The Effects of Religiosity, Ideology, and Sex on People’s
Opinion of Equality for Women
By:
Megan L. McKeown
Dr. Shaffer
Political Analysis
Spring Semester 2012
INTRODUCTION
Over the years, the South has continued to uphold traditional, conservative
values for families and social norms. Although nationally women have made
progress breaking out of the private sphere to join men in the public sphere,
there still appears to be a social stigma against many women in the
workplace—especially when women hold executive positions. In the Southern
region, the idea that women belong in the home is still very much alive and
this attitude may be stronger in Southern states than in other areas of the
country.
This traditional view towards a woman’s role in Mississippi can be at
least partially attributed to the geographic location of the state in the Bible
Belt. People in the Southern region of the country tend to be more religious.
Because churches preach conservatism and minimal social changes, a large part of
the Southern population still believes that a wife should cook, clean, and care
for the children, while the husband should serve as the breadwinner. Even
though the rest of the nation tends to hold more progressive ideas, states such
as Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, and Tennessee continue to promote old
values (Shaffer, 1992). This subject is important to study, because these types
of beliefs can also be connected to the negative views on abortion in Southern
states. Many people believe the recent failure in November 2011 of Amendment 26
—the Personhood Amendment—showed that perhaps Mississippi has overcome the old
way of thinking. However, the wording of the amendment may have been too vague
even for Mississippians, which could also be the reason Personhood did not
pass. Although, just because Amendment 26 did not pass does not mean that
efforts to make abortion illegal is over just yet in the state of Mississippi.
In order to study this subject further, I am going to look at what I
believe is the root causes of traditional values in Mississippi. I have
proposed five hypotheses, and based on my prior knowledge and my own
observations of Southern cultural trends, I expect that men will be more likely
than women to believe that a woman’s place is in the home. I also predict that
those who attend church regularly—or are very religious—will also tend to
believe that a woman’s place is in the home. I expect to find that men are more
likely to have a conservative ideology than women, those who attend church regularly
are more likely to be conservative, and finally, conservatives are more likely
than liberals to believe that a woman’s place is in the home.
MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
Assume
that people who attend church regularly and sex are the earliest/outside independent
variables. Ideological
self-identification is the intervening variable. Attitude towards the idea that
a woman’s place is in the home is the dependent variable.
Religious/Church Regulars
Ideology (cons) Woman’s Place
is in Home (Yes)
Gender
(men)
The
Hypotheses are:
H1:
Men are more likely than women to believe that a woman’s place should be in the
home.
H2:
Those who attend church regularly are more likely to believe a woman’s place
should be in the home, compared to those rarely attending church.
H3:
Men are more likely to be conservative self-identifiers than women.
H4:
Those who attend church regularly are more likely to be conservative
self-identifiers, compared to those rarely attending church.
H5:
Conservative self-identifiers are more likely than liberals to believe that a
woman’s place should be in the home.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Men are more likely than women to believe
that a woman’s place is in the home.
According
to the article “Gender Role Attitudes in the Southern United States,” in a
study of Southern states between 1972 and 1982, Hurlburt came to three key
conclusions from her research. She found that Southerners are more likely to
believe women should take care of the home and leave running politics up to
men, Southerners are less likely to find women emotionally stable enough for
politics, and finally, Southerners are less likely to say they would vote for a
woman for president (Rice and Coates, 1995: 745). Rice and Coates took her
research further and collected data from 1,500 interviews through the National
Opinion Research Center in each year from 1972 to 1995 and found that
Southerners tend to hold somewhat more conservative views toward the
desirability of women working outside the home (754); however, the researchers
suggest traditional attitudes towards women’s roles have receded since
Hurlburt’s study several decades ago—even in the South. In their study, they
found that Southern men hold more traditional views than Southern women except
on whether or not they would vote for a woman for president. On this question,
there was no noticeable difference between men and women, but men were more
conservative on the other seven questions (752). The researchers concluded that
white men hold the most conservative views about employed mothers (748), which
supports my hypothesis that men are more likely than women to believe that a
woman’s place is in the home.
In the article
“Race and sex differences in
sex role attitudes of Southern college students,” Lyson explores the
differences between black men and women and white men and women on views
towards sex roles. His study took place in the spring of 1977 from students
attending 17 predominantly white and 14 predominantly black colleges and
universities in 14 southern states (Lyson, 1986: 422). He found that women of
both races were more feminist in their views towards women’s role than men of
both races (426). Sex rather than race was found to be the primary determinant
of sex role attitudes among the students. He also concluded that black women
were more submissive and more likely to cater to the role of a wife and mother
than white women (422).
In another
article, “Husbands’ attitudes and wives’ commitment to employment,” the
researcher finds evidence that may disprove my hypothesis. The study was conducted
through a mail-in questionnaire that was sent to various women’s clubs in
Southern California where both women and their husbands attend (Arnott, 1972:
677). Arnott found that women choose to work in the home or in the public
sphere based on their husbands’ views on how women can contribute to the
relationship or marriage. Women seek to parallel their views on their role with
the views of their husbands (673). Surprisingly, Arnott found men were often
more interested in getting their wives involved in a career than the women
actually were (683). Furthermore, women with liberal ideologies were more
likely to expect their husband to change to accept their job or role, while
conservative women were more likely to adapt themselves rather than expect the husband
to accept their role. Her findings suggest that perhaps men are not necessarily
more likely to believe a woman’s place is in the home; however, if they do
believe women belong in the home, women simply change their own less
traditional views to match their husbands.
Those who attend church
regularly are more likely to believe a woman’s place is in the home, compared
to those rarely attending church.
In
the article, “Religion and Sexism: The Moderating Role of
Participant Gender,” ambivalent sexism was measured on a scale
from 0 to 6. The study surveyed 337 evangelical undergraduate Christians at a
private, liberal arts university in southwestern United States. The researchers
found that as men’s sexist views increased, their agreement with main Christian
tenets also increased. For women, however, there was no noticeable relationship
between religious orientation and sexism for women (Maltby and Anderson, 2010:
620). The writers note that one cannot conclude from their study that Christian
orthodoxy causes sexism in religious people; however, one can conclude that the
religious views work together with gender with regards to protective
paternalism (621). Though it is unlikely for a person to attend the same church
regularly and disagree totally with particular gender values and social norms,
the possibility cannot be thrown out. Therefore, men and women may be members
of a particular church that they attend regularly but still disagree with the
view that a woman’s place is in the home. In general, however, the findings of
this study should support my hypothesis that those who are regular church
frequenters would also be more likely to believe that a woman’s place is in the
home.
In
the article “The Impact of Religion on Gender Role Attitudes,” Morgan finds
religious devoutness to be the most pervasive influence on family-type values
(Morgan, 1987: 307). Data was collected through a mail-in questionnaire to
senior women students from two eastern land-grant universities (304). The Sex
Role Attitude Scale was used to measure sex role attitudes. In the study, the
researcher examined familial roles (roles of the men and women in the family),
extrafamilial roles (roles of men and women regarding career commitment), and
male and female stereotypes (302). The study found that as religious devoutness
increases, gender role attitudes become more traditional (305). After religious
devoutness, self-esteem was determined to be the next most important factor in
influencing gendered views. The study found that as the mother’s self-esteem
and likelihood of working outside of the home increased, attitudes toward
gender roles became more nontraditional within the family. However, this study does not address whether
a woman who is religiously devout can also have a high self-esteem and work
outside of the home.
To
offer extra support, I found an
excerpt from the book Thinking About Women: Sociological Perspectives
on Sex and Gender that was published online by the University of Alabama
Huntsville. In it, Andersen (2008)
asserts that women express higher levels of religiosity than men and are more
likely to attend church on a regular basis than men. However, men continue to
dominate positions of religious authority. Certain denominations, like Roman
Catholicism, prohibit women from ordination. Andersen claims religion is one of
the main forces in American culture that preserves tradition, maintains
established social order, stabilizes worldviews, and passes down values over
generations. The writer says that religion is as much of a source of social
control as it is of collective identity. Also, religious groups disapprove of
those who violate the social norm. Andersen concludes
that religious
conservatives have become very politically active on antifeminist issues.
Therefore, since religion continues to promote traditional values of
patriarchy, one would infer that those who are regularly exposed to these views
would generally not support increasing women’s role outside of the home.
Men are more likely to be
conservative self-identifiers than women.
According to the article, “Financial Conditions, Gender, and Voting in American
National
Elections,” Welch and Hibbing claim that women tend to be less favorable of
government spending on the military and the use of violence, more favorable of
funding for the elderly, the sick and the poor, and more likely to identify
with the Democratic Party and ultimately vote more Democratic than men. (Welch
and Hibbing, 1992: 201). The data for this study was taken from voting in the
presidential and House elections of 1980 and 1984 and drawn from the National
Election Studies. Party identification
was measured on a 7-point scale with 0 representing a strong Democrat and 6
representing a strong Republican. The writers suggest that perhaps the source
of the differences between men and women’s voting behavior may come from the
possession of differing values. Women are socialized to value nurturing,
harmony, and morals. Men, on the other hand, are socialized to be rational,
competitive, and objective (202). Since women are not as concerned with
economics as men are, Welch and Hibbing hypothesized that women will usually
not be pocketbook voters when choosing a political candidate. The findings
showed that for men, personal financial health in the year leading up to the
election affected their voting behavior in 1980. Men who were not satisfied
with their finances mostly voted Republican in 1980, and if they were still
dissatisfied by 1984, then they voted Democratic. The same trend was not found
for women. Financial concerns were
found to be far less likely to affect how women voted. Men were determined to
be egocentrically driven, while women were found to be slightly more
sociotropically driven voters (206). Therefore, since men are more concerned with
personal finances than women, one would expect men to better identify with
conservative ideology than women. Therefore, the results of this study strongly
support my hypothesis.
According to the article, “The Gender
Gap in Ideology,” Norrander and Wilcox say that the gender gap in presidential
voting first appeared in 1972 and has changed in the decades since then. The
gap highlights women as more likely to support the Democratic candidate and men
more likely to support the Republican candidate (Norrander and Wilcox, 2008:
503). The data used for this study was taken from the National Election Studies
Survey to examine changes in ideological ID for men and women, as well as the
sources of the gender gap in ideology (507). An ideological
identification question was asked starting in
1972, with responses ranging from 1 (extremely liberal) to 7 (extremely conservative). Respondents were asked, ‘‘Do you usually think of yourself as extremely liberal, liberal, slightly
liberal, moderate or middle of the road,
slightly conservative, extremely conservative, or have you not thought much about this?” The gender gap was measured by subtracting women’s average ideology score from the men’s
average. A positive gap number signified that
women were more liberal than men. In the years after
1972, the gender gap was positive, indicating
women are somewhat less conservative than men. However, in the years between 1972 and 1980, the gender gap mean was 0.04, which was determined not
significant. Between 1982 and 1990, it averaged
0.13, and was significant in 1982 and 1984. Between 1992 and 2004, the gender gap averaged 0.24 and was significant in five
of the seven surveys. As the writers note, women did not become
more liberal. Instead, the men became more conservative (509). Men were found
to become consistently more Republican and more conservative over time, while
women did not change in general. This lack of change for women was due to the
fact that one segment of women became more conservative, and the other segment
became more liberal, which balanced the average out. Therefore, Norrander and
Wilcox say men are becoming increasingly more conservative only, while women
are becoming increasingly more conservative and increasingly more liberal at
the same time. The researchers concluded that the diversity of women’s
ideological placement could be attributed to a larger culture war; highly
educated and employed women are becoming more liberal, while the religious
stay-at-home wives are becoming more conservative (511). The findings of this
study further validate my own research hypothesis that men are more likely to
be conservative self-identifiers than women.
However, I found
evidence that shows male conservatives might actually be becoming less
traditional on gender roles and attitudes on women in the workforce. According
to the article, “Changes in Men’s Conservative Gender Ideologies: Cohort and Period
Influences,” men have become substantially less conservative about women’s
roles since the 1970s (Ciabattari, 2001: 582). Data for this study was taken
from the 1974 to 1998 General Social Surveys, which are conducted by the
National Opinion Research Center. Only 18 years or older, English-speakers
living in the United States were surveyed (577). Ciabattari found that in the
‘70s, 46 percent of pre-baby boom men agreed that men were better suited for
politics, but by the 1990s, this number dropped to 26 percent. This pattern
held true for every cohort—meaning men have become substantially less
conservative from the 1970s to the 1990s. For another question, 70 percent of
pre-baby boom men in the 1970s agreed that “It’s better for everyone if the man
works and the woman cares for the home and family,” while only 53 percent of
pre-baby boom men agreed to the statement in the 1990s (583). It was also
determined that the largest change in men’s attitudes happened between the
1970s and the 1980s with only small changes between the ‘80s and the ‘90s. For
example, the number of men in the pre-baby boom cohort who agreed it was better
for men to work and women to tend to the home dropped 12 percent between the
1970s and 1980s, but the number dropped only 3 percent between the 1980s and
1990s (583). The researcher suggests that the decline in male conservatism
happened for two reasons: first, the expansion of educated women entering the
labor force and the feminist movement in the 1970s changed the public mindset, and
second, cohort replacement can be attributed to these changes, because the size
and influence of pre-baby boom men has declined (587). However, the writer also
notes that men across cohorts with unemployed wives are typically the most
conservative and most religious. Ciabattari says that the largest predictor of
men’s attitude depends on family context. Men whose wives work full time jobs
have the least conservative beliefs, but men in all other categories were found
to have more traditional attitudes toward working moms and separate spheres
(584).
Those who attend church
regularly are more likely to be conservative self-identifiers, compared to
those rarely attending church.
In the article “Holy Roll Calls:
Religious Tradition and Voting Behavior in the U.S. House,” the researchers
claim that religion impacts voting behavior of the House on controversial
issues such as abortion. The study examined roll call voting of every U.S.
House of Representatives member between 1959 and 1994 (Fastnow, Grant, and Rudolph,
1999: 694). Members of both the black Protestant and Jewish traditions were
consistently more liberal, especially in the 70s. Evangelical Protestants were
consistently on the conservative right over the years. In the 1960s, Catholics
were largely liberal, but this started changing in the 1970s. Now, or at least
up until 1994, Catholics and Protestants did not differ in voting habits in
general (696). By the 1980s, Mormons were significantly more conservative than
any religious tradition in Congress. Prior to this, Mormons did not have a
substantial effect on ideological voting, except on the abortion issue.
Fastnow, Grant, and Rudolph conclude that religion plays a role in voting
behavior; they note that as the religious make up of Congress changes, the
voting behavior of its members will also change (698). The problem in this study is that the
researchers are assuming that the House members were all deeply religious. Many
of the members may have identified as a Protestant, Catholic, Jew, etc. but do
not regularly attend church or consider themselves to be deeply religious. For
this reason, I cannot say for sure whether this study proves or disproves my
hypothesis. The findings here show that perhaps certain denominations can
determine ideology and voting behavior rather than just church attendance.
Since Catholics, Mormons, and Evangelical Protestants are adamantly pro-life,
one would expect people who attend these churches regularly to vote more
conservatively.
In
the article, “Exploring the Relationship Between Religiosity and Political
Ideology Among Social Workers,” the researchers found that social workers with
stronger religious and spiritual affiliations were more conservative in
ideology, showed less support for gay rights legislation, and favored the death
penalty (Smith-Osborne and Rosenwald, 2009: 393). The data for this study was
collected through a mail survey of a random sample of 294 social workers in
2003 in a “mid-Atlantic blue state” (395); that is, a state that voted
Democratic in the 2000 election and therefore determined a blue state by the
New York Times electoral map. Political ideology was measured on the
Professional Opinion Scale and all analysis was collected using SPSS 14.0
(396). The average strength of religious
affiliation level was found to be ‘‘fairly strongly religious or spiritual.” The most frequent religious affiliation in the
sample was Other Christian (36.1%), Catholic (21.4%), and Jewish
(16.3%). The percentage of respondents who said they had no
religious association was 12.6%, while 9.2% associated
themselves with other religions (397). Fifty-five percent of social workers reported a liberal to radical left political ideology, while 45%
endorsed a moderate to very conservative political ideology.
Denomination and strength of affiliation were determined to be highly related
to
political ideology in the analysis. Sixty-eight
percent of social workers who reported their religious affiliation as ‘‘other’’ identified themselves as liberals, along with 64.6 % of Jewish respondents and 52.4% of Catholic respondents. A majority of Protestant, or “Other Christian,” respondents (54.5%) were conservative
identifiers (398). The researchers note that this mainly Democratic sample of
social workers surveyed in 2003 expressed fairly
strong religiosity, along with 72% of Democrats nationally in 2003. However, this study found that strength of religious commitment was not significantly related to beliefs about
liberal requirements for the social work profession or with
overall political ideology. The findings of this study work against
my hypothesis; however, since the sample done was of social workers (a largely
liberal profession in the first place) in a Democratic state, the results may
not be applicable for generalization to church frequenters in the rest of the
country—especially not states in the Bible Belt or Mississippi specifically.
Conservative
self-identifiers are more likely than liberals to believe that a woman’s place
is in the home.
In
the article, “Sex-Role Attitudes, Identities, and Political Ideology,” the
researchers surveyed two random samples of students at Indiana University in
1974 and 1975 and used the Bem Sex Role Inventory to measure respondents’ sex
role identities (Hershey and Sullivan, 1977: 37). The first study conducted
interviews, while the second study was done in the form of a questionnaire that
the students completed (41). The study found a correlation between sex role
beliefs and political ideology. Those who scored more liberal on sex role
attitudes were also determined to be more likely to hold a liberal political
ideology. The respondents were measured on a scale to see how sex-typed they
were, depending on how they answered certain questions. The more sex-typed a
person is, the more they supported the adherence of traditional norms and gender
roles. The more androgynous a person was, the more flexible the person was in
sex role attitudes (50). Both surveys revealed that political conservatives on an assortment of subjects supported traditional sex
roles to a greater extent than liberals. Among men, a more
flexible, or androgynous, sex-role identity was found to be associated with more liberal political attitudes, although the correlations were determined
not to be very strong. However, among women, those with a flexible
identity were not necessarily more liberal in
politics than sex-typed women were. Instead, the degree to which a woman identifies with generally masculine characteristics was a found to
be a better predictor of her level of
political liberalism. Women who were determined to be more masculine were sometimes
more conservative on issues related to war, but more
liberal on other questions than were either the
androgynous or more feminine women. While the findings of this study do support
my hypothesis, it is important to note that this study was done three and a
half decades ago. Since much time has passed, the results may be too outdated
to be applicable.
In
the article, “The Effects of Gender, Race, Religion, and Political Orientation on the
Sex Role Attitudes of College Freshmen,” 556 freshmen at an Ivy League
university in the United States were studied through a questionnaire
administered during the first week of class (Lottes and Kuriloff, 1992). The
study examined the effects of gender, race, religion and political orientation
on views about “traditional attitudes toward female sexuality, justification of
male dominance, negative attitudes toward homosexuality, and attitudes toward
feminism” (1992). The researchers claim that even though each of the four
independent variables had a major effect on at least one of the ideologies,
religion and political orientation (liberal or conservative) were found to
produce the most profound differences on all four measures. Liberal students
were less supportive of traditional attitudes toward female sexuality and the
justification of male dominance. Surprisingly, the researchers found there was
no significant difference on feminist attitudes for liberal women and
conservative women. The largest difference on feminist attitudes was found
between liberal and conservative men, with liberal men reporting more feminist
attitudes than the conservative men (Lottes and Kuriloff, 1992). From this
research, I can conclude that at least male conservative-identifiers will tend
to believe that a woman’s place is in the home as compared to liberal men.
However, since the researchers found no substantial difference between liberal
and conservative women’s feminist attitudes, the same cannot be concluded for
women.
METHODS
To test my
model, I use data taken from The Mississippi Poll project, which has been
carried out over the years through a series of statewide public opinion polls
conducted by the Survey Research Unit of the Social Science Research Center
(SSRC) at Mississippi State University and led by political science professor
Stephen D. Shaffer. I combined or pooled telephone surveys conducted in three
years—2006, 2008, and 2010 to maximize my sample size and minimize my sample
error. The 2006 Mississippi Poll surveyed 574 adult Mississippi residents from
April 3 to April 23, 2006 and had a response rate of 50%. The 2008 Mississippi
Poll surveyed 528 adult Mississippi residents from April 2 to April 22, 2008
for a response rate of 40%. The 2010 Mississippi Poll surveyed 604 residents
from April 5 to April 25, 2010 with a response rate of 42%. The three years
combined contained 1,706 respondents. With 1,706 respondents interviewed, the
sample error is 2.4%, which means that if every adult Mississippian had been
interviewed, the results could differ from those reported here by as much as
2.4%. The pooled sample was adjusted or weighted by
demographic characteristics to ensure that social groups less likely to answer
the surveys or to own telephones were also represented in the sample in rough
proportion to their presence in the state population. In all three years, a
random sampling technique was used to select the households and each individual
within the household to be interviewed, and no substitutions were permitted.
The SSRC's Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing System (CATI) was used to
collect the data.
I relied on
four variables included in the three years of the Mississippi Poll. Sex was a straightforward
question, since respondents only had two options—male or female. The question
of views towards women’s equality was measured by asking whether the interviewee
agreed or disagreed with the following statement: “Women should take care of
running their homes, and leave running the country up to men.” Ideology was a
self-identification question, asking respondents the following question:
"What about your political beliefs? Do you consider yourself very liberal,
somewhat liberal, moderate or middle of the road, somewhat conservative, or
very conservative?" Finally, church attendance and religiosity was
measured by asking the question, “About how often do you attend
church: every week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a
year, or never?”
In order to have enough people to analyze using multivariate tables, I
recoded or combined categories of two of the variables. Five church attendance
groups were combined into three groups: those who claimed to attend church
every week were separated as the first group, near weekly and once or twice a
month were combined into the second group, and a few times a year or
never/seldom were combined into the last group. Five ideological
self-identification categories were combined into three groups: liberals
included those considering themselves as "very" or "somewhat"
liberal, conservatives were those identifying themselves as
"somewhat" or "very" conservative, and the middle category
of "moderate/middle of the road" constituted an intermediate
"moderate" grouping. Sex only had two options, so it did not have to
be recoded. Gender equality only had two choices: for equal rights or against
equal rights, so it did not have to be recoded either.
FINDINGS-BIVARIATE
Table 1
Sex and women’s role
|
Women should take care of homes |
SEX: Male |
Female |
|
Agree |
31% |
27.5% |
|
Disagree |
69% |
72.5% |
|
(N Size) |
(732) |
(873) |
Gamma=
.082
Chi-Square Significance > .05
Note: Percentages total 100% down each column
Source: 2006, 2008, and 2010 Mississippi Polls, conducted by Mississippi State
University
Hypothesis 1 of
my model states that men are more likely than women to believe that a woman’s
place should be in the home. In the 2006, 2008, and 2010 Mississippi
Poll, 31% of men agreed that women should take care of the home, compared to
almost 28% for women. The magnitude of this relationship is only 3.5%,
which is the percentage difference between the males and females who agreed
that women should take care of the home. The magnitude reflected by the
gamma value of this relationship is a mere .082. Furthermore, the
chi-square statistic is not significant at the .05 level. This indicates that the minute relationship
found between sex and women’s role in the 2006, 2008, and 2010 statewide polls could
not be generalized to the entire population. Thus, my hypothesis that men
are more likely than women to believe that a woman’s place should be in the
home is rejected.
Table 2
Religiosity and
women’s role
|
Women should take
care of homes |
High |
Religiosity: Medium |
Low |
|
Agree |
40% |
19.5% |
23% |
|
Disagree |
60% |
80.5% |
77% |
|
(N Size) |
(685) |
(519) |
(391) |
Gamma= .316
Chi-Square Significance <.001
Note: Percentages total 100% down each column
Source: 2006, 2008, and 2010 Mississippi Polls, conducted by
Mississippi State University
Hypothesis 2 of
my model claims that those who attend church regularly are more likely to
believe a woman’s place should be in the home, compared to those rarely
attending church. In the 2006, 2008, and 2010 Mississippi Poll, 60% of
those who have a high church attendance or religiosity disagreed that women
should take care of the home, while 77% of those who expressed low religiosity
disagreed that women should take care of the homes. The magnitude of this
relationship is 17%, which came from the percentage difference in attitudes
between those who are highly religious and those who are least religious.
The gamma value reflecting the magnitude of the relationship is .316. The
chi-squared statistic is significant at the .001 level, indicating that the
relationship found between religiosity and women’s role in the 2006, 2008, and
2010 statewide polls can be generalized to the entire population. My
hypothesis that those who express high religiosity are more likely to believe
women should work in the home compared to the least religious is accepted.
Table 3
Sex and ideology
|
Ideology |
Sex: Male |
Female |
|
Liberal |
14% |
19% |
|
Moderate |
31% |
32% |
|
Conservative |
55% |
49% |
|
(N Size) |
(759) |
(843) |
Gamma= -.130
Chi-Square Significance <.005
Note: Percentages total 100% down each column
Source: 2006, 2008, and 2010 Mississippi Polls, conducted by
Mississippi State University
Hypothesis 3 of
my model states that men are more likely than women to be conservative
self-identifiers. Among male respondents, 55% identified themselves as
holding a conservative ideology, and 49% of females self-identified themselves
as conservatives. The magnitude of this relationship is 6%, which is the
percentage difference between men and women who identified themselves as conservatives.
The gamma value reflecting this relationship between sex and ideology is -.130.
Additionally, the chi-squared statistic is significant at the .005 level,
meaning that the relationship between sex and ideology found in the 2006, 2008,
and 2010 statewide polls can be generalized to the entire population. My
hypothesis that men are more likely to identify themselves as conservative
compared to women is accepted.
Table 4
Religiosity and
ideology
|
Ideology |
High |
Religiosity: Medium |
Low |
|
Liberal |
11% |
20% |
23% |
|
Moderate |
23% |
38% |
39% |
|
Conservative |
66% |
42% |
38% |
|
(N Size) |
696 |
519 |
381 |
Gamma= -.334
Chi-Square Significance <.001
Note: Percentages total 100% down each column
Source: 2006, 2008, and 2010
Mississippi Polls, conducted by Mississippi State University
Hypothesis 4 of
my model says that those who attend church regularly are more likely to be
conservative self-identifiers, compared to those rarely attending church.
In the 2006, 2008, and 2010 Mississippi Poll, 66% of those who expressed high
religiosity were conservative self-identifiers, compared to 38% of those who
expressed low religiosity. The magnitude of the relationship is 28%,
which is the percentage difference between the highly religious and the least
religious who identify as conservatives. The gamma value that reflects
the magnitude of this relationship is -.334. The chi-squared statistic is
significant at the .001 level, meaning that the relationship found between religiosity
and ideology in the 2006, 2008, and 2010 statewide polls can be generalized to
the entire population. Thus, my hypothesis that the highly religious are
more likely to identify as conservative self-identifiers than the least
religious is accepted.
Table 5
Ideology and women’s role
|
Women should take
care of homes |
Liberal |
Ideology: Moderate |
Conservative |
|
Agree |
26% |
20% |
34.5% |
|
Disagree |
74% |
80% |
65.5% |
|
(N Size) |
(261) |
(478) |
(776) |
Gamma= -.222
Chi-Square Significance <.001
Note: Percentages total 100% down each column
Source: 2006, 2008, and 2010
Mississippi Polls, conducted by Mississippi State University
Hypothesis 5 of
my model states that conservative self-identifiers are more likely than
liberals to believe that a woman’s place should be in the home. In the 2006,
2008, and 2010 Mississippi Poll, 34.5% of conservatives agreed that a woman’s
place should be in the home, compared to 26% of liberals. The magnitude
of this relationship is 8.5%, which is the percentage difference between conservatives
and liberals who agreed that women should take care of the home. The
gamma value reflecting this relationship is -.222. The chi-squared
statistic is significant at the .001 level, meaning that the relationship found
between ideology and women’s role can be generalized to the entire
population. Thus, my hypothesis that those who identify conservatively
are more likely to believe that women belong in the home as compared to those
who identify liberally is also accepted.
FINDING-MULTIVARIATE
Table 6
Religiosity and women’s role as impacted by
ideology
(Liberals only)
|
Women should take
care of homes |
High |
Religiosity: Medium |
Low |
|
Agree |
37% |
26% |
18% |
|
Disagree |
63% |
74% |
82% |
|
(N Size) |
(76) |
(101) |
(84) |
Gamma= .306
Chi-Square Significance <.05
Note: Percentages total 100% down each column
Source: 2006, 2008, and 2010 Mississippi Polls, conducted by
Mississippi State University
Table 7
Religiosity and women’s role as impacted by
ideology
(Moderates Only)
|
Women should take
care of homes |
High |
Religiosity: Medium |
Low |
|
Agree |
35% |
13% |
14% |
|
Disagree |
65% |
87% |
86% |
|
(N Size) |
(144) |
(190) |
(144) |
Gamma= .409
Chi-Square Significance <.001
Note: Percentages total 100% down each column
Source: 2006, 2008, and 2010 Mississippi Polls, conducted by
Mississippi State University
Table 8
Religiosity and women’s role as impacted by
ideology
(Conservatives Only)
|
Women should take
care of homes |
High |
Religiosity: Medium |
Low |
|
Agree |
40% |
22% |
33% |
|
Disagree |
60% |
78% |
67% |
|
(N Size) |
(430) |
(201) |
(138) |
Gamma= .212
Chi-Square Significance <.001
Note: Percentages total 100% down each column
Source: 2006, 2008, and 2010 Mississippi Polls, conducted by
Mississippi State University
Tables 6-8 are multivariate tables that
control for the intervening variable of ideology. The findings show that among
the individuals who were liberal, moderate, and conservative, religiosity is an
important factor in determining what individuals will believe about the role of
women. Religiosity impacted liberals’ and moderates’ beliefs towards women’s
role the most, but for conservatives, religiosity was less of a determining
factor. Among self-identified liberals, 37% of the highly religious agreed that
women should take care of the home, compared to 18% of the least religious
liberals (Table 6). The magnitude of the relationship between religiosity and attitudes
about the role of women among self-identified liberals is 19%. The gamma value
reflecting the relationship between religiosity and attitudes about women’s
role among liberals is .306. Furthermore, the chi-squared statistic is significant
at the .001 level.
Among self-identified moderates, 35% of the highly religious agreed that women
should take care of the home, compared to 14% of the least religious moderates (Table
7). The magnitude of the relationship is 21%, which is the percentage
difference between the highly religious and least religious moderates who
agreed that women should work in the home. The gamma value reflecting the
relationship between religiosity and attitudes about women’s role among
moderates is .409. Additionally, the chi-square is statistically
significant at the .001 level.
Among self-identified conservatives, 40% of the highly religious agreed that
women should take care of the home, compared to 33% of the least religious
conservatives (Table 8). The magnitude of the relationship is a more modest 7%,
which is the percentage difference between the highly religious and least
religious conservatives who agreed that women should work in the home. The
gamma value reflecting the relationship between religiosity and attitudes about
women’s role among conservatives is .212. Furthermore, the chi-square
value is statistically significant at the .001 level.
The multivariate tables 6-8 show a relatively
strong relationship between religiosity and attitudes about women’s role among
liberals and moderates, but religiosity was least important among conservatives.
For example, the difference between the most religious and the least religious
individuals agreeing that women belong in the home for liberals and moderates
was 19% and 21% respectively, compared to only a 7% difference among the
conservatives. This shows that level of religiosity has a lesser affect on
conservative attitudes towards women’s role versus the liberals and moderates.
At least 35% of highly religious
individuals regardless of ideology agreed that women should work in the
home. 37% of the highly religious among liberal identifiers believed
women belong in the home, compared to 40% of the highly religious conservative
identifiers. This is a percentage difference of only 3 percent, which is
a smaller difference than what I would have expected. However, the difference
between the least religious liberals and least religious conservatives was more
disparate. 18% of the least religious among liberal identifiers believed women
belong in the home, compared to 33% of the least religious conservative
identifiers. The margin in this case was 15%, which is substantially
larger than the mere 3% difference among the highly religious.
Table 9
Ideology and women’s role as impacted by
religiosity
(Highly Religious Only)
|
Women should take
care of homes |
Liberal |
Ideology: Moderate |
Conservative |
|
Agree |
37% |
35% |
40% |
|
Disagree |
63% |
65% |
60% |
|
(N Size) |
(76) |
(144) |
(430) |
Gamma= -.079
Chi-Square Significance >.05
Note: Percentages total 100% down each column
Source: 2006, 2008, and 2010 Mississippi Polls, conducted by
Mississippi State University
Table 10
Ideology and women’s role as impacted by
religiosity
(Semi-Religious Only)
|
Women should take
care of homes |
Liberal |
Ideology: Moderate |
Conservative |
|
Agree |
26% |
13% |
22% |
|
Disagree |
74% |
87% |
78% |
|
(N Size) |
(101) |
(190) |
(201) |
Gamma= -.017; Gamma significant >.05
Chi-Square Significance <.05
Note: Percentages total 100% down each column
Source: 2006, 2008, and 2010 Mississippi Polls, conducted by
Mississippi State University
Table 11
Ideology and women’s role as impacted by religiosity
(Non-Religious Only)
|
Women should take
care of homes |
Liberal |
Ideology: Moderate |
Conservative |
|
Agree |
18% |
14% |
33% |
|
Disagree |
82% |
86% |
67% |
|
(N Size) |
(84) |
(144) |
(138) |
Gamma= -.338
Chi-Square Significance <.001
Note: Percentages total 100% down each column
Source: 2006, 2008, and 2010 Mississippi Polls, conducted by
Mississippi State University
Tables 9-11 are multivariate tables that
control for the intervening variable of religiosity. The findings show that
among the individuals who were highly religious and semi-religious, ideology is
not an important factor in determining agreement or disagreement towards
women’s role. However, among the non-religious, ideology was found to be a
significant factor. Liberals, moderates, and conservatives did not differ much
in their attitudes about women’s role among highly and semi-religious only.
Among the highly religious, 37% of liberal identifiers agreed that women belong
in the home compared to 40% of conservatives (Table 9). The magnitude of the relationship
is only 3%, which is the percentage difference between highly religious liberal
and conservative individuals who believed women should work in the home. The
gamma value reflecting the relationship between ideology and women’s role is a
mere -.079. Furthermore, the chi-squared statistic is not statistically
significant at the .05 level.
Among the semi-religious, 26% of liberal
identifiers agreed that women belong in the home compared to 22% of conservatives
(Table 10). The magnitude of the relationship is only 4%, which is the
percentage difference between semi-religious liberal and conservative
individuals who believed women should work in the home. The gamma value
reflecting the relationship between ideology and women’s role is only -.017.
However, even though the chi-square value is significant at .05, gamma is not
statistically significant in this case. Therefore, the findings show there is
no significant relationship among the semi-religious either.
Among the least or non-religious only, 18%
of liberal self-identifiers agreed that women belong in the home compared to 33%
of conservatives (Table 11). The magnitude of the relationship is 15%, which is
the percentage difference between non-religious liberal and conservative
individuals who believed women should work in the home. The gamma value
reflecting the relationship between ideology and women’s role is -.338.
Furthermore, the chi-squared statistic is significant at the .001 level.
Tables
9 and 10 do not show a significant relationship between ideology and attitudes
towards women’s role. Although for table 11, or the table involving the
non-religious only, ideology was an important factor in determining attitudes
about women working in the home. However,
these tables do reveal level of religiosity as an important factor in
determining what people believe about women working in the home in a similar
way that tables 6-8 did. Highly religious individuals among liberals and
conservatives are more likely to agree that women should work in the home as
compared to non-religious liberals and conservatives. For example, 37% of
highly religious liberals and 40% of highly religious conservatives agreed that
women should work in the home, compared to 18% of non-religious liberals and
33% of non-religious conservatives. Although 33% of non-religious conservatives
agreeing is a number substantially closer than the 18% of non-religious
liberals to 40% or even 37%, level of religiosity still plays a significant
role in determining how even the conservatives feel about women’s role.
The findings of tables 9-11 are interesting, because I would
have expected conservatives at all levels of religiosity to show similar
results with the percentage who believe women should work in the
home.
Even more surprising is the fact that a
higher percentage of non-religious conservatives (33%) agreed that women belong
in the home than semi-religious conservatives (22%).
CONCLUSION
Religious/Church Regulars
Ideology (cons) (only least
religious) Woman’s Place
is in Home (Yes)
Gender
(men)
Through
the critical analysis of how religiosity, ideology, and gender impact the
belief that women should work in the home, it can be concluded that all but one
variable played an important role. After testing my five hypotheses, every
variable but gender was found to be a significant factor. To my surprise, the
multivariate tables showed that ideology became important in determining
attitudes toward women in the home only among the least or non-religious. Furthermore, when impacted by ideology,
religiosity was an especially important factor for liberals’ and moderates’
beliefs towards women’s role. However, religiosity had a lesser impact on
conservative self-identifiers.
In
the literature, I found that male conservatives could be becoming less
traditional on gendered attitudes about women getting jobs. The article,
“Changes in Men’s Conservative Gender Ideologies: Cohort and Period Influences”
revealed that even pre-baby boom men have become less conservative about
women’s roles in the two decades between the ’70s and the ’90s. In fact, most
of the changing occurred in the ten years between the ’70s and a’80s. Based on
the findings of this article, I would expect to see an even larger shift away
from gendered attitudes in 2012. Since my findings showed gender as an
insignificant factor in determining women’s role, perhaps the gender gap in
attitudes is smaller than expected or even shrinking, or maybe women just so
happen to closely parallel the men. The researcher also found that men who have
wives that work full time jobs have the least conservative beliefs, as compared
to men with unemployed wives. The impact of employed versus unemployed wives on
the husband’s attitudes is an area that requires more study. The results of the
2012 Mississippi Poll may provide further insight into whether one or both
sexes are having decreasingly traditional attitudes towards women in the home,
but perhaps future polls should ask men if their wives are employed. When
speaking to married women, they also should be asked if they are employed or if
the husband is the only one making an income.
However,
it is possible that regional location may impact attitudes toward women working
outside of the home. In the article “Gender Role Attitudes in the Southern
United States,” the researcher found that Southerners were less likely to find
women emotionally stable enough for politics and less likely to admit that they
would vote for a female president. Although the researcher found that
Southerners typically have more conservative values and beliefs, he also found
that even for the South, traditional attitudes have decreased over the years.
More research should be done in examining Southern attitudes towards women and
gender roles in comparison to the rest of the country as a whole.
In
addition, the article “Holy Roll Calls: Religious Tradition and Voting Behavior
in the U.S. House” examined the impact of religion on voting behavior of House
members on controversial issues. Catholics and Protestants were found to vote
more conservatively in recent years as compared to black Protestant and Jewish
people. Mormons voted significantly more religious than other religious groups
and denominations within Congress. As we see the increasing possibility of
having the next U.S. president be a Mormon through Republican candidate Mitt
Romney, denominational impact on voting and ideology is an area that
necessitates further study. If Romney were deeply tied to his religion and
identity as a Mormon, then I would expect to see him pushing very conservative
legislation if elected in November.
More
generally, religious devoutness was found to be the most pervasive influence on
traditional or family values, according to the article “The Impact of Religion
on Gender Role Attitudes.” However, self-esteem was found to be second most
important in determining likelihood of a mother working outside of the home.
Self-esteem is an area that deserves more analysis in future studies. Perhaps
increasing numbers of women are working outside of the home because of
generational changes in attitudes and a sense of empowerment. Also, higher
divorce rates may be causing women to actively seek careers. The threat of
becoming a single mother may be leading women to assert their economic and
financial independence apart from their husbands.
There
are several more gaps in our understanding of shifting attitudes towards women
working outside of the home, and further research into each of these areas is
necessary to better support trends of decreasingly traditional attitudes. As
the more conservative generations age and die off, one would expect for
children growing up with two working parents to have less traditional
attitudes. This is important because as attitudes shift in this way, women
become more likely to break the glass ceiling that keeps them from top tier
promotion in their respective career paths. Also, less traditional attitudes
may lead to more support for allowing choice in making the decision to have an
abortion.
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