potential activists among African-Americans compared to whites may account for part of this continuing disparity. Indeed, in none of the southern states did the percentage of African-Americans among Democratic grassroots party activists reach the black presence in the state population, though South Carolina given its long tradition of racial inclusion, came closest (with Mississippi also very close) (table 1)(Shaffer and Johnson, forthcoming; Hadley and Bowman, 1995).

Racial diversity within the Republican party organizations across the South even as late as 1991 was noticeable by its near absence. Consistently, less than 5% of Republican county executive committee members were African-Americans, and black representation among the more important GOP county chairs was even smaller, reaching zero in five states including Mississippi (table 1). As the national and many state GOP parties desperate sought to attract more black support, a likely explanation for the dearth of African-American Republicans was the conservative image of the GOP. While Democratic parties in each southern state had significant liberal, moderate, and conservative wings, thereby accommodating everyone including liberals (such as many African-Americans), the only real diversity within the southern Republican parties was over just how conservative the party should be. Typically, about 40% of southern Republican party organization members regarded themselves as "very conservative" while 40% saw themselves as only "somewhat conservative." Liberals and moderates generally comprised only one-fifth of the party membership (table 2; Hadley and Bowman, 1995).

The implications of the different levels of African-American representation within the two parties are evident in the 1991 gubernatorial contests in Mississippi. In the Democratic primary battle, African-American leaders were torn between two white allies--Wayne Dowdy who had backed black causes at the federal level, and incumbent Ray Mabus who had appointed many blacks to state boards and commissions. While backing Mabus with radio ads, Congressman Espy quickly added that his efforts were "not anti-Dowdy at all. It was pro-Mabus." The influential black Greenwood Voters' League backed Mabus in "a close call," because "Dowdy's record is almost as good." Choices within the Republican party included Goldwater-Reaganite businessman Kirk Fordice, who in a meeting with black Republicans claimed to be "the perfect color-blind person" given his focus on appointments based on qualifications rather than race, and then attacked affirmative action as reverse discrimination and admitted that, "I hear that you've got special problems. But frankly, I don't know how to deal with it." In the GOP runoff Jack Reed backed Democrat-turned-Republican and education proponent Pete Johnson, urging an "inclusive, not exclusive party," but the 10% of voters who voted in the GOP rather than Democratic primary were obviously a conservative bunch. Fordice blasted Johnson's more moderate conservative philosophy, and one of his television ads claimed that Fordice "hates job quotas so much he spent a year in Washington fighting them," while Johnson allegedly was "waffling on racial quotas in the workplace." In his general election upset of Mabus, Fordice ran one ad promoting workfare "instead of generations of welfare dependency," as the camera briefly focused on a young black mother holding her child in her arms. Fordice also opposed extending the Voting Rights Act unless it was expanded to include the entire nation. Campaigning at historically black Jackson State University, Congressman Espy blasted Fordice as another Ronald Reagan. While voter dissatisfaction with Mabus' performance, magnified by unpopular budget cuts during the recession, was the key factor in Fordice's victory, DNC chairman Ron Brown accused Fordice of "playing the race card" with his anti-welfare and anti-quotas ads and claimed that he was another David Duke, a charge vehemently denied by national Republicans (Minor and Shaffer, forthcoming; the Jackson Clarion-Ledger: July 30, 1991, B2; September 8, 1991, 1, B1; September 14, 1991, 3B; September 20, 1991, 1; October 28, 1991, 5A; November 3, 1991, 3G; November 10, 1991, 14A).

The more limited role of African-Americans in the GOP was also illustrated when examining Mississippi's two U.S. Senators. Senator Thad Cochran maintained a conservative voting record on roll call issues, but moderated his image by backing such programs as food stamps, rural housing, and aid to black colleges. Cochran also submitted the name of African-American former Assistant U.S. Attorney, Henry Wingate, as a federal district judge, who took office in 1986 as one of only four state and federal black judges in Mississippi (at that time). The more inclusive Cochran approach contrasted with an embarrassing experience that Trent Lott encountered in his successful 1988 bid to the U.S. Senate. After his opponent, Congressman Wayne Dowdy, had accused Lott of having hired only 2 blacks among the 163 people he had hired since his election to the U.S. House in 1972, Lott responded that he had hired 5 or 6 and that few African-Americans had ever come to him for a job (Coleman, 1993; Shaffer, 1991).

One belated episode of civil rights veterans helping to torpedo the election hopes of an "old guard" white Democrat was in the 1991 lieutenant governor's race, where incumbent Democrat Brad Dye had gotten his political start in the 1960s as an aide to Senator James Eastland. In his 1991 re-election bid, the three-term incumbent was blasted by black Independent Henry Kirksey as a barrier to improved race relations, as Kirksey charged that he had supported the state Sovereignty Commission which had fought against civil rights activists in the 1950s and 1960s, and that he had urged revoking the charter of historically black Tougaloo College for its civil rights work. The Lyndon Johnson-style New Dealer (who had successfully backed an ambitious highway program, a gifted school for high schoolers, and who had unsuccessfully fought for a tax increase for higher education) and wheeler-dealer Dye received only 41.5% of the general election vote to Kirksey's 9% and Republican Eddie Briggs' 49.5% (Minor and Shaffer, forthcoming; the Clarion-Ledger, October 20, 1991, 15A).

A cursory review of 1992 presidential campaign events in Mississippi illustrates the disparate importance of African-Americans to the two parties. Presidential candidate Bill Clinton visited a largely black classroom in Mississippi where he emphasized economic issues and urged racial brotherhood, while Congressman Mike Espy toured Mississippi and other states with other members of the Congressional Black Caucus backing Clinton and deriding Bush. Jesse Jackson twice visited Mississippi seeking to increase black voter registration by raising the specter of the election of more Fordices, and stressed economic issues that united the races. One of the few mentions of issues of special interest to African-Americans by Republicans was two state GOP mailouts sent out to party supporters blasting Clinton's liberalism which included alleged support for statehood for Washington D.C. (Shaffer, 1994).

While the African-American presence in the state legislature has increased substantially, this is largely because of the initiative of African-American Mississippians who have had to resort to lawsuits, rather than because of enlightened whites who have promoted racial inclusion. After the court-ordered implementation of non-discriminatory single-member districts, the number of African-American lawmakers jumped to 17 after the 1979 elections and slowly rose to 25 in 1991. Aggressive advocacy by African-American lawmakers on the legislative redistricting committee, along with support by the Republican-controlled U.S. Justice Department, resulted in enough majority black districts so that 32 black state representatives (out of 122 total members) and 10 state senators (of 52 total senators) were elected in the special election of 1992. With African-American backing of white Democrat Tim Ford's re-election as House Speaker, the membership elevated civil rights pioneer Robert Clark to the number two leadership position of Speaker Pro Tem. One disappointing statistic for party unity was that virtually all black lawmakers came from majority black districts, illustrating how many whites were still unwilling to vote for an African-American. Recent Supreme Court rulings striking down gerrymandered majority-minority districts may not have a major impact on black representation in the Mississippi legislature, since a state with a 36% black population especially concentrated in one geographic area should retain a sizable number of majority black districts even if its current lines are challenged, and to date no challenge has been filed. Furthermore, as the Espy case illustrated, effective constituency-service oriented lawmakers who happen to be African-Americans are able to attract some white support when seeking re-election, despite a liberal voting record.

The 1993 special election to replace Congressman Mike Espy saw the election of an outspoken and confrontational liberal African-American, Bennie Thompson, a civil rights veteran who in the 1960s after winning popular elections had had to file two lawsuits in order to be permitted by white election officials to take his seat. Thompson viewed the election as a "litmus test of whether the party survives... The party faithful must be willing to back African-American candidates as well as white candidates." In the redrawn 58% African-American voting age district, Thompson won 55% of the vote against conservative white Republican Hayes Dent. Thompson was unable to significantly increase his victory margin in the bad Democratic year of 1994 against black Republican lawyer and minister, Bill Jordan. Illustrating some African-American second-thoughts about the craze towards more majority-minority districts, Congressman Espy had opposed redrawing the lines of his district to further increase the proportion of blacks, and Democratic state party chairman Ed Cole expressed concern over its possible negative impact on Democratic party activities of conservative whites (Minor and Shaffer, forthcoming; Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, March 6, 1993, 536-537).

Meanwhile, the election of the first Republican governor since Reconstruction, and a very conservative one at that, clearly illustrated to white conservatives what party shared their values. While Fordice was clearly an outspoken conservative in the Rush Limbaugh-Barry Goldwater mold, he was soon attacked for being insensitive to African-Americans. When asked whether he would support raising taxes if a federal judge ordered it to desegregate the state's higher education system by better funding the traditionally black schools, Fordice used a metaphor by saying he would "call out the National Guard" rather than raise taxes. With frequent disagreements between the liberal black caucus and the conservative Fordice, on one occasion some black lawmakers walked out of the governor's state of the state address. The white electorate had been divided pretty evenly between the two parties in terms of party identification in 1990, but in 1992 shortly after Fordice's election 52% of whites now regarded themselves as Republicans, while 33% remained Democrats. By 1996 this margin had increased to a 58-31% level of white Republican support. Yet "white flight" from the Democrats occurred primarily among self-identified conservatives. In 1990 41% of white conservatives had remained Democratic while 54% were Republican. In only two years, Democratic backing by conservative whites had fallen to 20% and GOP backing had risen to 68% (and 73% in 1996) (Shaffer and Johnson, forthcoming).

One very real possibility is that the historic pattern of racial exclusion from the dominant Democratic party is gradually being replaced by exclusion by choice from the increasingly powerful southern GOP parties, given their conservative orientations. In his 1995 re-election bid, Fordice was blasted by liberals for racial insensitivity (at minimum) for refusing to apologize for the murders of the three civil rights leaders in Neshoba County thirty years earlier, as he pursued a classic "Feel Good", it's "Morning in Mississippi" re-election strategy. Fordice's efforts to replace welfare with workfare led to African-American political leaders accusing him of hurting innocent children, and of wanting to go back to the days when whites could employ a cleaning lady for a dollar a day and blacks were picking cotton. Democratic opponent Dick Molpus sought to stimulate black turnout by running a radio ad on black stations with an African-American voice claiming that Fordice wanted to "put folks like you and me" in the "back of the bus" and that after his re-election he would "write us off." Fordice responded that, "I don't do race," and blasted Molpus as a "professional politician race-baiting for votes." GOP Lieutenant Governor Eddie Briggs ran ads attacking welfare and advocating chain gangs for prisoners. Regardless of who (if anyone) was attempting to play "the race card," Fordice's re-election margin matched that predicted by a poll over one year before the election, while Briggs went down to defeat by moderate Democratic state senator and chair of the Education Committee, Ronnie Musgrove (Minor and Shaffer, forthcoming; the Clarion-Ledger: August 10, 1995, 9A; August 24, 1995, B1; September 11, 1995, 7A; November 4, 1995, 1).

The all-Democratic legislative Black Caucus has exerted an important progressive and moderating influence on Mississippi's state legislature and on public policy, an ultimate indicator of effective racial inclusiveness. In a 1992 legislative war, African-American Democrats provided both leadership for and the crucial margin of victory in overriding Fordice's veto of a sales tax increase to enhance education and prevent further recession-induced cuts. Black Democrats unanimously opposed Fordice's 1995 income tax cut, thereby providing the margin necessary to kill it. White Democrats' sensitivity to their African-American colleagues' strong opposition to "caning" quite likely was instrumental in killing the House-passed bill in a Senate committee. When Fordice vetoed a racial set-aside telecommunications conference and training center bond bill in 1995, lawmakers and the press quickly shifted the focus of the bill from its affirmative action component to its economic development goal, and over three-fourths of white Democrats joined all black lawmakers to successfully override the veto (Shaffer and Johnson, 1996).

The ability of African-American Democrats to exert a veto power over some issues of vital interest to the black community was illustrated in a racially divisive war over Fordice's College Board nominees in 1996. Lieutenant Governor Ronnie Musgrove had pursued diversity in his Senate committee chairmanship appointments, naming eight African-Americans to chair the 35 committees and continuing the practice to also name some Republicans (who controlled about one-third of each chamber). Fordice proceeded to nominate as College Board members four well qualified successful businessmen who were graduates of the state's public universities and who had been leaders of their alumni associations and financial contributors, but who also were all white male Republicans who had backed his re-election and who were graduates of only the three largest, traditionally-white schools. Senate Universities and Colleges Committee chair, Hillman Frazier, an African-American Democrat, promptly appointed a five member subcommittee to consider them, consisting of three African-American Democrats, one white Democrat, and one Republican. The subcommittee members were also very well qualified, with one of the African-Americans being a former leader of the Mississippi Association of Educators and another being an unconfirmed nominee to the College Board under a previous governor, but both were also leaders of the state Democratic party. The subcommittee by a 4-1 vote tabled all four nominations in the regular session, because of the failure to include one or two African-American or women nominees. In a special session called by Fordice, the full committee voted by a 7-6 margin to also kill the nominations.

The College Board episode illustrated as much about the role of African-Americans within each party as it did about the possibility of racism, racial insensitivity, or reverse discrimination raised by the state's liberal and conservative public officials and journalists. Given that only about 10% of Fordice's reelection support came from African-Americans, a slate of four nominees who were 100% white is not that different from the 90% white nature of his victory coalition. Also, given that 56% of Democratic party identifiers in the public in 1996 were African-American, a five-member legislative subcommittee that had three blacks was very close to the racial composition of the modern state Democratic party. Especially interesting was that the black-white Democratic coalition remained intact at the full committee level, where the vote was even more charged by ideology than by race. The most liberal members of the full committee--the five African-American Democrats--voted against all four nominees, while the most conservative committee members--the five white Republicans--voted for them. The most moderate bloc in the legislature--white Democrats--largely stayed with their party colleagues, as two of the three voted against the Fordice nominees.

Meanwhile, another racial episode was brewing, as the Democratic party state convention in 1996 ended its racial quota system that guaranteed racial equality in the awarding of state party positions, and promptly elected two African-Americans as national committee members (unseating one white). The state party executive committee subsequently re-elected Johnnie Walls as party chairman, thereby sending an all-black, three member delegation from Mississippi to the Democratic National Committee. While some whites expressed concern that they were now being "excluded" from the state party, it should be pointed out that the victors did garner some white support and that they had excellent qualifications, with two being prominent state legislators. Not mentioned much in the press sensationalizing of this episode was that all seven of the Democratic public officials elected statewide were white males, suggesting that an all-black slate of party leaders could be viewed as a means of promoting racial inclusion in the party.

While African-Americans have clearly attained not merely inclusion in the state's Democratic Party but also a real partnership with their white colleagues, the GOP faces the problem of the vast majority of blacks not wishing to be included in a party that is viewed as too conservative and too insensitive to the interests of African-Americans. The party has nominated conservative African-Americans, such as Bill Jordan as the GOP's 1994 2nd Congressional district hopeful and the 1995 state attorney general nominee, but on both occasions he lost to incumbent Democrats. In 1996 the national GOP promoted former Webb Franklin aide, Danny Covington, the GOP nominee for the 2nd district, as one of their three strongest African-American prospects for the U.S. House. Yet the nomination of such conservative African-Americans illustrates how many Mississippi Republicans approach the issue of racial inclusion--they welcome conservative blacks, but show little willingness to moderate their conservative philosophy in order to reach out to more moderate African-Americans.

A REGRESSION BACK TO EXCLUSION?

Many scholars and public officials have expressed the concern that GOP gains among white southerners may eventually lead to an all-white Republican Party and an all-black Democratic Party. Hence, African-Americans would once again be effectively excluded from real political power, as they would dominate a party that lacked political power. In its worst case scenario, the new party system could resemble the pre-1960 system with the party labels changed, as the black Democratic Party would be as powerless as the GOP had been, while the white Republican Party would dominate elective offices as did the Regular Democrats of the 1960s. In short, too much diversity could lead to state Democratic parties in states with high percentages of African-Americans that became viewed as "the black" parties.

Party image data from the April 1996 statewide MSU opinion poll permit a more in-depth examination of why most Mississippi whites today regard themselves as Republicans, and why African-Americans are overwhelmingly Democratic. A recursive path analysis is performed predicting party identification from six items asking respondents which party "does the best job" in dealing with six different subjects. One of those subjects is a general "protecting the interests of people like you," while the other five deal with reducing crime, preserving traditional values, supporting education, caring for the have-nots, and protecting the interests of African-Americans. Party identification is regressed on all of these variables, while protecting the interests of people like you is regressed on the other five subjects in order to determine why people regard a party as better for their own interests.

Clearly the most powerful single factor in shaping the partisanship of Mississippians of both races is the perception that a party is better able to protect the interests of people like themselves. This single factor is the only one exerting a direct effect on the partisanship of African-Americans, while it is the most important factor for whites, who are also directly affected by issues of crime, traditional values, and the poverty. When determining why whites believe that a party is better able to protect their interests, the most important factors are again crime and traditional values, and to an even greater extent the issue of education. Interestingly enough, the perception that Democrats best serve the interests of African-Americans exerts no statistically significant impact on whites' partisanship or on their perception of which party best serves their own interests. In other words, whites do not appear to be turning away from the Democratic party because of its being perceived as very sympathetic to the African-American cause. This confirms Jelen's (1996) examination of General Social Survey data, where he finds that "the political importance of racism may be overstated or overestimated," as individualist values appear more salient to southern whites. Among African-Americans, the perception that the Democratic party best serves the interests of blacks does directly affect one's perception of which party best serves one's own interests, but so too do the issues of education and poverty. Hence, Democratic party support for African-American causes may on balance be an electoral plus, solidifying the Democratic sympathies of blacks despite their rising incomes, while exerting no influence in either direction over the views of whites (figure 1).

African-American Mississippians have very Democratic sympathies, rating the Democratic party as preferable to the GOP in dealing with all public issues asked about, especially education, poverty, African-American interests, and one's own interests. Even on the issues of crime and traditional values, about 50% of African-Americans prefer the Democrats and less than 30% the Republicans. Whites have more divided views towards the parties, recognizing that the Democrats better protect the interests of blacks and care more about the have-nots of society, but prefering the GOP on issues of greater importance to them--crime, traditional values, and education. Yet only half of whites clearly perceive the GOP as best for protecting their own interests, while about one-fourth prefer the Democrats and the other one-fourth see no difference between the parties (table 3). Rather than a reaction against African-Americans, the flight of white conservatives to the GOP may reflect a perception that liberal political leaders are too soft on crime (while twenty thousand innocent Americans are murdered each year, less than one hundred murderers are executed), too hostile towards religion in public life (a Jackson principal is fired for permitting students to read a short non-denominational prayer over the loudspeaker, Governor Fordice is blasted by the press for calling America a "Christian nation"), and too supportive of a bloated education bureaucracy (with numerous non-teaching administrators, and public school teachers opposing any use of merit pay).

The 1994 Democratic debacle saw the GOP gain control of a majority of congressional and U.S. Senate seats in the South for the first time since Reconstruction. The GOP also made important gains in the state legislatures, gaining outright control of four of the twenty-two chambers. In every Rim South state except Arkansas, over forty percent of state legislative seats were now held by the GOP. Republicans still fared less well in the Deep South, holding less than 40% of the seats in every state except South Carolina (table 4). The subject of GOP gains in southern state legislatures has been expertly analyzed by John McGlennon (1996), with Joseph Aistrup (1996) and Terrel Rhodes (1996) also thoroughly examining Congressional seats. Perhaps the behavior of Democratic candidates and officeholders plays a contributing role in GOP gains among white southerners.

The typical white southerner has a moderate conservative ideological self-identification (Carmines and Stanley, 1990). Given this right-of-center ideological orientation and the rising strength of the GOP in the region, it is an ironic electoral strategy that state Democrats participated in maximizing the number of majority black congressional districts. While an understandable reaction to the long decades of racial exclusion, the net result of the creation of majority black districts was the election of more liberals within the Democratic party, as well as the election of more Republicans in the remaining, more heavily white districts. Indeed, all of the African-American Democratic Congressmembers from the South maintained voting records in the most liberal one-third of ideological pressure groups' rating scales. Heavily gerrymandered white majority districts often elected Republicans, nearly all of whom were in the most conservative one-third of the ideology scale (table 5). Using the CQ conservative coalition indicator, Young, Hindera, and Thielemann (1996) also confirm these ideological differences between congressional party-race factions.

Also ironic in the face of the right-of-center views of many white southerners was the extent to which white Democratic congressmembers had moved significantly to the left. For a majority party whose southern congressional delegation had averaged in the most conservative one-third only twenty-five years earlier (Ladd and Hadley, 1978: 148-9), it is instructive to point out that nearly every white Southern Democrat had by 1996 compiled either a liberal or moderate voting record. The liberalizing of white Democrats is especially evident in the Rim South, where the only conservative white Democrats remaining are in the Texas delegation. Including U.S. Senators among the white Democratic congressmembers, Arkansas has four liberals and North Carolina two liberals, Florida has five liberals and one moderate, Virginia has three liberals and three moderates, and Tennessee has one liberal and two moderates. Texas has the most diverse white Democratic delegation with six liberals, seven moderates, and three conservatives. And in the five Rim South states that elected a total of nine African-American Democrats, all of these black Democrats had liberal orientations

(table 5).

Deep South white Democrats appear to be more successful in maintaining a more moderate posture, but there were fewer of them remaining in the Democratic party. Partly due to racially-conscious redistricting the number of African-American Democrats began to approach the number of white Democrats in Congress. Indeed, in Georgia the carving out of three majority black districts produced three liberal African-American Democratic congressmembers, but the other eight majority white districts are today all represented by conservative white Republicans. After party switching, the same exists in Louisiana with two liberal African-Americans from the majority black districts, and five conservative white Republicans in the five majority white districts. Indeed, an interesting separating out of ideology by race has occurred regionwide, as all eight African-American Democrats from the Deep South had liberal voting records, while nine of the eleven white Democrats maintained moderate voting records (table 5). With a somewhat right-of-center electorate, statewide races between liberal black Democrats and conservative white Republicans promised to turn out like the Louisiana governor's race of 1995 where African-American Democrat Cleo Fields suffered a crushing defeat. Statewide races with moderate white Democrats opposing conservative Republicans offered greater promise for the Democrats, as reflected in Ronnie Musgrove's upset of GOP Lieutenant Governor Eddie Briggs the same year in Mississippi.

The existence of a more moderate orientation by white Democratic congress members in the Deep South relative to the Rim South, and the larger numbers of Democrats in the state legislatures of the Deep South relative to the Rim South suggest that there may be a causal linkage. Perhaps the Democratic state legislators in the Rim South share a more liberal orientation as their state's congressional Democrats do, while Democratic legislators in the Deep South maintain the same type of moderate orientations as the white Democratic congress members do. Only two states fail to conform to the pattern of greater Democratic state legislative strength in the Deep South, and a closer examination of South Carolina helps to account for this deviant case. Despite its being a Deep South state, the GOP held over 40% of the state legislative seats, but this deviancy may be explained by its congressional delegation being the only one in the Deep South to have a liberal white Democrat. Additional evidence that the state Democrats may have become too liberal is that South Carolina Democrats are the only Deep South Democratic grassroots party activists where the percentage of liberals is as high as 40%. The only other deviant case is Arkansas, which has a heavily Democratic state legislature in the face of an all-liberal Democratic congressional delegation (see Blair, 1988 for a thorough examination of Arkansas politics). Yet Arkansas' state Democratic party organization members retain a less liberal orientation, with equal numbers being liberal, moderate, and conservative, much like the Deep South Democratic parties of Alabama and Mississippi. Perhaps Democratic state legislators mirror their party organization's views rather than their congressional delegation's, or perhaps the people of Arkansas are less conservative than in other southern states (tables 2, 4, 5).

CONCLUSIONS

For well over one hundred years African-Americans in the South were excluded from effective political power. During and immediately after the Civil Rights movement, blacks finally gained acceptance in the southern states' parties, were appointed to public offices by governors, and were eventually nominated for congressional and statewide races by both parties. African-Americans had gained full partnership in some southern parties, such as in the Mississippi Democratic case. Yet white flight to the southern GOP has raised concerns that an emerging era of exclusion may soon effectively exist in some nearly all-white Republican parties.

Our study suggests that the issue of ideology may be a greater motivating force to many white southerners than the issue of race. African-Americans find it difficult to gain election in majority white electoral districts because so often their liberal views may be too liberal for most whites. Indeed, Douglas Wilder "cleverly shaved the liberal edges off of his public record, instead focusing on his legislative achievements, his Korean War valor, and the patriotic virtues and moderate-conservative Virginia values he claimed to possess" to become the first post-Reconstruction black to win a statewide non-judicial office in the South (Lamis, 1990, 289). Another strategy that African-Americans may employ is to focus on non-ideological issues such as constituency service and effective performance generally, as Congressman Mike Espy from Mississippi did to gain easy re-election victories.

Yet another strategy might be for liberal African-Americans to focus on gaining prominent positions within the state Democratic parties, which are less conservative than are the southern state electorates as a whole. Indeed, in the Mississippi case Democrats won seven of the eight statewide elected positions in 1995, with all seven victors being white males. All three state Democratic party leadership positions went to African-Americans, which could be viewed as a kind of counterbalance. With all seven white Democrats having philosophies that ranged from progressive (for Motor Voter, anti-tobacco firms, pro-education, pro-diversity, pro-bond bills, pro-prevention and rehabilitation in crime) to moderate conservative (anti-fraud and waste, anti-abortion, pro family values, for fiscal responsibility), it is understandable why a more liberal African-American political leader might be willing to voluntarily forego backing a liberal African-American candidate in a majority white constituency in order to prevent the election of a conservative Republican. The rise to power of conservatives such as Ronald Reagan, Kirk Fordice, and Newt Gingrich serves as a powerful reminder of how disillusionment with Democrats who "aren't liberal enough" can lead to the election of people who for many African-Americans are viewed as being by far "the worst of two evils."

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ABSTRACT

The transformation of southern party systems from an era of the exclusion of African-Americans to the modern era of inclusion is examined with a special focus on the historically race-conscious Deep South state of Mississippi. African-Americans have achieved notable influence in southern Democratic parties, including a genuine racial partnership in modern Mississippi. Significant African-American influence in southern GOP parties is lacking, presumably because of the parties' near uniform conservative nature. Concerns that the growing African-American presence in state Democratic parties is precipitating white flight that may result in all-black Democratic parties in some southern states appear unwarranted. Whites in Mississippi have moved more towards the GOP largely because of their conservative values on issues such as crime and morality, rather than because of racial resentments. The behavior of some Democratic party activists and public officials throughout the region (as well as national party figures) may encourage white conservative flight to the GOP, as Democratic public officials especially in Rim South states appear to be pursuing more liberal public policies than party officials in previous generations, thereby growing out-of-touch with many white southerners.