Chapter 11
Virginia: From Aristocratic Democratic Machine to Ideological Two-Party Politics
Virginia shares most traits of other Rim South states, having a higher socioeconomic status population, a better funded education system, and a smaller black population size than any Deep South state. With African Americans comprising a smaller proportion of the population, discriminatory voting devices did not exert as severe an effect as in Deep South states. Sharing the Appalachian mountains with two other Rim South states, pockets of Republicans always existed, and along with affluent suburbs surrounding such cities as Washington D.C., the GOP was able to make electoral gains earlier than in the Deep South.
Virginia is unique in many ways. First, its aristocratic nature dates back to the Founding Fathers, and in the first half of the 20th century a Democratic Party machine controlled state politics and discouraged popular participation. Unlike most southern states but like Arkansas’ Winthrop Rockefeller, the Republican Party of Virginia took advantage of the ruling Democratic party’s preoccupation with race during the 1960s and elected a progressive as governor. Virginia was especially unique in the rapid ideological realignment of the two parties, as “liberals” quickly seized control of the Democratic Party and helped to produce a string of GOP victories in the 1970s. The moderate wing of the party fought back in the 1980s, jettisoned the primary in favor of party conventions, and proceeded to nominate more conservative candidates who regained the governorship and one U.S. senate seat. Since the last decade of the 20th century, both parties have been competitive, though the more conservative Republican Party has had the political advantage.
The Democratic Party machine of U.S. Senator Harry Byrd, a machine that was clearly associated with conservative policies, dominated Virginia politics in the first half of the 20th century. Harry Byrd had quit school to help run his father’s nearly bankrupt newspaper business, and was soon putting in 18-hour work days working in that business and in two others (Heinemann 1996: 6, 9). These teenage experiences instilled in him the political philosophy that government’s role was simply to “provide an environment in which individual opportunity might flourish” so that self-reliant people like himself could create personal wealth “with minimal taxation” and government “regulation” (Heinemann 1996: 10). Having served a brief stint on the Winchester City Council, Byrd was elected to the state senate in 1915, pledging to run state government “with the same efficiency and economy as any private business” (Heinemann 1996: 17). The son of a former state house speaker and the nephew of a political boss, state senator Byrd was elected state Democratic Party chairman in 1922. His spearheading the defeat of a bond measure for the state’s highways, thereby enshrining a “pay-as-you-go” mentality into state public policies propelled him to election as governor in 1925 (Heinemann 1996: 42).
As governor, Byrd continued his conservative philosophy of opposing bonded indebtedness in favor of a pay-as-you-go philosophy for building highways, promoted government economy and efficiency by reorganizing and consolidating state government, and publicly campaigned for a constitutional amendment that reduced the number of elective state offices to only three (Heinemann 1996: 60-61). As a U.S. Senator from 1933 until 1965, the conservative Byrd initially backed President Roosevelt’s New Deal programs because of the dire emergency of the Great Depression. He soon began to fight against such “government handouts” that corrupted his philosophy of “self-help,” and to rail against the “New Dealers, Communists, the CIO-PAC” (Heinemann 1996: 176 1st two quotes; Key 1949: 34 3rd quote).
The Byrd Democratic machine promoted the interests of banks and retailing businesses and the wealthier citizens, exercised “restraint in the expansion of services, such as education, public health, and welfare,” and was strongest in rural areas, particularly in the south and tidewater areas that had sizable black populations and an agricultural economy (Key 1949: 27 quote; 33; Eisenberg 1972: 44). Typical of Byrd machine governors was Bill Tuck, who after being elected in 1945 proceeded to denounce “public employee unions,” to induct utility workers who had gone on strike into the state militia, to enact a Right to Work law that outlawed compulsory union membership, and to enact a law permitting state government to seize the “strike-plagued utilities” (Atkinson 2006a: 23). Typical of state legislative policy during the Byrd era was a 1950 law the required that state budget surpluses be refunded to the taxpayer (Atkinson 2006a: 43). The anti-organization faction of the Democratic Party constituted the “liberal” wing of the party, favoring improved public services in education and other social service programs, supporting “national Democratic leaders,” and drawing support from voters in urban areas, blue-collar workers in the tidewater area, and voters generally in the western and southwestern counties of agricultural protest, traditional Republicanism, and mining and manufacturing industries (Key 1949: 28 quote, 30-31; Eisenberg 1972: 45).
The Byrd machine consistently controlled the governorship from 1925 until the 1960s, largely because of the “hands-on leadership” style that Byrd had established as boss of the state Democratic political machine and had maintained while in the U.S. Senate. He “comfortably mingled with” local officials, “relishing” meals with them and talk of such daily matters as the “weather and farm prices,” and then kept in “direct contact with them through his many letters and energetic campaigning at election time.” Byrd also “cultivated friends in the business” and journalism communities, the latter impressed by his numerous press releases. His leadership style was “to reward with praise, jobs, roads, and legislation” rather than to punish (Heinemann 1996: 46 all quotes in paragraph). The Byrd machine was also maintained by the central position of Byrd functionary E.R. Combs, who as clerk of the state senate and chair of the state compensation board influenced the determination of salaries and expenses to county officials and the legislature’s selection of circuit judges, judges who appointed the local electoral boards (Key 1949: 20-22).
The Byrd machine also maintained its political power by keeping turnout lower than in any other southern state, partly through racially discriminatory voting devices and partly because of the aristocratic tradition of the state that held that only the “leading citizens” in the tradition of a Thomas Jefferson should exercise political power (Key 1949: 20, 493, 496; Bass and DeVries 1977: 343 quote). As late as the 1947 through 1964 period, a smaller proportion of African Americans in Virginia were registered to vote than in any other Rim South state, and black voter registration was consistently lower only in the Deep South states of Alabama and Mississippi (Garrow 1978: 7, 11, 19; Key 1949: 523).
African American disfranchisement occurred after a brief period of rule by the Readjuster Party, a forerunner of the Populists, which sought to readjust the public debt in favor of the poor at the expense of the wealthy. The Readjusters were strongest in poor agricultural areas with few blacks in the south and southwest, and in some eastern areas where blacks were able to vote (Key 1949: 546-547). The 1900 popular vote on calling a constitutional convention that disfranchised blacks was backed most strongly by whites in counties with high black populations, and opposed in western and southwestern counties having few blacks and more Republicans (Key 1949: 546). The convention proceeded to enact a literacy test and poll tax. The literacy test required that one register to vote in their own handwriting, and was sometimes applied unfairly to prevent blacks from voting, though discrimination occurred more often in rural than in urban areas (Key 1949: 558, 564). Instances of discrimination included local white registrars asking blacks such obscure questions as how many people had signed the Declaration of Independence and the number of counties in one’s judicial district (Atkinson 2006a: 15-16). The $1.50 annual poll tax was cumulative and had to be paid for all three years before an election, and it also had to be paid not later than six months before a general election and three months before a primary election (Heinemann 1996: 12; Key 1949: 581, 587). Virginia’s state Democratic Party instituted a white primary after a 1912 state primary law was enacted, but in 1930 a federal court invalidated it (Morris and Bradley 1994: 274).
As Senator Byrd continued to rule state Democratic politics “from afar,” by the middle of the century his political machine began to encounter serious challenges to its dominance (Heinemann 1996: 270). In the 1949 Democratic gubernatorial primary, the organization candidate John Battle, a moderate, won by only a 7.5% margin of the popular vote over former state lawmaker Francis Pickens Miller, an anti-organization man. Miller had blasted the organization for the state’s shortcomings in education and other public services, and won the support of blacks, urban whites, and union members (Heinemann 1996: 282; Eisenberg 1972: 48; Atkinson 2006a: 35-36). The Byrd organization won only after it put pressure on local officials by reminding them that Combs as chair of the Compensation Board set their salaries, and after its candidate attracted some Republican support. Indeed, even Senator Byrd himself made a rare visible intervention into a campaign, as he blasted Miller as “a CIO-supported candidate” who would let “outside labor leaders” gain control of Virginia (Heinemann 1996: 283 quote, 284; Atkinson 2006a: 39-40).
The organization fended off a progressive Republican in the 1953 gubernatorial race with Democrat Thomas Stanley winning a mere 55% of the general election popular vote to Ted Dalton’s 44%. The Republican Dalton, who was supported by the 1949 anti-organization Democratic loser, backed raising teachers’ salaries, spending more on state mental institutions, vigorously promoting industrial development, and repealing the poll tax, but his support for a highway bond bill sealed his doom by inciting Senator Byrd’s active opposition (Eisenberg 1972: 49; Atkinson 2006a: 73, 76). However, during the subsequent 1954 state legislative session the Byrd organization was forced to compromise with a group of Democratic Young Turks, a group of “young Organization members, many of them veterans of World War II representing urban areas” (Heinemann 1996: 318). With the Young Turks upset over the state’s last-in-the-nation ranking in high school and college attendance, the organization acceded to suspending the state law requiring that budget surpluses be returned to the taxpayers and instead appropriated part of the surplus for such public education improvements as higher teacher salaries (Heinemann 1996: 317, 324; Atkinson 2006a: 85).
The issue of civil rights, made salient by the 1954 Brown desegregation decision, soon added even more strains on the Democratic machine. Viewing the race issue as one that would help the organization to maintain its political domination, U.S. Senator Byrd pushed a policy of “massive resistance” and Governor Stanley reluctantly agreed to it (Heinemann 1996: 329 quote; Eisenberg 1972: 51). State legislators from the south and from other rural areas with large black populations proceeded to enact this policy into law over the opposition of lawmakers from urban areas (Eisenberg 1972: 52). Democrat J. Lindsay Almond, who had promised to “cut off his right arm before a single black child entered a white school,” was then elected governor in 1957 by a landslide 63% of the vote over moderate Republican Ted Dalton, whose attack on massive resistance received even less sympathy from white voters after President Eisenhower’s dispatch of federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas (Atkinson 2006a: 109 quote, 107). Almond as governor proceeded to fight against integration by closing some public schools, prompting “unfavorable national publicity” and a public outcry by the state’s parents, teachers, prominent newspapers, and by business and civic leaders (Heinemann 1996: 345 quote, 346). Almond, the “realistic lawyer,” finally admitted defeat and assembled a coalition of moderates, anti-organization liberals, and Republicans to repeal the massive resistance policy, thereby incurring the wrath of Senator Byrd (Eisenberg 1972: 53). The organization bound its wounds back together for the 1961 gubernatorial race, when its gubernatorial candidate, Attorney General Albertis S. Harrison, Jr. and a racial moderate, won 57% of the Democratic primary vote and 64% of the general election vote, after the organization chose a leader of the massive resistance movement, state senator Mills E. Godwin Jr., as its lieutenant governor designee (Eisenberg 1972: 54-55; Atkinson 2006a: 134).
Events of the mid-1960s would signal the end of the Byrd Democratic monopoly over Virginia politics. Urban areas grew in size to comprise 58.5% of the state’s population by 1970, and these residents favored more spending for public services, particularly education (Eisenberg 1972: 61-62). Furthermore, reapportionment by 1966 made it clear that the more rural-based organization could no longer dominate the state legislature (Eisenberg 1972: 57). Meanwhile, the 1964 state Democratic convention disregarded the views of their governor and Senator Byrd, and endorsed President Johnson’s reelection because of Johnson’s backing among anti-organization delegates and urban moderate elements within the party (Eisenberg 1972: 63). For the first time since 1948 and the last time until 2008, Virginia voted for a Democratic presidential candidate, as Johnson won support from urban areas, blacks, and anti-organization elements. Yet the Byrd machine was being increasingly challenged, only now from the political right wing as well as the left, as Republican loser Goldwater was strongest in the conservative Southside area, counties with a large black population where whites constituted the heart of the Byrd machine (Eisenberg 1972: 63, 64; Atkinson 2006a: 163-164). Meanwhile, Republicans began to court the support of conservative Democrats and young conservatives of all stripes with such rising party leaders as Richard Obenshain, a “conservative true-believer” who nevertheless retained a “progressive social outlook, particularly on racial matters” that reflected his mountain roots in southwest Virginia (Atkinson 2006a: 137).
The last hurrah for the Byrd machine was the election in 1965 of Lieutenant Governor Mills Godwin as governor. Even so, Godwin won only 48% of the vote over Republican Linwood Holton who garnered a respectable 38%. Facing a Republican who was a “young and attractive candidate who campaigned with a moderate platform,” Godwin found himself repudiating the low services tradition of the organization by promising to promote public education (Eisenberg 1972: 64 quote, 65). Indeed, anticipating his party’s move toward the center with the enfranchisement of African Americans, Godwin had even campaigned across Virginia for President Johnson the previous year with the nation’s First Lady, Lady Bird Johnson (Atkinson 2006a: 160-161). These progressive moves by Godwin prompted dissatisfied conservatives to bolt from the Democratic Party to form the Conservative Party, whose candidate won 13% of the vote, and the “organization” candidate Godwin became dependent on urban and black support in order to win the general election (Eisenberg 1972: 64, 65; Atkinson 2006a: 176). Governor Godwin’s program as governor further repudiated the organization’s historic policies, as he helped to enact a state sales tax to significantly increase funding for public elementary, secondary, and higher education and to pass a bond bill for mental hospitals and higher education (Eisenberg 1972: 65; Atkinson 2006a: 180-181). The Byrd machine “officially” ended when Harry Byrd announced his resignation from the U.S. senate in 1965, necessitating a special election the next year for his seat in addition to the regular senate election.
The 1966 federal elections illustrated how the Democratic Party was now split into liberal, moderate, and “organization” factions, and showed how Republicans could gain from Democratic party divisions. Anti-organization Young Turks challenged 79-year-old U.S. Senator A. Willis Robertson and Senator Harry Byrd Jr. (appointed to fill his father’s vacancy). Aided by urban and black support in the Democratic primary, 45-year-old state senator William Spong, the leader of the moderate faction and a racial moderate, unseated the overconfident Robertson by 50.1% of the vote by exploiting the age issue, while the other anti-organization candidate won 49% and nearly upset the “legend’s” son. Both Democrats won the general election and held Republican opponents to under 40% of the vote, though Byrd’s modest 53% popular vote included only 13.5% of the normally Democratic black vote. Meanwhile, veteran House Rules Committee chairman, segregationist Congressman Howard Smith, was upset in the Democratic primary by “liberal” state representative George C. Rawlings Jr., whose narrow 51% victory was made possible by successfully registering and transporting rural blacks to the polls. Rawlings was an ally of state senator Henry Howell, the leader of the liberal faction who was generally regarded as “the most liberal Democrat on Virginia’s political spectrum” (Eisenberg 1972: 69 quote, 67-72; Atkinson 2006a: 188). The liberal Rawlings proceeded to lose the general election in this suburban Washington D.C. district to Republican William L. Scott, who had deemphasized his Republican label and aggressively courted the support of Smith conservatives (Eisenberg 1972: 69-70).
Political events in 1968 further illustrated Democratic disunity and the opportunity that such divisions within the governing majority party provided to the GOP. Governor Mills Godwin, who was now the leader of the organization forces, was successful in helping to narrowly reelect as state party chairman Watkins Abbitt, a conservative congressman, over a political ally of the liberal Howell (Eisenberg 1972: 72-73; Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews 1972: 845). On the other hand, liberals and moderates were able to unite behind state senator William B. Hopkins and to elect him to a Democratic national committee position, after the organization candidate withdrew. Republicans benefited from Democratic divisions after a victory by liberals over moderates in the Democratic primary for the 2nd congressional district office vacated by a retiring incumbent. Electing a well-known television commentator, Republican William Whitehurst to Congress over a liberal Democrat who had survived this bitter party primary, the GOP after the 1968 elections now controlled half of the state’s U.S. house delegation (Eisenberg 1972: 73-74; Atkinson 2006a: 204).
The final deathblow for the Byrd organization was the 1969 Democratic primary for statewide offices, when the party’s moderate and liberal factions not only nominated anti-organization candidates for lieutenant governor and attorney general (the only two offices in Virginia other than governor elected statewide), but also delivered them two-thirds of the primary vote over organization candidates (Eisenberg 1972: 76-78). Liberal leader and anti-organization man Henry Howell made the gubernatorial runoff with a non-organization moderate candidate William Battle, the son of former governor John Battle. The “moderate” Battle had been an ambassador in the Kennedy administration and had campaigned for William Spong’s upset of the organization’s U.S. senator in 1966 (Atkinson 2006a: 207). Howell, an attorney and state senator, had fought for the consumer against the electric, telephone, and automobile insurance companies, had exposed abuses at black mental hospitals, had opposed closing the schools as a way of resisting integration, and had unsuccessfully “taken on” organization-leader Senator Byrd in the 1952 Democratic primary (Bass and DeVries 1977: 356-357; Eisenberg 1972: 75). Running as a “people’s candidate” who pledged to “Keep the Big Boys Honest,” Howell proceeded to run “a series of shouting, arm-waving television commercials attacking special interests,” prompting political opponents to tag him “Howling Henry” (Bass and DeVries 1977: 357). Battle narrowly won the Democratic gubernatorial runoff primary with 52% of the vote after Governor Godwin endorsed him, an endorsement that angered Howell’s supporters, who were further alienated by a snub when Howell was not seated at the head table or even introduced at an October “unity” dinner (Bass and DeVries 1977: 353-354).
Republicans benefited from Democratic disunity and the attractive candidacy of moderate Linwood Holton, and elected their first governor since Reconstruction. With a good organization, skillful use of the media, an endorsement from the AFL-CIO, an ability to win 37% of the black vote, backing from conservative Byrd Democrats, and a “time for a change” slogan, Republican Holton won 53% of the vote to Battle’s 45% (Eisenberg 1972: 79 quote, 80; Bass and DeVries 1977: 353; Morris and Bradley 1994: 277; Atkinson 2006a: 214). A mountain Republican whose father had shown his hatred for bigotry by voting for Catholic Al Smith in the 1928 presidential election, Governor Holton declared that “the era of defiance is behind us” and pledged “an aristocracy of ability, regardless of race” (Bass and DeVries 1977: 358 quote, 359). He proceeded to appoint the first black to the governor’s staff, expanded job opportunities for blacks in state government and in the private sector, enacted the South’s first open housing law, and gained national recognition for personally escorting his daughter to a largely black school in the midst of an emotional desegregation controversy (Bass and DeVries 1977: 358-359; Atkinson 2006a: 232).
Liberal Democrats flexed their muscles even further and announced that state representative George Rawlings, whose nomination to a congressional seat had helped to elect a Republican in 1966, would challenge Senator Byrd for renomination to the Senate in 1970. Fearing that he might not even be able to win the nomination of a party trending to the left, Byrd promptly announced that he would run as an Independent. The now “Independent” Byrd was reelected with 54% of the vote to 31% for Rawlings and 15% for a weak Republican candidate. Byrd was endorsed by former Governor Godwin, backed by much of the state business community, had the tacit support of President Nixon, and won over many George Wallace voters, but he lost the black vote. He continued to caucus with Senate Democrats, who permitted him to keep his committee assignments and seniority. Byrd’s abandonment of the state Democratic Party sent a message to many conservative Democrats that they were no longer welcome in the party. Former governor Godwin switched to the Republican Party in 1973, and many conservative Democrats followed his move (Bass and DeVries 1977: 354-355; Lamis 1990: 152-153; Atkinson 2006a: 249). As a reelected U.S. senator, Harry Byrd continued to maintain a conservative voting record. Republicans did not even run a candidate against him in his last reelection in 1976, when Byrd ran again as an Independent, this time winning 57% of the vote over Democratic retired admiral Elmo Zumwalt’s 38% (Barone and Ujifusa 1981: 1123, 1124).
With growing conservative disillusionment with the Democratic Party, fueled by “national Democrats” denying such moderate conservatives as former governor Godwin a seat at the 1972 state convention and proceeding to elect “articulate and outspoken black women as national committeewoman and state vice-chairman,” even a moderate like U.S. Senator William Spong became a political casualty (Bass and DeVries 1977: 366 quote; Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews 1972: 837; Atkinson 2006a: 285). Republican William Scott, a conservative who had been elected to congress from the 8th district after a liberal had upset the conservative incumbent in the 1966 Democratic primary, defeated the Democratic senator in his 1972 reelection bid by a 51-46% vote margin (Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews 1972: 851). Taking advantage of liberal Democratic presidential nominee McGovern’s unpopularity in Virginia, which produced a Nixon landslide of 69% of the two-party vote, Scott became the first GOP U.S. Senator from Virginia since Reconstruction, after accusing the Democratic senate incumbent of supporting busing, gun control, and George McGovern (Lamis 1990: 154; Atkinson 2006a: 289-291). As a senator, Scott continued his conservative voting record, illustrating a growing ideological divide in the state GOP between conservatives and the more moderate and progressive faction led by Governor Holton (Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews 1977: 868).
Virginia Democrats responded to their growing disarray and capture by liberal elements by temporarily abandoning the party primary in favor of the convention for nominating its candidates. For a vacant lieutenant governorship in 1971, Democrats nominated a moderate who sought conservative support and Republicans chose a supporter of Governor Holton, prompting liberal Democrat Henry Howell to run as an Independent. The liberal Howell was elected with 40% of the vote to the Democrat’s 37% and the Republican’s 23% (Lamis 1990: 153). In total disarray, Democrats did not even offer a gubernatorial candidate in 1973, leaving the field to Democrat-turned-Republican former governor Mills Godwin and to Independent Henry Howell. While Howell called for replacing the sales tax on food with taxes targeting the affluent, and tried to assemble a populist coalition of blacks, liberals, and blue-collar whites, Godwin blasted him as a candidate of radicals and labor leaders and accused him of supporting forced busing to achieve racial integration in the schools. Godwin, winning big in some suburbs and in southern counties still influenced by the old Byrd machine, only narrowly defeated Howell with 51% of the vote, despite being backed by popular governor Holton and such moderate Democrats as 1969 gubernatorial loser William Battle (Lamis 1990: 155; Atkinson 2006a: 237, 314-315). Godwin’s second term as governor, this time as a Republican, unlike the first term was known for few major programs other than penal reform, reinstatement of the death penalty, and cuts in state spending because of recession-induced budget shortfalls (Atkinson 2006a: 337; see website http://www.state.va.us/home/vagov/2godwin.html).
Democrats continued their 1970s shutout of major offices by losing the 1977 governorship. John Dalton, a mountain Republican whose father had opposed the Byrd machine, had been elected lieutenant governor in 1973, and won 56% of the vote for governor four years later to easily defeat Henry Howell (Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews 1979: 889, 893). Howell had returned to the Democratic party, and backed by such intense Democratic activists as members of the AFL-CIO, the state education association, and the most prominent state African American organization, he upset the moderate Attorney General Andrew Miller in the Democratic gubernatorial primary (Atkinson 2006a: 367, 371). Conservative Democrats and independents, including prominent Byrd machine associates and forty-nine current and former Democratic state lawmakers, promptly backed Republican Dalton, and the popular departing governor Mills Godwin actively campaigned to defeat the “liberal” Democrat (Lamis 1990: 156 quote; Atkinson 2006a: 373, 381). As governor, Dalton was most known for fiscal conservatism and slowing the growth of government by cutting the number of state government employees. His record on race relations was mixed. While he backed a settlement of the state’s higher education desegregation lawsuit that included racial goals in enrollment, he also vetoed a Martin Luther King state holiday (Atkinson 2006b: 14, 23, 41).
Democrats made their last futile effort of the 1970s by abandoning the primary in 1978 and for years afterwards, in favor of a nominating convention to choose a candidate for the U.S. senate seat vacated by Republican Senator Scott (Atkinson 2006a: 412). Democrats chose moderate former attorney general Andrew Miller, who had lost the party’s gubernatorial primary to Howell the previous year. Virginia Republicans, who had always used a convention, at first nominated conservative former state party chair Richard Obenshain, but after his death in a plane crash the GOP state committee settled on former Navy Secretary John Warner. Miller made an admirable effort to unify the Democratic party, as he boasted the support of organized labor, Henry Howell supporters, and even some conservatives who had been segregationists (Lamis 1990: 157; McGlennon 1988: 59). Warner benefited from his non-partisan Washington experience as former Navy Secretary, the notoriety of his famous actress wife Elizabeth Taylor, a spending advantage thanks to business support and his own wealth, support from conservatives such as former governor Godwin and former Democratic senator Byrd, and the state “GOP’s sophisticated voter identification and turnout operation,” to pull out a razor thin 50.2% of the vote (Atkinson 2006a: 398, 428, 436, 437, 441 quote).
This U.S. senate defeat would later prove to be an especially bitter blow for Virginia Democrats, as Warner would proceed to be repeatedly reelected and to hold this seat for the GOP into the 21st century. Warner compiled the usual southern Republican voting record of pretty consistent conservatism, as he normally received scores above 80 from the conservative ACU and scores below 20 from the liberal ADA. However, his occasional bouts of independence and moderation, such as his opposition to President Reagan’s nomination of conservative Robert Bork to the Supreme Court, periodically angered some conservative Republicans in Virginia. Most recently, he held hearings that shed negative light on some Bush administration Iraqi failures, such as prisoner abuses in Abu Ghraib and failures to adequately plan for what would happen after the fall of Baghdad (Duncan 1989: 1537; Koszczuk and Stern 2005: 1050-1051; Atkinson 2006b: 182).
The decade of the 1970s had been disastrous for Virginia Democrats, as the historically governing party of the state lost seven consecutive major statewide elections- three gubernatorial and two senate elections to Republicans, and two senate contests to an Independent (Table 11-1). Furthermore, not since 1964 had Democrats carried the state in a presidential election, and not since the 1966 election had Democrats controlled a majority of the state’s U.S. house delegation (Bass and DeVries 1977: 37). Going into the decade of the 1980s, Virginia Democrats could gain some solace from their continued control of over three-fourths of state legislative seats, as well as from the fact that more Virginians continued to think of themselves as “Democrats” than as Republicans (Table 11-2). Furthermore, the party had dealt with the growing problem of Democratic primary voters being more “liberal, black, and/or urban” than the general election electorate, and therefore likely to nominate unelectable liberals like Henry Howell. They had abandoned the primary in favor of nominating conventions more controlled by pragmatic party leaders who desired to win in November (McGlennon 1988: 59). Hungry from wandering in the political wilderness for a decade, Virginia Democrats were poised to try to take back their state’s top political positions.
Democrats made their political comeback by rejecting the liberalism of the Henry Howell wing of their party and pursuing a more centrist strategy that attracted a biracial coalition around ideologically diverse issues. In 1981 they nominated Lieutenant Governor Charles (Chuck) Robb for governor, along with two moderates for the positions of attorney general and lieutenant governor, and ended up sweeping all three offices (McGlennon 1988: 61). Robb, former President Lyndon Johnson’s son-in-law and a former Marine, embraced the Byrd machine’s mantle of fiscal conservatism. Yet he also held “progressive views on race and social issues,” and pledged to help the poor and elderly by repealing the state sales tax on food (Rozell 2003: 139 quote; Lamis 1990: 158). Robb was also “vouched for” by the lone African American in the state senate, Doug Wilder, “a favorite of organized labor and liberals” (Atkinson 2006b: 7). Robb was so zealous in assembling a broad, ideologically inclusive coalition that he even reached out to old-time segregationist and anti-union Democratic officials.
Republicans in 1981 were the party harmed by intra-party divisions, as many conservatives were angered by the state nominating convention’s nomination of a moderate life-long Republican for lieutenant governor, a choice that repudiated the conservative candidate backed by former Democrats who had recently joined the party. Conservatives were also upset by their party’s gubernatorial nominee Marshall Coleman, who as state attorney general had backed such progressive measures as a higher education desegregation lawsuit settlement that included racial goals (Atkinson 2006b: 21-23, 36-37). Some voters generally were upset when former governor Godwin, the “ex-champion of Massive Resistance,” while stumping for GOP gubernatorial hopeful Coleman, blasted Robb for supporting the Voting Rights Act, a blunder that may have contributed to high black turnout (Atkinson 2006b: 42 quote; Lamis 1990: 158-160). Robb was elected governor with a healthy 54% of the vote.
As governor, Robb used the same ideologically inclusive strategy to govern, as he had to campaign. He pleased liberals by increasing spending on education, raising teachers’ salaries, fully funding the state’s elementary and secondary education “Standards of Quality” program, and appointing the first African American to the state supreme court. Conservatives appreciated his fiscal conservatism, reflected in his ability to balance the state budget without raising taxes (Atkinson 2006b: 44 quote, 45). Most importantly, Robb had blazed a path for Virginia Democrats out of the political wilderness by pursuing ideologically diverse policies instead of consistently promoting liberal causes. Robb was so successful that voters elevated him to the U.S. senate later in the decade (Rozell 2003: 139).
Democratic staying power was proven in the 1985 gubernatorial race, when Democratic Attorney General Gerald Baliles defeated Republican Wyatt Durrette with an impressive 55% of the vote. Baliles closely linked himself with the popular administration of Governor Robb’s, which had benefited from a period of economic prosperity, and like Robb he ran as a fiscal conservative with a progressive orientation on social and race issues (Lamis 1990: 289-290; Rozell 2003: 140; Atkinson 2006b: 68). Meanwhile, Republicans were once again the “bitterly divided” party, only this time it was the moderates who were unable to defeat conservative candidates for governor or lieutenant governor (Atkinson 2006b: 56 quote, 57). Indeed, even former GOP governor Linwood Holton “declined to support the Republican ticket,” hoping that Virginia would make history by electing African American Democrat Doug Wilder as lieutenant governor (Atkinson 2006b: 60). Republicans compounded their problems when the state press accused them of “arousing racial passions” when former Governor Godwin accused the Democratic gubernatorial nominee of supporting state senator Doug Wilder’s record, which included attempted repeal of the state song, “Carry Me Back to Ole Virginny” (Atkinson 2006b: 65 1st quote; 64 2nd quote). As governor, Democrat Baliles increased spending on transportation by backing a sales tax increase, promoted economic development by “leading a record eight foreign trade missions,” and backed increased spending on such social welfare programs as “mental health, indigent healthcare, and child care services” (Atkinson 2006b: 75 quote, 70).
Democrats in 1985 showed an impressive ability to offer a demographically balanced slate to voters, as they swept three of the state’s elected executive offices for the second consecutive election. They made history by electing the first African American to any statewide, non-judicial office in the South since Reconstruction, L. Douglas Wilder as lieutenant governor, and the first woman in Virginia to any statewide office, Mary Sue Terry as attorney general (Lamis 1990: 288-290). As in the case of the two African Americans elected to statewide offices in modern Georgia, Wilder avoided the “liberal” label, and stressed his non-ideological accomplishments during his life of public service. Wilder also sought out many white voters when traveling to small towns and rural areas across the state, and even ran television ads in rural areas “featuring a rotund white sheriff with a thick accent” who strongly endorsed his candidacy (Rozell 2007: 147). Wilder also preempted Republicans from using the “liberal” label against him by immediately charging that using such a term to describe his record would constitute a “racial code word” (Atkinson 2006b: 62 quote, 63). He ended up winning 44% of the white vote over state senator John Chichester, who had been bloodied in a divisive GOP convention (Lamis 1990: 288-289).
Democrats won the governorship for the third time in a row in 1989 when they once again defeated Marshall Coleman's candidacy for the state's top office. Wilder benefited from his political experience, having served 16 years in the state senate and four years as lieutenant governor, and was nominated without opposition, while Coleman waged a “negative” campaign in barely edging out by 2% of the vote former U.S. senator Trible for the Republican party’s nomination (Atkinson 2006b: 96 quote; Edds and Morris 1999: 141-142; Lamis 1990: 317; Menifield, Shaffer, and Brassell 2005: 174). Stressing that the election was all about “Leadership and experience,” the moderate Wilder positioned himself as a fiscal conservative who opposed any sales tax increase, and as someone who was tough on crime and who supported the death penalty (Lamis 1990: 318 quote; Morris and Bradley 1994: 278; Atkinson 2006b: 71, 74, 94). Wilder also appeared to benefit from his Republican opponent’s “doctrinaire conservatism,” as the Democrat criticized Coleman’s opposition to abortion even in the cases of rape and incest (Edds and Morris 1999: 140). A Wilder television ad explained his support for the right to choose to have an abortion in the context of Virginia’s “strong tradition of freedom and individual liberty” and his desire to “keep the politicians out of your personal life” (Edds and Morris 1999: 141). Benefited by a strong state economy and the support of Governors Robb and Baliles, Wilder won an estimated 41% of the white vote with a nonracial campaign in which he ran “not as a black politician, but as a politician who happened to be black,” yet he still benefited from a black turnout rate 8% higher than that of whites. Wilder’s razor thin win with only 50.1% of the vote was nevertheless less impressive than his 52% vote victory for lieutenant governor (Morris and Bradley 1994: 278; Atkinson 2006b: 93).
As governor Wilder demonstrated his fiscal conservatism by balancing the budget without raising taxes, establishing a “rainy day” fund from surplus revenue in economically prosperous years, and earning Virginia one financial magazine’s rating as the “fiscally best run” state in the nation (Atkinson 2006b: 106, 1st quote; Edds and Morris 1999: 146, 2nd quote). However, some Democratic constituencies were angered by his cuts in education and social services and his freezing of state salaries during the recession of the early 1990s (Rozell 2003: 143; Atkinson 2006b: 136). Two of Wilder’s more “liberal” moments came when he successfully enacted a one-gun per month purchase limit law over the gun lobby’s opposition, and when he criticized the centrist Democratic Leadership Council as a pseudo-Republican group (Rozell 2003: 140, 141, 144). More problematic for Democrats was the constant infighting between Democrats Wilder, U.S. Senator Chuck Robb, and Attorney General Mary Sue Terry, and the constant battling between the governor and the Democratic-controlled state legislature (Edds and Morris 1999: 143). Such bickering within the party suggested that the 1980s era of Democratic resurgence was drawing to a close.
Even during the 1980s heyday of Democratic resurgence, Republicans were able to pull out a few prominent victories, particularly for the U.S. Senate. Republicans picked up Independent Harry Byrd’s U.S. Senate seat in 1982 with Congressman Paul Trible’s 51% win over Lieutenant Governor Richard Davis. Trible got an early start in organizing and raising funds for the race, was benefited by the technologically oriented state Republican Party, and outspent his Democratic opponent by a nearly two-to-one margin. Though posting a conservative voting record as Congressman, Trible had fought for his district’s interests and had reached out to African Americans by creating a black college scholarship fund with his own money and by voting for the Martin Luther King holiday. A somewhat wooden campaigner who was criticized by his Democratic opponent for taking a Vietnam-era draft deferment for a minor ailment, Trible accused his opponent of being a “liberal” and death penalty opponent who was associated with the unpopular policies of “Jimmy Carter and the national Democratic Party” and who would vote with Ted Kennedy in the senate (Atkinson 2006b: 52 quotes; Ehrenhalt 1983: 1557-1558). As senator, Trible continued his conservative voting record (Ehrenhalt 1987: 1551).
Republicans were also able to easily reelect their incumbent Senator John Warner on two occasions. In his first reelection of 1984, Warner applied his massive over five-to-one spending advantage to polish off with 70% of the vote former state representative Edythe Harrison (Lamis 1990: 260). Harrison, who had even lost her last race for the legislature, was an ally of the liberal Henry Howell, and she generated little enthusiasm among some of her own party members. In 1990 Democrats refrained from even offering an opponent to Warner, and he won reelection yet again with 82% of the vote over an Independent. Perhaps Democrats were unable to field strong opponents to Warner because of the Republican’s pragmatic nature. Despite an overall conservative voting record, Warner gained a reputation for pursuing bipartisanship, had shown some moderation on domestic issues by backing revisions of the Clean Air Act, and even had angered many conservatives of his own party by voting against President Reagan’s nomination of conservative scholar Robert Bork to the U.S. Supreme Court (Duncan 1991: 1522-1524).
More indicative of the Democratic resurgence of the 1980s was their easy pickup of Trible’s senate seat after his retirement in 1988. Democrat Chuck Robb had been such a popular governor that one poll had him leading incumbent senator Trible. Serving as a Washington D.C. lawyer after his gubernatorial term, Robb had sought to move the national Democratic Party more towards the center by co-founding the centrist Democratic Leadership Council and by promoting the creation of Super Tuesday, a day when most southern states would hold primaries simultaneously to select delegates to attend the national party convention, thereby creating a “Southern Primary” that would hopefully help to produce a more moderate or conservative presidential nominee. Employing a ten-to-one spending advantage over his politically inexperienced Republican opponent, Maurice Dawkins, a 67-year-old African American minister, Robb breezed to a 71% landslide victory. The only bump in the road for Robb were reports that he had attended beachfront parties along with businessmen who were later investigated for alleged cocaine use, a charge that Robb rebutted by taking and passing a drug test. Dawkins, who aggressively espoused the conservative philosophy of “self-reliance, anti-welfare state,” was unable to make significant inroads into the African American community despite being a “fiery” speaker (Sabato 1991: 237-239, 243; Duncan 1989: 1538-1539; quote in Rozell 2003: 141).
The decade of the 1990s began with Democratic mistakes as usual helping the Republican Party. A former beauty queen came forward and claimed that she had had an affair with Chuck Robb when he had been governor, prompting the senator to admit that she had given him a nude massage in a hotel. Seeking to divert attention from their bosses’ personal problems, three Robb aides leaked an illegally obtained cellular phone conversation of Wilder’s where the governor had gloated over his rival’s problems, resulting in the aides’ convictions of minor charges. As Wilder floated a stillborn trial balloon for the Democratic presidential nomination while the state’s economy took a nosedive and the governor bickered with the state legislature controlled by his own party, Republicans made dramatic gains in the state senate in the 1991 elections so that they now controlled over 40% of the seats in both legislative chambers (Edds and Morris 1999: 139, 142-145).
Republicans won back the governorship in 1993 with George Allen, a former state representative and one-term congressman whose father was the well-known coach of the Washington Redskins. Allen defeated Democratic two-term attorney general, Mary Sue Terry. Allen, by projecting an independent, American West persona as he “campaigned in cowboy boots, chewed tobacco, and decorated his office with animal skins.” The Republican also skillfully exploited the infighting among prominent Democratic officeholders by asking voters to send a message to the “’Robb-Wilder-Terry’ Democrats” (Edds and Morris 1999: 1st quote 147, 145; Rozell 2003: 145, 2nd quote). Allen shored up his conservative support by pledging to “abolish parole, reduce government spending, and reform welfare,” while his Democratic opponent called for a five-day waiting period for handgun purchases. The Republican gained an anti-crime image by blasting the Democratic attorney general for presiding over rising violent crime and for supporting a “dishonest, lenient, liberal parole system,” and by publicizing his own endorsement from the Fraternal Order of Police (Edds and Morris 1999: 146, 1st quote; Atkinson 2006b: 162, 2nd quote, 169). With Terry lacking “presence” on the campaign trail and alienating her base by attacking President Clinton’s economic program, refusing help from labor unions, and delaying in seeking Governor Wilder’s support, Allen won a landslide 58% to Terry’s 41% (Rozell 2003: 145 quote; Atkinson 2006b: 174).
As governor, Allen was credited with leadership in abolishing parole and enacting truth-in-sentencing, reforming welfare, enacting a strict parental notification of minor’s abortions, supporting charter schools, and attracting high-tech industry to the state through new tax incentives, though his proposed tax cut was killed in the legislature because of opposition to its resulting cuts in education programs (Edds and Morris 1999: 147, 152-154, 163; Nutting and Stern 2001: 1039; Atkinson 2006b: 133, 137). In the 1995 legislative elections, the GOP gained parity with Democrats in the state senate after Allen and GOP lawmakers emulated Gingrich’s Contract with America tactics of the year before as they offered Virginians a “Pledge for Honest Change” agenda (Atkinson 2006b: 204). Lamenting that the state Democratic party was “out of touch with mainstream Virginia,” one Democratic state senator forced his own party to enact a power-sharing arrangement with Republicans. Meanwhile, partisan bitterness rose in the state house as the Democratic Speaker booted two GOP leaders “from key committees in retaliation for their leadership roles in the preceding fall’s GOP campaigns” (Atkinson 2006b: 219, 1st quote; 220, 2nd quote). In his last two years, Allen enacted education reform that included increased funding for elementary, secondary, and higher education, accountability through rigorous student testing, reduced class sizes in early school grades, and more funding for classroom technology (Atkinson 2006b: 140-142). Allen’s legislative successes are attributed to his “aw-shucks demeanor,” “intellectual rigor, philosophical motivation, and political ingenuity,” his willingness to share “credit with lawmakers,” and his eventual stress on “conciliation and compromise” (Atkinson 2006b: 131, 1st two quotes; 145, 2nd two quotes).
Republicans swept all three statewide offices in 1997 for their first time in Virginia history. For governor, first term attorney general Jim Gilmore, a “straight-talking” prosecutor with “working-class roots” who was very “down-to-earth,” defeated two-term Democratic lieutenant governor Donald S. Beyer, Jr. with 56-43% of the vote, making this election second only to the previous gubernatorial election for a weak Democratic popular vote showing (Atkinson 2006b: 230). Voters appeared to prefer Gilmore’s education plan to hire four thousand new teachers to Beyer’s pledge to raise teachers’ salaries to the national average, as well as to favor the Republican’s pledge to eliminate the personal property tax on cars and trucks worth less than $20,000 over Beyer’s more modest car-tag plan (Edds and Morris 1999: 157-159). Beyer played defense throughout the campaign, first having to deny that he would raise taxes to pay for his promised massive investments in schools and roads, and then finding himself having to offer a car-tax cut plan of his own that was “derisively dubbed ‘car tax lite’ by reporters” (Atkinson 2006b: 227 quote, 223-224). Gilmore was also benefited by Governor Allen’s popularity and the good economy, as well as by Doug Wilder’s refusal to endorse anyone for governor, perhaps because of Gilmore’s aggressiveness as attorney general in vigorously investigating a rash of black church burnings (Atkinson 2006b: 229, 235). Republicans also won the lieutenant governorship with John Hager, a retired tobacco executive and long-time party activist who had spent years in a wheelchair because of polio. The GOP completed its sweep by electing as attorney general conservative pro-life state senator Mark Earley. Winning endorsements from prominent moderate and liberal newspapers, Earley was elected attorney general in a 58% landslide vote (Edds and Morris 1999: 158, 160).
Republicans also narrowly gained control of the state senate for the first time in the 20th century after special elections necessitated by two Democratic senators accepting positions in Gilmore’s administration, though the power-sharing arrangement struck two years earlier remained in effect (Edds and Morris 1999: 139). In the state house, an Independent’s switch to the GOP after the election produced an even split between the parties, thereby ushering in a four-year power-sharing arrangement there as well (Atkinson 2006b: 243). After the 1999 legislative midterm elections, Republicans gained outright control of the state house and elected a Speaker from their own party, and the GOP retained control of both legislative chambers into the 21st century (Atkinson 2006b: 251; McGlennon 2002: 207). Meanwhile, as governor Jim Gilmore delivered on his car-tag pledge by having state government reimburse taxpayers for the personal property tax that they paid on their cars. He also enacted innovative information technology measures and established a state technology secretary, cut college tuition, and diverted lottery money to the public schools, though liberals were angered by his declaration of a Confederate History Month (McGlennon 2003: 200; Rozell 2003: 137; Atkinson 2006b: 146).
Both parties’ U.S. senators were reelected in the mid-1990s, though both elections were competitive. To take on Democratic Senator Robb and his personal problems, Republican state convention delegates in 1994 narrowly nominated with 55% of the vote Ollie North, who had been convicted for obstructing Congress in the Iran-Contra scandal during the Reagan presidency (though the conviction was later overturned). The conservative North proceeded to offer a “culture war” against “promoters of abortion rights, homosexuals in the military, and big government” and accused President Clinton and Chuck Robb of “betrayal of the men and women” in the armed forces (Edds and Morris 1999: 149 quote, 137). Republican were bitterly split over the controversial North with Virginia’s other U.S. senator, Republican John Warner, charging that “North has betrayed President Reagan” and supporting Republican Marshall Coleman’s decision to run for the senate as an Independent. Even former First Lady Nancy Reagan blasted North for having “lied to my husband and lied about my husband” and “kept things from him that he should not have kept from him” (Atkinson 2006b: 187, 1st quote; Edds and Morris 1999: 150 2nd quote, 148).
Meanwhile, Senator Robb portrayed himself as a centrist who had backed the Persian Gulf War, opposed deficit spending, and had won lucrative defense contracts for Virginia firms. Robb went on to win his first and last reelection with 46% of the vote to North’s 43% with two-time losing GOP gubernatorial hopeful Coleman pulling in 11% (Atkinson 2006b: 194). Exit polls revealed the effects of North’s ethical problems stemming from his involvement in the Iran-Contra scandal, and the impact of his perceived extreme conservatism on voters. The loser North won a vote majority only among born-again white Christians and among gun enthusiasts, while winning less than one-third of the votes of other voters (Rozell 2007: 152; Atkinson 2006b: 199). Despite Robb’s reelection as a centrist, he increasingly governed as a liberal. Reflecting the trend in other states for southern parties to increasingly realign along ideological lines, Robb’s roll call voting record, which had generally been moderate-to-moderate liberal before his reelection, veered towards a more liberal orientation afterwards (Duncan 1993: 1572; Duncan and Nutting 1999: 1401).
Angered by Senator John Warner’s “disloyalty” to GOP nominee North, Ollie backed the man he had defeated for the 1994 senate GOP nomination, Reagan’s former budget chief Jim Miller, in Miller’s attempt to deny Warner the GOP senate nomination in 1996. Also winning support from the NRA and Christian Coalition, Miller proceeded to blast Warner as a “Clinton Republican” who had supported Clinton administration proposals 60% of the time (Atkinson 2006b: 205). The GOP challenger was the clear favorite among Republican convention delegates, prompting Warner to invoke a little-known state law permitting an incumbent to choose the method of renomination. Choosing a primary election, Warner attracted Independents and Democrats and won renomination with 66% of the vote. The embattled incumbent proceeded to stress his military experience and to explain to voters that he voted “his conscience, putting principle before politics” (Atkinson 2006b: 207). Despite being outspent over two-to-one by Democrat Mark Warner, a cellular phone multimillionaire and former state Democratic party chair, Republican John Warner was reelected to a fourth term with 53% of the vote (Edds and Morris 1999: 154-155; Rozell 2003: 147-148; McGlennon 1997: 217; Duncan and Lawrence 1997: 1476, 1477). Given Warner’s obvious popularity with voters even in the face of dissension within his own party and a well-funded opponent, Democrats failed to even offer an opponent to the Republican incumbent’s next reelection bid, which Warner won in 2002 with 83% of the vote over two independents (Koszczuk and Stern 2005: 1050).
Republicans flexed their muscles in 2000 by knocking off Senator Chuck Robb and picking up the state’s second U.S. Senate seat with George Allen. A popular former governor, Allen was widely regarded as a “likeable figure” who was “comfortable in jeans and cowboy boots” and had a “backslapping fellowship” demeanor, a contrast to Robb’s “low-key demeanor” (Nutting and Stern 2001: 1039). Blasting Robb for supportingPresident Clinton’s programs 80% of the time, Allen claimed to represent “Virginia values” instead of “Clinton values,” and also benefited from his record as the “education governor” (Atkinson 2006b: 263 1st two quotes, 264 3rd quote). Crippled by “questions about his personal life,” Robb was outspent by $10 million to $6.8 million, and went down to defeat by a 52-48% vote margin (Nutting and Stern 2001: 1039 quote, 1154). Allen’s victory was cemented by Republican presidential candidate George Bush’s comfortable 52.5% win in Virginia over Gore’s 44.4% (McGlennon 2002: 210, 214). As senator, Allen compiled a conservative voting record that consistently took the conservative position over 80% of the time and the liberal position less than 20% of the time, while also championing the state’s high-tech industry (Koszczuk and Stern 2005: 1053).
Democrats showed some resiliency by winning back the governor’s office in 2001 and then keeping it in the next election. Democrat Mark Warner stressed his conservative values as a cautious businessman, who would not raise broad-based taxes, would uphold the traditional family, would protect the right to bear arms, and would only veto new restrictions on abortion instead of repealing existing ones. Warner reached out to rural areas with extensive personal campaigning, running an ad with a bluegrass song that hailed him as a “good ol’ boy from up in Nova-ville,” and organizing a “Sportsmen for Warner” group (Sabato 2001: 7 quote, 6). Republican Attorney General Mark Earley, a staunch conservative, survived a bitter nomination battle with Lieutenant Governor John Hager, and proceeded to lose moderate and liberal Republican support to Warner as well as losing businessmen who had backed Hager (Atkinson 2006b: 269-270). Going negative and accusing the Democrats of having “the most liberal ticket in Virginia history,” Earley was nevertheless outgunned by a two-to-one spending disadvantage, partly due to the multi-millionaire Democrat’s spending some of his own fortune on his campaign, and the Republican also faced a disadvantage in editorial endorsements (Sabato 2001: 8 quote, 10; Rozell 2007: 155). Democrats were also helped by Warner’s promise to retain the popular conservative programs enacted by the two previous GOP governors, and by a split within the GOP between conservatives who wanted to continue the car tag relief program and moderate senators who feared the loss of revenue because of an economic downturn (Atkinson 2006b: 255, 269-270). Warner won the governorship with 52% of the vote to Earley’s 47%, and Richmond Mayor Tim Kaine regained the lieutenant governorship for the Democrats (Sabato 2001: 13).
As
governor, Mark Warner faced a serious budget shortfall by first imposing deep
spending cuts and then two years later working with legislative Republicans to
enact a $1.4 billion tax hike program. This prudent approach to the economic
crisis gave him an image of a “statesman,” and support from the “broad,
independent middle” of the state electorate (Atkinson 2006b: 281 quote, 278).
Naming him as “Public Official of the Year” in 2004, Governing magazine
praised Warner’s management of state government, which had preserved the
state’s triple-A credit rating and permitted some targeted investments into
important education priorities (Atkinson 2006b: 283 quote, 280).
In
2005 Democrats retained the governorship with Lieutenant Governor Tim Kaine
beating GOP Attorney General Jerry Kilgore by a 52-46% vote margin, though the
competitiveness of state elections was reflected in Republican Bill Bolling
being elected lieutenant governor by a margin of only 1.2% of the vote and GOP
Bob McDonnell elected as attorney general by only 323 votes among over 1.9
million votes cast (see Website: http://www.sbe.virginia.gov/cms/).
Kaine, the son-in-law of former GOP governor Linwood Holton, ran as a moderate
and tied himself to the popular outgoing Democratic governor Mark Warner, who
“vouched for Kaine’s character and solidarity with the Warner agenda and bipartisan
approach,” while the Republican was backed by President Bush and Senator Allen
(Atkinson 2006b: 288; Whitley 2005). Both candidates focused on education with
Kaine backing expanding Virginia’s preschool kindergarten program and Kilgore
favoring a tax break for parents to buy school supplies. As both campaigns
turned nasty, Kilgore accused the Democrat of being a liberal who as a civil
rights lawyer had fought against the death penalty, while Kaine responded that
he would enforce the state’s death penalty “because it’s ‘the law’” (Whitley
2005). Though losing the governorship once again, Republicans kept control of
both chambers of the state legislature, holding about 58% of the seats in each
chamber. Working with the legislature, as governor in his first year Kaine
dramatically increased funding for K-12 education (Governor Kaine's
website).
The
competitiveness of two-party politics in today’s Virginia was illustrated in
the 2006 elections, when incumbent Senator Allen was narrowly unseated by
Democrat Jim Webb. Webb, a former Marine whose Vietnam service had earned him
several medals, was a former Republican who had served as Assistant Secretary
of Defense in the Reagan Administration. The Democrat immediately ran an ad
where President Reagan at a 1985 Naval Academy commencement address had praised
his service, and he also wore his son’s combat boots on the campaign trail to
honor his son’s continuing the family military tradition by serving in Iraq
(Boyer 2006; Richmond Times-Dispatch 2006). The challenger proceeded to play on
the public’s dissatisfaction with the Iraqi war and other problems facing the
nation, as he blasted President Bush’s “incompetence” for hindering “our ability to fight international
terror," and called for the election of a “new team in Congress,” “a
Democratic Congress,” which would provide “a new direction in Iraq” (Whitley 2006).
Meanwhile, an overconfident Allen, touted
by some Republicans as a likely presidential hopeful, ribbed a Webb staffer of
Asian-Indian descent who was filming him at a campaign rally: “This
fellow here, over here, with the yellow shirt … Macaca, or whatever his
name is, he’s with my opponent… So, welcome, let’s give a welcome to Macaca
here. Welcome to America, and the real world of Virginia” (Boyer 2006). Allen
suddenly found himself on the defensive against charges of racism, as he denied
any awareness that the word “macaca” was a racial slur used by whites in some
French-colonized African nations to
refer to a type of monkey, a macaque. The embattled Republican also found
himself rejecting charges that as a college football player decades ago, he had
used the N word to describe blacks (Stallsmith 2006). In pulling off a narrow
upset with 49.6% of the vote to 49.2% for the incumbent, exit polls found
Democrat Webb winning the votes of 56% of Independents, 60% of self-identified
moderates, and even 42% of whites (http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/pages/results/states/VA/S/01/epolls.0.html).
The competitiveness of the
state’s two parties was also illustrated the next year, when Democrats narrowly
regained control of the state senate, while Republicans maintained control of the state house.
The year 2008 was a good year for Democrats in Virginia as it was nationally. Not only was Obama able to pick off Virginia, the first time since 1964 that Democrats were able to win the presidential race in that state, but Democrats picked up Virginia's second U.S. senate seat and also won majority control of the U.S. house delegation with a net pickup of three seats. Two former governors faced off for the senate seat vacated by Republican veteran John Warner. Republican Jim Gilmore's major gubernatorial accomplishment had been his slashing of the car tag tax, prompting many law enforcement officials to endorse his senatorial opponent after blasting Gilmore's tax cuts that had "ravaged public safety in Virginia" by cutting anti-crime funding (Schapiro 2008). Gilmore's Democratic opponent and his successor as governor, Mark Warner, proceeded to take credit for dealing with Gilmore's mess as he had "erased a budget deficit, ended partisan bickering and left the state rated as the best managed state and best state for business in the nation" (Whitley 2007). Voters evidently agreed with Democrat Warner, as two-thirds of Independents and three-fourths of moderates backed him as he went on to win a nearly two-to-one victory over the outclassed Republican (http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#val=VAS01p1).
Republicans staged a comeback the very next year, regaining the governor's mansion, retaining both offices of lieutenant governor and attorney general, and gaining some state legislative seats. As early as February Republican Bob McDonnell, the state's popular attorney general, held a narrow lead in the race for governor over likely Democratic nominees such as state representative R. Creig Deeds (http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/election_2009/virginia/election_2009_virginia_governor_election). In the general election campaign, Democratic nominee Deeds proceeded to blast Republican nominee McDonnell for writing a Masters thesis 20 years ago that was allegedly "hostile to working women and their reproductive rights" (paraphrased), prompting the Republican during a debate to point to his wife and daughter in the audience, both working women with one serving in Iraq (Nolan 2009). Endorsing all three Republican candidates for the statewide offices, the Richmond Times-Dispatch praised McDonnell as a man of "moderate temperament, broad experience, and sound philosophy," who offered "pragmatic, creative solutions for the state's many challenges" (Richmond Times-Dispatch 2009). The final nail in the Democrat's coffin was the bad economy during Obama's first year as President, as the nearly half of voters who regarded it as the most important issue went Republican by a 15 percentage point margin. Winning Independents by a two-to-one margin, Republican McDonnell coasted to a landslide 59% vote victory. Republicans continued their winning ways in the 2010 midterm congressional elections, making a net gain of three U.S. House seats and reaching their historic high of controlling 73% of the state's U.S. House delegation.
Democrats had a good year in 2012, winning the top prizes of carrying Virginia for Obama once again and replacing retiring Senator Webb with former Democratic governor Tim Kaine, though Republicans retained their lopsided U.S. house delegation size. Democrat Kaine ran as a moderate who would strive for compromises with Republicans, as he suggested a middle-ground that would raise taxes only on those making over $500,000, and even ran a positive ad about former President Bush (Grant 2012). With Democrats outnumbering Republicans 39-32% among exit poll voters, Obama carrying the state, and partisans and Obama-Romney voters being over 90% likely to vote for the same party in the senate race, Kaine defeated former governor and senator, George Allen (website: http://www.cnn.com/election/2012/results/state/VA/senate).
The 2013 state elections continued the Democratic resurgence, as the party won back not only the governorship but the two other statewide offices. Former Democratic National Committee chair Terry McAuliffe blasted Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli, backed by Christian conservatives and tea party activists, for his uncompromising and faith-based conservative positions on abortion and same sex marriage (Fisher 2013). With Democrats outnumbering Republicans among exit poll voters by a 37% to 32% margin and being even more united behind their party's candidate (95% versus 92% for Republican loyalty), McAuliffe won a narrow 48% vote to the Republican's 45% (see website: http://www.nytimes.com/projects/elections/2013/general/virginia/exit-polls.html). One bright spot for the GOP was that despite elections for all seats in the lower house, they retained their overwhelming hold on 68% of that chamber's seats.
The 2014 national GOP tsunami was so strong that it nearly upended popular U.S. senator and former governor Democrat Mark Warner. With 58% of voters disapproving of President Obama's job performance and with the parties tied in party identification (at 36% each of exit poll voters), only Warner's greater popularity over former RNC chair Ed Gillespie's saved him (Warner had a 56% favorable, 42% unfavorable rating, compared to Gillespie's 48-47% ratings in a CNN exit poll). Winning by less than 1% of the vote, the shaken Warner reinforced his bipartisan reputation by pledging to "end the gridlock and get back to work" and to "work with anyone, Republican or Democrat," to "get the Senate back in the business of solving problems and not simply scoring political points" (Vozzella, Olivo, Portnoy 2014).
The 2016 election year was yet another good year for Virginia Democrats, as Virginia was the only southern state that backed Clinton for president. Democrats outnumbered Republicans by 40% to 33% among voters, 54% of voters approved of Obama's job performance as President (only 45% disapproved), and conservatives outnumbered liberals by only 7% (33% vs. 26%), and all of these categories voted for President in the expected partisan direction (92% of Democrats backed Clinton, for example). Though Republicans retained control of the state's U.S. House delegation, Democrats did pickup one seat to narrow the gap (http://www.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls/virginia/president).
The Democratic state victories in 2017 confirmed that Virginia has now become a Democratic leaning state, as Democrats won all three statewide contests and made impressive gains in the state house. Democratic gubernatorial candidate Ralph S. Northam had much connection to the state. Born in Virginia and having attended Virginia Military Institute and Eastern Virginia Medical School, Northam had served 8 years in the Army in the Medical Corps, 6 years in the Virginia state senate, and was completing his term as the state's Lieutenant Governor. Republican gubernatorial hopeful Ed Gillespie had more of a national focus, having been a previous Chair of the Republican National Committee and a Counselor to President Bush, though he had run a close senate race in 2014. While the Republican in paid ads sought to exploit divisive cultural issues by supporting Confederate monuments and blasting the Democratic governor-lieutenant governor team for restoring voting rights to thousands of convicted felons, Northam wisely ducked any ideological "liberal" label. Having voted twice for President Bush, and described as "a moderate by inclination," Northam pledged to sign any law banning sanctuary cities, and to defer to local authorities on the fate of Confederate statues (Martin 2017). The new Democratic advantage in the state was reflected in exit polls showing that 41% of voters were Democratic and only 30% Republican, with each candidate getting at least 95% of their party's supporters and Independents splitting fairly evenly. Northam also received 77% of the vote of those caring about the single most important issue (health care), and won 64% of moderates and even 42% of whites. Reflecting the possible weighing of state versus national level assocations, outgoing Democratic Governor McAuliffe had a 54% approval rating among voters versus a mere 40% approval rating for President Trump (https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/virginia-politics/governor-exit-polls/?utm_term=.b30ba7f80680). Not only did Northam win a convincing 54-45% victory, but Democrats swept the two other statewide offices, which included the election of African American Justin Fairfax, a former assistant U.S. Attorney, as lieutenant governor. Democrats also made gains in the state house, winning 49 seats to the GOP 51.
Democrats had good years in 2018 and 2020. In 2018 they reelected first-term Senator Tim Kaine and gained easy control of the state's U.S. House delegation. Democrats outnumbered Republicans among exit poll voters by 38-31%, and President Trump had only a 43% approval rating (57% disapprove), problems for the GOP as about 90% of people voted consistent with their partisanship and views of Trump. Senator Kaine stressed "jobs, health care, education, and 'a Virginia that works for all'". Republican Corey Stewart, a county supervisors board chairman, "ran on hard-line opposition to illegal immigration and support for the Trump agenda" (Moomaw 2018, all quotes). Kaine ended up winning 53% of Independents, 69% of moderates, and even 42% of whites (https://www.cnn.com/election/2018/exit-polls). Democrats made further gains in the 2019 state elections, winning back majority control of both state legislative chambers, making Virginia the only southern state where Democrats controlled even one state legislative chamber. Despite allegations involving all three statewide elected Democratic officials, with the governor and attorney general accused of wearing blackface in college and the lieutenant governor accused of rape in college, Democratic legislative candidates successfully pushed such issues as health care (Medicaid expansion, Medicare for all) and gun control (to deal with mass shootings) and outspent Republicans thanks to donations from such liberal interest groups as a gun control group (Wilson 2019). In 2020 Democrats reelected Senator Mark Warner, as he beat a disabled war hero Daniel Gade. Warner backed inclusive civil rights, public education, reducing college student debt, renewable energy investments, and enhanced veteran benefits, and touted next generation technologies (Miller 2020). Expanding on the mere 2% edge that Democrats held over Republicans in a CNN exit poll, the incumbent Democrat won 68% of moderates, 59% of Independents, and a respectable 45% of whites.
Republicans staged a comeback in 2021, winning all three statewide elective offices by very narrow margins, and regaining control of the state house. Democratic former governor Terry McAuliffe lost to Republican businessman Glenn Youngkin, who portrayed himself as "a likeable moderate who wears a red fleece vest," accepted Trump's endorsement but then refused to campaign with him and basically kept Trump out of the state. When Democrat McAuliffe defended the right of educators to teach controversial subjects like critical race theory, Youngkin blasted him as a tool of the teachers' union who wanted to keep parents out of the classroom (Schneider and Vozzella, 2021). Though 36% of exit poll voters were Democrats and 34% Republicans, nationalizing the election by having former President Obama, Vice President Harris, and voting rights activist Stacey Abrams campaign for him probably didn't help McAuliffe, since President Biden had only a 46% approval rating (53% disapprove). Youngkin's 50% favorable approval rating exceeded McAuliffe's 47%, and the Republican was benefitted by the two top issues of the economy and education (named by 33% and 24% of voters, respectively), where he won 55% and 53% vote totals. Indeed, 52% of voters said that parents should have a lot of say in what schools teach, and 51% rejected the political correctness of removing Confederate monuments (https://www.cnn.com/election/2021/november/exit-polls/virginia/governor/). Republicans also elected Winsome Sears as lieutenant governor, and Jason Miyares as attorney general, the first black woman and first Latino elected to statewide office. Sears rejected victimhood as divisive, and related how her father had brought her to America from Jamaica for jobs and opportunity, and she proudly recounted how she had lived the American dream (Thomas 2021). Sears was a former Marine, who was the only black Republican state legislator and the only Republican who had represented a majority black district. An anti-abortion and pro-gun rights candidate, she ridiculed the Democratic governor's mask mandate, but her independent nature was also evident in her campaign website where she said she was proudest of her community work leading a men's prison ministry and directing a women's Salvation Army homeless shelter. Miyares' family had left Cuba and he was born in North Carolina, and he was elected three times to the Virginia house. The first Cuban American in that body, his voting record was a conservative but not an extreme one. Indeed, one of his first acts as attorney general was to accept the resignation of a deputy attorney general who on facebook had referred to the January 6, 2021 Capitol rioters as "patriots," with his spokesperson reiterating that: "The attorney general has been very clear. Joe Biden won the election and he has condemned the January 6 attack" (Lybrand and Rabinowitz, 2022). Democrats staged a comeback in the 2023 legislative contests, as they narrowly regained control of the state house, giving them conrol of both state legislative chambers. With Governor Youngkin pushing for a 15-week abortion ban, Democratic ads stressed their party's pro-choice posture, helping them in suburban swing districts despite President Biden's modest 43% approval rating in Virginia (compared to Youngkin's 54%)(Montellaro 2023b).
As
in other Rim South states, competitive party politics emerged in Virginia at a
relatively early time, as the state voted twice for Eisenhower in the 1950s and
elected a GOP governor and U.S. senator in 1969 and 1972, respectively. Like
Arkansas, Virginia’s first GOP governor was a progressive, but conservatives
fleeing the increasingly liberal direction of the state and national Democratic
Party quickly transformed the state GOP into a conservative organization.
Unique among the southern states was the rapid deterioration of the Virginia
Democratic Party, which lost seven major elections in the decade of the 1970s
as liberals challenged and then defeated more moderate candidates for the
party’s nominations for governor and U.S. senator (Table 11-1). Also unique was
how quickly moderate Democrats responded, adopting a nominating convention
process to reduce the influence of liberals, and offering voters more moderate
candidates who during the 1980s won three consecutive gubernatorial elections
and won back one of the state’s U.S. senate seats. The GOP surged back in the
1990s and established a GOP advantage in state politics by generally
controlling two of the three top elective offices (governor and two U.S.
senators), which in the early years of the 21st century even
included control of the state legislature and a majority of U.S. house seats.
The fact that top offices in the state today are often won with 53% or less of
the vote, that the public is closely divided in terms of their partisan
identifications, and that Democrats won recent contests in 2005, 2006, and
2008 for governor and senator (though lost the governorship in 2009),
illustrates that Republicans are nowhere close to establishing the kind
of political dominance that the Democrats enjoyed during the Byrd machine’s
heyday (Table 11-2).
The
Democratic disasters of the 1970s began in 1969, when liberal leader Henry
Howell lost the gubernatorial nomination, and his natural constituency of labor
and African Americans ended up helping to elect a racially liberal Republican,
Linwood Holton, as governor. Democrats were so badly split in 1973 that they
offered no gubernatorial candidate, Howell ran as an independent, and former
Democratic governor Mills Godwin was elected as a Republican, after accusing
the liberal Howell of supporting forced busing. The ultimate victory for
liberals was Howell’s capture of the Democratic gubernatorial nomination in
1977, though it was a temporary win as Republican John Dalton, backed by
two-term formerly Democratic and now Republican governor Godwin, won the governorship
(Table 11-3). Having nearly been beated for the Democratic U.S. senate
nomination by an anti-organization candidate in 1966 and then losing black
support on the way to a narrow victory in the general election, Senator Byrd in
1970 dealt with rumors of a liberal challenger in the party primary by promptly
running for re-election as an Independent and winning. Another setback for the
Democrats was the ability of Republicans in 1972 to elect a U.S. senator,
unseating a moderate Democratic incumbent whom they tied to the liberal
Democratic presidential candidate, George McGovern, an ideologically extreme
national Democrat who lost the state in a landslide.
Unlike
the futile national Democrats who, after agricultural-extremist William
Jennings Bryan’s three fruitless races for the presidency at the outset of the
20th century, remained in the political wilderness as a minority
party for thirty years, or the hapless Republicans who likewise were
politically impotent nationwide for decades after the Great Depression and the
New Deal, Virginia Democrats stormed back to political power after only a
decade. In the 1980s they elected three successive governors, each of whom
assembled a broad, biracial coalition around ideologically diverse issues.
Charles Robb, Gerald Baliles, and Douglas Wilder all were elected as fiscal
conservatives (with African American Wilder also stressing his law-and-order
credentials and running as a well qualified candidate and not merely as a black
candidate). Yet all three were able to win African American and liberal support
by also offering progressive views on social and race issues (Table 11-3). Robb
was such a successful governor that he went on to two terms in the U.S. senate,
where he sought to move the national Democratic party back towards the
ideological center. While offering a moderate who unified Democrats was a
winning strategy in these cases, it was not sufficient to derail John Warner
from keeping Senator Scott’s seat Republican in 1978, as his well organized and
financed campaign coupled with a famous actress wife produced a very narrow
victory.
Some
type of partisan equilibrium was finally achieved by the 1990s, as the two
parties split the next five gubernatorial elections and as Harry Byrd’s
old
senate seat switched between the two parties. Candidates from each party
benefited by seizing on popular issues, projecting winning personalities, and
exploiting divisions in the other party. Republicans elected the conservative
and folksy Allen as governor after a police association endorsed him, and his
opponent angered normally Democratic constituencies. Republican Gilmore,
backing a popular (at the time) car tag tax cut issue, succeeded him.
Democrats elected Mark
Warner governor, benefiting from their candidate’s focus on his conservative
values, his willingness to spend some of his personal wealth to wage an
effective campaign, and his astute courting of rural voters, and were also
helped by a bitterly divided Republican party. Democrats kept the governorship
with Tim Kaine, who was elected on his popular predecessor’s coattails (Table
11-3). Meanwhile, Republicans gained the state’s second U.S. senate seat for
six years, as popular former governor Allen unseated Chuck Robb, the incumbent
who was hurt by questions about his personal life. Democrats quickly won back
the seat by offering a decorated Marine and former Republican with past ties to
President Reagan, who capitalized over an Allen campaign mistake and over
public anger over the endless Iraq war quagmire. Indeed, the partisan
yo-yo even appeared to be back, as Democrats won the second senate seat in 2008 after John
Warner's retirement, and Republicans won back the governor's office the
next year.
Up until the last three years of the Bush administration, Republicans had
appeared to be the more dominant party in federal elections, carrying
Virginia in every
presidential election since 1952, except for the Goldwater debacle.
Indeed, the early years of the
new century found Republicans controlling 8 of the state’s 11 U.S. house seats.
The possible linkage in the public mind between presidential politics and
campaigns for other offices had been a nightmare for Democrats. President
Bush
carried 9 of the state’s U.S. house districts in his 2004 reelection, and all
except one had also voted for a GOP congressman. The Democratic
congressional
delegation after that election consisted of a liberal African American
representing a majority black district, a white liberal representing a district
with a significant black and Hispanic population, and a moderate liberal white
first elected in 1982 to the state’s poorest, most rural, and most blue collar
9th district. Every one of the returning GOP congress members were
whites with conservative voting records (Koszczuk and Stern 2005). The
increasing ideological polarization of the two parties was also evident in the
U.S. senate. As late as the 1960s Democratic senators offered a conservative
(Harry Byrd) or moderate (William Spong) voting record to their fellow
Virginians, but Democrat Chuck Robb left office in 2000 with a fairly liberal record.
The ideological purity of the modern Republican party is even more evident, as
all four GOP U.S. senators from William Scott to George Allen compiled solid
conservative records (Table 11-4). The Democratic resurgence of 2005-2008 in
Virginia illustrates that association with the "liberal" national
Democratic Party is not always fatal for a southern state Democratic
Party, and could offer lessons to Democratic Party candidates in other Rim
South states.
Nevertheless, some growing ideological polarization of the two parties is
evident in state politics. Prior to the 1990s, both Democratic and
Republican governors
pursued a range of ideologically diverse policies with Republican Holton being
a racial liberal and Democrats Robb and Wilder balancing the state budget without
a tax increase. The Republican governors of the 1990s were more known for
conservative programs, ranging from Allen’s enactment of anti-crime, pro-life,
and welfare reform policies to Gilmore’s tax cuts and courting of Confederate
history fans. Democratic governors of the new century have clearly focused on
education with both Warner and Kaine increasing funding for kindergartens and
public elementary and secondary education. In the case of state politics, the
fact that both parties are able to emphasize popular issues on their end of the
ideological spectrum keeps both parties politically competitive.
At the outset of the 21st century, both political parties in Virginia were very ideologically distinct. Among Republican party activists, “ideological diversity has been largely eliminated” and “all but a handful” of Republicans called themselves conservative with 58% even claiming to be “very conservative” in ideology (McGlennon 2003: 204). Democratic activists inhabited a broader tent, but as in other southern states a tent with a growing left-wing. Fully 31% of Democratic activists called themselves “very liberal,” 35% were “somewhat liberal,” 26% were moderate and only 8% remained conservative (McGlennon 2003: 204). Perhaps the greatest challenge facing both of the parties in this modern era of intense partisan competition is for party activists to avoid satisfying their personal views by nominating ideologically “pure” candidates. Much like George McGovern and Barry Goldwater nationally, such ideologically extreme choices would likely be unelectable in Virginia. Virginia Democrats learned that lesson in the 1970s. Republicans may have suffered a similar lesson with the Christian Right backing for 1994 senatorial loser Ollie North, and with gubernatorial nominee Mark Earley who went on to lose the 2001 election for state chief executive (Edds and Morris 1999: 161-163).
Table 11-1
Governors and U.S. Senators and Their Parties in Modern Virginia
|
|
Democrats |
|
Republicans |
||||
|
|
Governors |
Senators |
Senators |
|
Governors |
Senators |
Senators |
|
1969 |
|
Byrd |
Spong |
|
Holton* |
|
|
|
1970 |
|
Byrd*+ |
Spong |
|
Holton |
|
|
|
1972 |
|
Byrd |
|
|
Holton |
|
Scott* |
|
1973 |
|
Byrd |
|
|
Godwin* |
|
Scott |
|
1974 |
|
Byrd |
|
|
Godwin |
|
Scott |
|
1976 |
|
Byrd*+ |
|
|
Godwin |
|
Scott |
|
1977 |
|
Byrd |
|
|
Dalton* |
|
Scott |
|
1978 |
|
Byrd |
|
|
Dalton |
|
Warner* |
|
1980 |
|
Byrd |
|
|
Dalton |
|
Warner |
|
1981 |
Robb* |
Byrd |
|
|
|
|
Warner |
|
1982 |
Robb |
|
|
|
|
Trible* |
Warner |
|
1984 |
Robb |
|
|
|
|
Trible |
Warner* |
|
1985 |
Baliles* |
|
|
|
|
Trible |
Warner |
|
1986 |
Baliles |
|
|
|
|
Trible |
Warner |
|
1988 |
Baliles |
Robb* |
|
|
|
|
Warner |
|
1989 |
Wilder* |
Robb |
|
|
|
|
Warner |
|
1990 |
Wilder |
Robb |
|
|
|
|
Warner* |
|
1992 |
Wilder |
Robb |
|
|
|
|
Warner |
|
1993 |
|
Robb |
|
|
Allen* |
|
Warner |
|
1994 |
|
Robb* |
|
|
Allen |
|
Warner |
|
1996 |
|
Robb |
|
|
Allen |
|
Warner* |
|
1997 |
|
Robb |
|
|
Gilmore* |
|
Warner |
|
1998 |
|
Robb |
|
|
Gilmore |
|
Warner |
|
2000 |
|
|
|
|
Gilmore |
Allen* |
Warner |
|
2001 |
M. Warner* |
|
|
|
|
Allen |
Warner |
|
2002 |
M. Warner |
|
|
|
|
Allen |
Warner* |
|
2004 |
M. Warner |
|
|
|
|
Allen |
Warner |
|
2005 |
Kaine* |
|
|
|
|
Allen |
Warner |
|
2006 |
Kaine |
Webb* |
|
|
|
|
Warner |
|
2008 |
Kaine |
Webb |
M. Warner* |
|
|
|
|
|
2009 |
Webb |
M. Warner |
McDonnell* |
|
|||
|
2010 |
Webb |
M. Warner |
McDonnell |
|
|||
|
2012 |
Kaine* |
M. Warner |
McDonnell |
|
|||
|
2013 |
McAuliffe* |
Kaine |
M. Warner |
|
|||
|
2014 |
McAuliffe |
Kaine |
M. Warner* |
|
|||
|
2016 |
McAuliffe |
Kaine |
M. Warner |
|
|||
|
2017 |
Northam* |
Kaine |
M. Warner |
|
|||
|
2018 |
Northam |
Kaine* |
M. Warner |
|
|||
|
2020 |
Northam |
Kaine |
M. Warner* |
|
|||
|
2021 |
Kaine |
M. Warner |
Youngkin* |
|
|||
|
2022 |
Kaine |
M. Warner |
Youngkin |
|
|||
Note: Cell entries indicate the governors and U.S. Senators elected in or serving during the years listed at the left. In Virginia, governors are elected in the odd-numbered year after a presidential election, so those years are included in this table.
* Indicates that the officeholder was elected in that year.
+ Harry Byrd was re-elected in 1970 and 1976 as an Independent, but he caucused with Senate Democrats.
Table 11-2. Republican
Growth in Virginia
|
Year of Election |
Pres. Vote (% Rep) |
U.S. Senate Seats* (% Rep
of 2 pty.) |
Gov. Pty.* (% Rep) |
Party Ident. (% Rep of 2
pty.) |
U.S. House Seats (% Rep) |
State Senate Seats (% Rep) |
State House Seats (% Rep) |
Sub-Gov. Office (% Rep) |
|
1970 |
NA |
0 (33) |
R-54 |
NA |
60 |
18 |
24 |
0 |
|
1972 |
69 |
50 (53) |
Rep |
NA |
70 |
18 |
25 |
0 |
|
1974 |
NA |
50 |
R-100 |
NA |
50 |
15 |
22 |
50 |
|
1976 |
51 |
50 (0) |
Rep |
35++ |
60 |
13 |
18 |
50 |
|
1978 |
NA |
50 (50) |
R-56 |
34++ |
60 |
15 |
22 |
50 |
|
1980 |
57 |
50 |
Rep |
40++ |
90 |
23 |
25 |
50 |
|
1982 |
NA |
100 (51) |
D-46 |
43 |
60 |
23 |
33 |
0 |
|
1984 |
63 |
100 (70) |
Dem |
54 |
60 |
20 |
34 |
0 |
|
1986 |
NA |
100 |
D-45 |
NA |
50 |
20 |
34 |
0 |
|
1988 |
60 |
50 (29) |
Dem |
44 |
50 |
25 |
35 |
0 |
|
1990 |
NA |
50 (100) |
D-50 |
48** |
40 |
25 |
40 |
0 |
|
1992 |
53 |
50 |
Dem |
NA |
36 |
45 |
41 |
0 |
|
1994 |
NA |
50 (48) |
R-59 |
NA |
45 |
45 |
47 |
50 |
|
1996 |
51 |
50 (53) |
Rep |
54 |
45 |
50 |
47 |
50 |
|
1998 |
NA |
50 |
R-57 |
52 |
45 |
53 |
49 |
100 |
|
2000 |
54 |
100 (52) |
Rep |
51+++ |
73+ |
53 |
53 |
100 |
|
2002 |
NA |
100 (100) |
D-47 |
NA |
73 |
58 |
65 |
50 |
|
2004 |
54 |
100 |
Dem |
53+++ |
73 |
60 |
62 |
50 |
|
2006 |
NA |
50 (50) |
D-47 |
NA |
73 |
58 |
58 |
100 |
|
2008 |
47 |
0 (34) |
Dem |
46+++ |
45 |
48 |
55 |
100 |
|
2010 |
NA |
0 |
R-59 |
53*** |
73 |
48 |
60 |
100 |
|
2012 |
47 |
0 (47) |
Rep |
45+++ |
73 |
50 |
68 |
100 |
|
2014 |
NA |
0 (49.6) |
D-49 |
50*** |
73 |
53 |
69 |
0 |
|
2016 |
47 |
0 |
Dem |
50 |
64 |
53 |
66 |
0 |
|
2018 |
NA |
0 (42) |
D-45 |
45+++ |
36 |
53 |
51 |
0 |
|
2020 |
45 |
0 (44) |
Dem |
48+++ |
36 |
48 |
45 |
0 |
|
2022 |
NA |
0 |
R-51 |
NA |
45 |
48 |
52 |
100 |
|
2024 |
NA |
NA |
Rep |
NA |
NA |
48 |
49 |
100 |
*
Virginia state offices are elected in the year after a presidential election;
only governor, lieutenant governor and attorney general are popularly elected.
State election results are reported in next year.
**
Party identification data are drawn from a January 1991 poll.
*** 2010 party identification data are drawn from a November 2009
exit poll, while later data are drawn from CNN exit polls.
+ Reflects a GOP gain in a 2001 special election, plus an Independent caucusing with the GOP and switching to the GOP the next year.
++ Pools results of two statewide polls conducted that year.
+++ From exit polls of voters, not all adults. The 2020 data are from Fox poll, reported in Buchanan and Kapeluck, The 2020 Presidential Election in the South, p. 11.
Note:
NA indicates not available or no election held.
Source:
The Almanac of American Politics, 1972-1984; CQ=s Politics in America,
1986-2006; Rozell (2007); Lamis (1990); Edds and Morris (1999); McGlennon
(1988); Bullock and Rozell (2007b); Bullock (2014); Jones (2017); the Commonwealth Poll (July 1988, January
1991, July 1996, May 1998) cited in Shaffer, Pierce, and Kohnke (2000), and http://www.sbe.virginia.gov/cms/.
Table 11-3
Factors Affecting Elections of Virginia Governors and U.S. Senators
|
Officeholder (party-year 1st, imp. elections) |
Issues |
Candidate
Attributes |
Party/Campaign
Factors |
Performance
Factors |
Governors |
|
|
|
|
|
A. L. Holton (R- 1969) |
“Time for a change” slogan |
Mountain Rep., dad race liberal |
Divided Dems, lose labor-black |
GOP good organ, media |
|
Mills Godwin (R- 1973) |
Pro-busing, labor Howell |
|
No Dem cand., GOP Byrd votes |
GOP former Dem. gov. |
|
John Dalton (R- 1977) |
Liberal beats Dem. moderate |
Mountain Republican |
Gov. Godwin blasts Howell |
GOP 1-term lieutenant gov. |
|
Charles Robb (D- 1981) |
Fiscal conser., for poor-black |
LBJ relative |
Broad coalition, hi black turnout |
Lieut. gov. Dem |
|
Gerald Baliles (D- 1985) |
Fiscal conser., race-social lib. |
|
Divided Reps, race blunder |
Atty. general, popular gov. link |
|
Doug Wilder (D- 1989) |
Anti-crime, fiscal conser. D |
Leadership, experience |
Nonrace camp., divided Reps. |
Lieut. gov, 16 years st. senator |
|
George Allen (R- 1993) |
Crime, welfare, spend conser. |
West persona, football dad |
Police for GOP, Dem anger base |
State rep., 1 term cong. |
|
James Gilmore (R- 1997) |
Car tag tax cut, more teachers |
Working class, down to earth |
Popular GOP governor |
Attorney general |
|
Mark Warner (D- 2001) |
Conser. Dem. values |
Dem rural campaign |
GOP divided, some back Dem |
Dem rich, camp $, st. pty. chair |
|
Tim Kaine (D- 2005) |
Preschools, mod. cap pun. |
|
Popular gov., bipartisan style |
Lieut. gov., civil rights lawyer |
|
Bob McDonnell (R- 2009) |
Bad economy hurts Dem. |
Popular Rep- high favorables |
Negative Dem ad backfires |
Attorney general wins |
|
Terry McAuliffe (D- 2013) |
Rep too cultural conservative |
Rep tea party, religious right backers |
Dem. exit poll edge |
Dem spending advantage |
|
Ralph Northam (D- 2017) |
Rep cultural conservative |
Dem moderate image |
Dem. exit poll advantage |
Dem state experience, lieut. gov. |
|
Glenn Youngkin (R- 2021) |
Dem nat'l liberal, Rep state issues |
Rep likeable moderate image |
Rep avoids Trump camaigning |
Dem less popular than Rep. |
Senators |
|
|
|
|
|
William Spong (D- 1966) |
Race moderate upsets incumb. |
|
Moderate wins blacks-urban |
State senator victor |
|
Harry Byrd Jr. (D/I- ‘66, ’70) |
Blacks defect/ runs as Indep. |
|
Anti-organ. primary bid/ Wallace voters |
Machine leader’s son wins/ Godwin backing |
|
William Scott (R- 1972) |
Dem. for gun ctrl, busing? |
|
Nixon landslide, McGovern tied |
Conser. 3 term Congressman |
|
John Warner (R- 1978, ’96) |
Moderate unifies Dems/ military back. |
Actress Eliz. Taylor wife/ conscience |
GOP organiz, $ advantage/ conser Rep split |
Former Navy Secretary/ Dem well funded |
|
Paul Trible (R- 1982) |
Dem. lib., anti-death penalty |
Rep. “wooden”, draft avoided |
GOP organiz, $ advantage |
Conser. 3 term Congressman |
|
Charles Robb (D- 1988, ’94) |
Dem. centrist-conser. causes/ conser. North |
Dem. personal drug charge/ extremist GOP |
Dem. spending advantage/ bitter GOP split |
Popular gov. vs. inexperienced/ GOP felon issue |
|
George Allen (R- 2000) |
Dem personal life, Clinton tie |
Friendly, “country” Rep. |
Bush victory, Dem outspent |
GOP popular former governor |
|
Jim Webb (D- 2006) |
Pres Bush Iraq war mess |
Marine Dem,. racial slur Rep |
Overconfident Rep.- macaca |
Dem former Rep, Reaganite |
|
Mark Warner (D- 2008) |
Dem effective former governor |
|||
|
Tim Kaine (D- 2012,'18) |
Dem moderate, compromiser/Rep pro-Trump, anti-illegals |
Dem exit poll advantage/Dem exit poll advan. |
Dem popular former governor/ |
Table 11-4
Programs of Virginia Governors and U.S. Senators
|
Officeholder (party-year 1st elected) |
Progressive
Policies |
Neutral Policies |
Conservative
Policies |
|
Governors |
|
|
|
|
A. Linwood Holton (R- 1969) |
Black jobs, open housing, daughter integrates school |
|
|
|
Mills Godwin (R- 1973) |
|
Penal reform |
Death penalty, spending cuts |
|
John Dalton (R- 1977) |
Settles higher educ. desegregation lawsuit |
|
Fiscal conservative, cuts state workers |
|
Charles Robb (D- 1981) |
Black-women appoints, $ education |
|
Balanced budget without tax increase |
|
Gerald Baliles (D- 1985) |
Health, child care spending increase |
Transportation $, economic develop. |
|
|
L. Douglas Wilder (D- 1989) |
Pro-gun control, blasts conser. Dems. |
Excellent fiscal management |
Cuts educ, no tax hike, budget balance |
|
George Allen (R- 1993) |
Education funding, lower class sizes |
Attracts hi tech industry |
Welfare reform, anti-crime, pro-life |
|
James Gilmore (R- 1997) |
Lottery education money |
Technology measures |
Confederate hist., car tag tax cut |
|
Mark Warner (D- 2001) |
Later tax hike helps K-12 education |
Recognition for best managed state |
Early spending cuts |
|
Tim Kaine (D- 2005) |
K-12 education funding increases |
|
|
|
Bob McDonnell (R- 2009) |
|
|
|
|
Terry McAuliffe (D- 2013) |
Felons rights restored |
|
|
Senators |
|
|
|
William Spong
(D- 1966)
|
|
Moderate voting record |
|
|
Harry Byrd Jr. (D/I- 1966/’70) |
|
|
Conservative voting record |
|
William Scott (R- 1972) |
|
|
Conservative voting record |
|
John Warner (R- 1978) |
Against conser. Bork, for clean air bill |
Bipartisan, indep, Iraq war failures |
Conservative voting record |
|
Paul Trible (R- 1982) |
|
|
Conservative voting record |
|
Charles Robb (D- 1988/1994) |
Liberal after 1994 |
Moderate liberal before 1994 |
|
|
George Allen (R- 2000) |
|
Promotes state high technology industry |
Conservative voting record |
|
Jim Webb (D- 2006) |
|
||
|
Mark Warner (D- 2008) |
|
Bipartisan work style |
|
|
Tim Kaine (D- 2012) |
|