WEEK 4: PARTY IN THE ELECTORATE
A
famous political science scholar Frank Sorauf argued that a political party
should not merely be regarded as the formal organization recognized by
government bodies, but also as adults (or voters) who psychologically identify
with the political party (termed party identification), and also as the public
officials who bear the party label. As such, Sorauf viewed political parties as
three-headed beasts: party in the electorate, party organization, and party in
government. This week we’ll talk about who is most likely in the electorate to
identify as Democrats or as Republicans. Party identification is measured with
a 7-point scale, and we will generally include Independents leaning towards one
of the two parties as partisans of that party, since they vote in as partisan a
manner as the Weak Democrats and Weak Republicans. We group our discussion by
important demographic groups.
Race. African-Americans are heavily Democratic in
party identification, since they are one of the most liberal groups in America
on a diverse range of policy issues (see my Public Opinion class notes). A 2025
Pew study of found of American adults found that 71% of African Americans were
Democrats and only 19% were Republican (a 5% GOP gain since 2020). Whites on the other hand were more
divided, with 57% being Republican and 38% Democratic. The remainder of both
races were Independents.
(Source: https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/06/02/democratic-edge-in-party-identification-narrows-slightly/) Since most partisans vote about 90% for their
party’s candidates, this resulted in 86% of African Americans nationally voting
for Kamala Harris, while only 42% of whites backed her (2024 CNN exit poll). The most racially polarized
state in the previous presidential election was Mississippi, where 94% of blacks backed Biden, compared to only 18%
of whites (Democrats lost ground in Mississippi, as Harris won 82% of blacks and only 17% of whites; Fox News Voter Analysis). Given the large African American populations in the South, this has
resulted in Democratic primaries in the South being much more biracial in terms
of voters compared to the Republican primaries. About 38% of Democratic primary
voters in the South are African American, and African Americans reach a
majority in states like Mississippi, South Carolina, Alabama, and Georgia (p.
44, Buchanan/Kapeluck book, The 2020 Presidential Election in the South). As such, an increasing number of Democratic
gubernatorial and U.S. senate candidates in the South are African American
(Mike Espy for Senate in Mississippi, Stacey Abrams for governor in Georgia).
Whites overwhelmingly dominate Republican primaries, but ideologically
conservative African Americans can win GOP primaries (Senator Tim Scott of
South Carolina, Lieutenant Governor Mark Robinson of North Carolina).
Hispanics
(Latinos) and Asian Americans
are other important racial groups, and both lean Democratic. Pew in 2025 found that
Democrats had a 52% to 33% advantage over Republicans among Hispanics, and a
56% to 38% advantage among Asian Americans. Hispanics are especially important
in states like Texas and Florida, where they comprise 32% and 19% respectively
of the Democratic primary electorate (p. 45, Buchanan/Kapeluck book). However, Hispanics are
not as monolithic as African Americans, and anti-communist Cuban Americans in
Florida actually lean in a Republican direction. In 2020 56% of Florida Cuban
Americans voted for Trump, compared to only 31% of Puerto Rican Floridians (p.
189 Buchanan/Kapeluck). There is also some diversity among Texas Hispanics, as Trump
improved his vote totals in 2020 in “most of the heavily Latino counties at or near the
Mexico border” (p. 272 Buchanan/Kapeluck). Some Republican officials in those states
have worked to appeal to Hispanics, with former Texas governor George Bush speaking a
little Spanish, current Texas governor Greg Abbott boasting that his wife was
the first Hispanic First Lady of Texas, and former Florida governor Jeb Bush
meeting his future Mexican wife while working in Mexico.
Democrats
have also become the majority party among the college educated, a
reversal of party fortunes from three decades ago. The 2025 Pew poll found that 55%
of college graduates are Democrats, compared to 40% who are Republican. The
Democratic advantage goes up to 59-35% for those having some graduate school
education. Republicans have a 49%-40% edge among those with high school
diplomas or less. The GOP edge among this less educated group increases when focusing only on whites. Many believe that the college experience
is a broadening and liberalizing experience. The Erikson and Tedin textbook in
the Public Opinion class documented a 12-14% increased liberalism among college
students over their college careers when it came to lifestyle issues such as
abortion, same sex marriage, and legalized marijuana (p. 138, American Public Opinion, 11th edition). Perhaps the
educational environment provided by college professors plays some role, as by
2016 fully 60% of professors were liberal and only 13% were conservative (p. 139).
Finally, many college graduates are working in high tech, information, and
social services related careers that may benefit from more government spending
and programs. The emerging GOP advantage among those lacking a college degree
is also a fascinating development, likely enhanced by Trump’s blue collar
policy orientations and politically incorrect style. Income, however, has less effect on party ties today. In 2020, Trump did win 54% of the over $100,000 income group
to only 42% for Biden, and Biden won the
under $100,000 group by a 56-43% margin. But patterns were reversed in 2024, as Harris won 51% of the over $100,000 group to 47% for Trump, and Trump won 50% of the under $50,000 group to 48% for Harris (CNN exit polls).
Age is
another important factor with the young being more Democratic and the
old being more Republican. The 2025 Pew poll found that 49% of the 18-29 year olds were Democrats, while 43% were Republicans (Democrats had a wider edge of 55-37% in 2020) The other age groups are more closely divided, though Republicans in 2025 did have a 51-42% edge among the 50-64 age group and a 48-44 edge among the 65 and older group. These patterns are confirmed by two
CNN exit polls for recent presidential elections. In 2020, Biden won a 60% to 36% victory among
those under 30, while middle age groups saw closer partisan divisions, and those
65 and older narrowly favored Trump 52-47%. However, age differences declined in 2024, as Harris' edge over Trump was only 54-43% among the under 30, and Trump's edge was only 50-49 among the 65 and older. As we discussed in the Public
Opinion class, young people (especially in Mississippi) tend to be more liberal
than older people on a number of lifestyle and other issues.
A
gender gap emerged in the United States with the election of conservative
Ronald Reagan. Pew in 2025 found that 51% of women were Democrats and 41% were Republican.
Men, on the other hand, were 53% Republican and 39% Democratic (a 5% GOP gain among men since 2020). Nationally, 53%
of women voted for Harris compared to only 43% of men (CNN exit poll). In the Public
Opinion class we talked about how women tend to favor more compassionate social
welfare types of programs, and how they tend to oppose the use of force (being
anti-death penalty, anti-guns, anti-war) compared to men. Indeed, the Democratic advantage is especially
evident among college educated women, where 65% were Democratic and only 30%
Republican (a 2020 Pew poll). This helps to explain why so many commentators and
journalists on the liberal cable networks CNN and MSNBC are women.
There are some big
partisan differences between people living in urban versus rural areas,
though some of those differences reflect these other demographic differences in
who lives in such areas. Democrats had a 62-31% advantage among urban
residents nationally, while Republicans had a 58-35% advantage among rural
residents (2020 Pew poll). Fully 60% of urban residents voted for Harris, compared to only
34% of rural residents (CNN exit poll). These urban-rural differences are especially evident in states like Virginia and Texas. What kind of area do you live in, and do you see these
patterns existing in your state?
Finally, religion plays
a partisan role. Historically, Jews were about 80% Democratic, Catholics were
about 70% Democratic, and Protestants outside the South were about 60%
Republican. However, in this century Catholics have been trending towards an
even split between the two parties (Erikson and Tedin, p. 205). Today, one of the biggest religious splits is
between the Secular non-churchgoers and the Evangelical (born again) Protestant
Churchgoers. About 72% of the Seculars are Democrats, compared to only
14% of Evangelicals (p. 207, Erikson-Tedin). So,
Seculars are an important component of the modern Democratic Party, while
Evangelicals (also known as the Religious Right) are important in today’s
Republican Party.
Turnout is yet another factor that the two parties have to be concerned
about. Historically, turnout has been higher among more Republican demographic
groups, such as whites and people older in age. Those demographic differences
persisted in 2020 and 2024. Another problem for Democrats is that most states have some
restrictions on felons voting, even after they have served their sentences.
Mississippi bars anyone convicted of 23 crimes from voting, unless their voting
rights have been restored by the legislature. A Florida initiative restored
voting rights to felons, though the Republican-controlled state legislature
amended that law to ensure that all former felons had paid all of their
outstanding fines and made restitution. The former Democratic governor of Virginia
simply pardoned every felon who had served their sentence. In California, felons can vote if they have served
their sentences and parole. Mississippi’s state legislature is currently
looking at their felony voting requirements. It should be noted that once
someone is on the voting rolls, they can be called for jury duty, and felony
convictions typically require a unanimous jury vote. One positive for Democrats
was that the Covid situation in 2020 led most states to make it easier for
people to vote, as most enacted easier mail-in and early in-person voting
options. Turnout in 2020 increased in every state, and was the highest since at
least 1980 (and perhaps 1960); it remained high in 2024. While scholars have questioned whether higher
turnout automatically benefits the Democrats, our book found a high
relationship between southern states with high turnout and Biden’s vote totals
(Buchanan/Kapeluck p. 310). Republican-controlled state legislatures across the country are being
accused of rolling back some of those easier methods of voting, but perhaps
some are just going back to pre-pandemic practices. Stacey Abrams of Georgia
did a great job of increasing voter registration and turnout among Democratic
groups, and Democrats won both of that state’s U.S. Senate seats in 2020. Mississippi has a similar effort designed to increase
voter registration, called Mississippi Votes (they also have internships and
jobs available).