Chapter 3
The South in the Modern Party Era
How Should We Define the South?
As we turn our focus from national party politics to a concentration on party politics in the South, let us first explain the political uniqueness of the South. V.O. Key (1949:10) defined the South as the eleven states of the old Confederacy, pointing to their shared heritage of secession from the Union, sizable African American populations, and their solid Democratic voting patterns in presidential elections. I rely on Key’s definition, as well as a subdivision of the region into the Deep South and Rim South, because of the politically relevant distinctions between these two sub-regions. The Deep South consists of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina, states with the most extensive plantations before the Civil War, and consequently today having the highest proportion of African Americans, the most rural economies, the most impoverished citizens, and the fewest in-migrants. The Rim South consists of Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia, which were the opposites of the Deep South in these characteristics. Rim South states like North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia have mountainous areas with poor soil unsuited to a plantation economy and therefore have fewer African American residents and exhibited less hostility to northern-operated Reconstruction after the Civil War. Other Rim South states like Florida and Texas have undergone considerable in-migration of non-southerners having less traditional values than do native southerners.
Even at the outset of the 21st century, some political differences between the Deep and Rim South states persist. The percentage of the state population that was African American in the 2000 census ranged from a low of 26% in the Deep South state of Alabama to a high of 36% in Mississippi, while in the Rim South states the black proportion of the state populations ranged from 11% in Texas to a high of 21% in North Carolina. The median household income in the average Deep South state in 1999 was $35,509 compared to $38,858 in the average Rim South state. Interestingly enough, though, the average abortion rate in the Deep South was 11.9 per one thousand women in the year 2000 compared to 19.1 in the average Rim South state, possibly suggesting a greater commitment to family, religion, or to “moral” concerns in the more tradition-bound Deep South (state-level analysis of census data is at: http://sds17.pspa.msstate.edu/classes/southern/notes.html).
Bullock and Rozell (2003) also group the southern states into these two sub-regions, though they add the border state of Oklahoma to the Rim South. Swansbrough and Brodsky (1988) employ three sub-regions by grouping Florida and Texas into a Sunbelt South sub-region (they also add the border state of Kentucky to the Rim South). Havard (1972) employs three sub-regions that range from the “evolving states” (four Rim South states) to the “protest states” (four Deep South states) with Arkansas, Georgia, and North Carolina serving as an intermediate “wavering states” grouping. Cotter, Shaffer, and Breaux (2006) more fully discuss the various definitions of the South that other southern politics scholars have employed, while expressing a preference for Key’s timeless definition.
The power of Key’s definition of the South is reflected historically in the partisan consistency of the eleven states of the old Confederacy in presidential elections. In every election from 1880 up through and including 1916, every one of the southern states cast its electoral votes for the Democratic presidential nominee. With the nation returning to “normalcy” after World War 1 and giving the national majority party’s candidate Warren G. Harding 60% of the popular vote, one southern state (Tennessee) was willing to vote Republican. After the South returned to its Solid Democratic posture in 1924, five Rim South states found themselves voting for Republican Herbert Hoover in 1928 instead of for the urban, immigrant, anti-prohibition, Catholic Democrat, Al Smith. These few southern defections from the Democratic party were the exception to the rule, as each of the four Franklin D. Roosevelt elections from 1932 through 1944 exhibited a solid Democratic South (Table 3-1).
The era of the fight over civil rights from 1948 through 1968 illustrates how the Deep South was most obsessed with maintaining its segregated political and social system, while the Rim South was more willing to realign its more general conservative values on a diversity of issues with the national party that offered candidates that were merely “moderate” conservatives. The only four states that cast their electoral votes in 1948 for the States’ Rights Party of segregationist Strom Thurmond were all Deep South states. In 1960 electors from only two states, both in the Deep South, voted for Virginia senator and civil rights opponent Harry Byrd instead of for “liberal” John Kennedy. In 1964 all five Deep South states voted for conservative ideologue and opponent of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Republican Barry Goldwater. In a final spasm of reaction against the Second Reconstruction that produced landmark federal civil rights laws, in 1968 all but one Deep South states voted for segregationist George C. Wallace (as did Arkansas), who as governor of Alabama had stood in the schoolhouse doors and chanted, “Segregation now-segregation tomorrow-segregation forever” (Bass and DeVries, 1977: 62).
Rim South states were the sub-region first receptive to the more moderate conservatism of the national Republican party. Four Rim South states voted for Eisenhower in both 1952 and 1956 (plus Louisiana backed Ike’s reelection) and three backed Nixon in 1960. Goldwater’s extreme conservatism was too much for the less-racially obsessed Rim South as every one voted for Democrat Johnson. Four years later four Rim South states plus South Carolina backed the more moderate conservative Republican, Richard Nixon, who had been Eisenhower’s vice president (Table 3-1).
The post-civil rights era has seen the South more politically united in presidential elections with few dramatic differences existing between the Deep and Rim South. In 1972 every southern state backed Republican Nixon’s reelection instead of voting for the liberal George McGovern, who had pledged to “crawl to Hanoi” (the capital of communist North Vietnam) if necessary to end the Vietnam War and to get our POW’s released (Hart 2003). Four years later, every southern state except Virginia again backed the winning presidential candidate, this time a Democrat and fellow southerner, “born again” Southern Baptist Jimmy Carter. In 1980 every southern state except Carter’s home state of Georgia voted for a change, backing victorious GOP presidential candidate Ronald Reagan. Every southern state voted for the next two victorious Republican nominees, Reagan in 1984 and George Herbert Walker Bush in 1988. In each of the two Clinton elections, seven southern states supported the national GOP loser, but Clinton was able to break the now “solid Republican South,” twice winning his home state of Arkansas and Vice President Gore’s home state of Tennessee, as well as capturing Georgia and Louisiana in 1992 and Florida and Louisiana in 1996. The next two elections, featuring George W. Bush, produced a return of the Solid Republican South in presidential elections, as all eleven states voted for Bush both times. The 2008 election in the South was historic, as economic conditions were so poor that three southern states (the Rim South states of Virginia, Florida, and North Carolina) actually voted for a Democratic presidential candidate who wasn't a southerner, Barack Obama, a liberal from Illinois.
A comparison of the popular vote total in each southern state with the national average uncovers some intriguing sub-regional differences, however. The more conservative Deep South was most negative towards liberal McGovern, with every Deep South state except Louisiana giving Nixon 72% or more of its share of the two-party vote (at least 10% more than the national GOP average, see Table 3-2), a level of negativism towards liberalism shared by only one Rim South state. Jimmy Carter’s “friends and neighbors” support in his home state of Georgia partly accounts for his slightly greater support in the Deep South rather than the Rim South in his two elections, reversing the sub-regional patterns of party support of 1976. The Deep and Rim South were roughly equal in their support for GOP presidential candidates in the last two elections of the 1980s, being separated by only one or two percentage points, and with the two sub-regions splitting the distinction of being the most Republican area. The last five elections starting with 1992 have seen the Deep South emerge as consistently the slightly more Republican sub-region, as the Republican popular vote percentages have been a modest 1-4% higher in the Deep South than in the Rim South. The Deep South states of Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina were the three most heavily Republican Deep South states in four of the last five elections.
Other studies have also found a continued utility in the concept of southern sub-regions, supporting our decision to at least group our state chapters by sub-region. Examining the “southernness” or conservatism of all 50 states on such public policy outcomes as abortion, gay civil rights, health spending, and TANF welfare reform, Cooper and Knotts (2004) discover that four of the five “most southern” of the southern states are Deep South states, while the least “southern” of the southern states are four Rim South states. Using NES and GSS data from the 1970s thru 2000, Valentino and Sears (2005: 679) found that Deep South whites exhibited more support for Jim Crow segregation, for symbolic racism, for negative black stereotyping, and for negative reactions to blacks on feelings thermometers than did whites in the Rim South and the rest of the nation. In the 2000 network exit polls, Black (2004) found that African Americans now made up a majority of 52% of Democratic party identifiers in the Deep South, compared to a still sizable but less dominant 31% of Democrats in the Rim South.
Republicans first made gains in the U.S. Senate in the less tradition-bound Rim South states. After the 1970 midterm elections (two years after Nixon’s election as President), Republicans held only 5 of the South’s 22 U.S. senate seats with two senators from Tennessee, and one each from Florida and Texas. Only South Carolina senator Strom Thurmond’s switch to the GOP during the 1964 period of white southern enthusiasm over conservative Barry Goldwater gave the GOP one senator from the Deep South. With Nixon’s sweeping landslide in 1972, Republicans added two more senate seats in Rim South states, one each in North Carolina and Virginia. It wasn’t until 1978 that a Deep South state outright elected a life-long Republican as senator, Thad Cochran of Mississippi (Table 3-3).
Ronald Reagan’s victory in 1980 ushered in a temporary near-parity between the parties in southern senate seats, but a more lasting virtual elimination of sub-regional differences in the strengths of the parties in the Senate. Republicans made a net gain of four senate seats in the South that year, including one each in the Deep South states of Alabama and Georgia, giving them nearly half of the 11-state region’s senate seats. Those ten GOP senate seats were pretty equally distributed between the two sub-regions with four from the Deep South and six from the Rim South. Six years later, however, in Reagan’s second midterm election (when his party lost control of the U.S. Senate which they had gained in 1980), Republicans returned to their pre-Reagan level of 6 southern senate seats and sub-regional party differences returned to the pre-Reagan level of two-thirds of GOP senate seats being in the Rim South. Sub-regional differences in party diminished in a more permanent manner two years later, as GOP congressman Trent Lott won Mississippi’s second senate seat in 1988 after Democrat John Stennis’ retirement, resulting in three of the party’s seven southern senate seats being in the Deep South.
The Clinton years, like the Reagan years, ushered in another period of GOP gains in Dixie. In 1992 Republicans gained senate seats in Georgia and North Carolina, and added Texas the next year, returning the party to its historic high margins during the early Reagan years. The 1994 national GOP tsunami in Clinton’s first midterm election after the Democratic president unsuccessfully pushed for gays in the military and “HillaryCare” gave the GOP its first ever majority of U.S. senate seats in the South. Adding insult to injury, Republicans picked up both senate seats in Vice President Gore’s home state of Tennessee, and picked up a seat in Alabama after the Democratic incumbent switched parties. Republicans maintained a majority of 13-15 of the region’s 22 seats until the 2004 elections, when they picked up five senate seats from five retiring Democratic senators. Achieving an unprecedented high of controlling 18 of the region’s 22 senate seats, the GOP was denied a total sweep of senate elections in the South in 2004 only by the reelection of Arkansas Democrat Blanche Lincoln. Reflecting the closing of sub-regional gaps in partisanship, 9 of the GOP’s senate seats were in the Deep South, and 9 in the Rim South (Table 3-3). Reflecting the persisting strength of the GOP in Dixie, even in the miserable midterm year of 2006 when public anxiety over the endless mess in Iraq and over scandals in the GOP-controlled Congress produced a Democratic pickup of both chambers of congress for the first time in twelve years, the GOP lost only one senate seat in the South. Two years later, though, Republicans lost two more southern senate seats, as Democrat Obama won the presidency in the face of massive economic dissatisfaction under a Republican president. The 2010 senate elections in the South continued to reflect national patterns of voter dissatisfaction hurting the incumbent president's party, as Republicans gained one senate seat by knocking off Blanche Lincoln.
Contributing to GOP Senate gains in Dixie since 1968 may be the leftward shift in Democratic senators’ roll call votes. Hood, Kidd, and Morris (1999) believe that the enfranchisement of African Americans after the 1965 Voting Rights Act, coupled with the growing electoral threat of the GOP, forced southern Democratic senators to become more ideologically consistent with their national party. From 1960 to 1995, for example, the average rating that southern Democratic senators received from the liberal Americans for Democratic Action rose from 8 to 75 (a 100 is perfect liberalism).
As with the U.S. senate, it is useful to think of GOP gains in Dixie in the U.S. House in terms of presidential administrations. In 1948 and 1950 the GOP held only 2 of the region’s 105 house seats. Eisenhower’s election as president in 1952 saw GOP numbers in Dixie creep up to 6, and then 7 after the 1954 midterm election. Southern Republican congressmen continued to inch forward in the 1960s, rising to 11 seats after the 1962 elections, 16 after the 1964 Goldwater race, 23 after 1966 (a good GOP year nationally when it won back the seats it had lost two years earlier), 26 after Nixon’s election in 1968, and then 27 in 1970 (Bass and DeVries 1977: 37). Compared to Democrats however, the GOP remained fairly weak during the Nixon years, controlling only 25% of southern house seats before the 1972 elections, and holding a majority of seats in only one southern state (the Rim South state of Virginia). Republicans made temporary gains when Nixon was reelected in 1972, but then lost those gains in the 1974 midterm elections after the Watergate scandal forced Nixon’s resignation as president (Table 3-4). Republican house seats in Dixie rose from 27 in 1976 to 31 in 1978 in the first midterm election after Carter’s election. The Reagan victory in 1980 was accompanied by a noticeable spike in GOP house seats in Dixie from 31 to 39, and with some fluctuations GOP seats remained at that level up through 1990. Yet the GOP still controlled a majority of only one state’s house seats. After losing control of a majority of Virginia’s congressional delegation in 1986, Republicans gained a majority of the Rim South state of Florida’s seats in the 1988 election.
The Clinton years were devastating to Democrats in the U.S. House. While Clinton was winning the presidency in 1992, the GOP made a net gain of 9 house seats in Dixie, including picking up three seats each in Florida and Georgia, partly because of the seats that these states gained because of their population growth. The 1994 GOP tsunami saw the party pick up 16 seats in Dixie, giving Republicans a majority of U.S. house seats in the South for the first time since Reconstruction (Table 3-4). In addition to Florida, Republicans now held a majority of house seats in the Rim South states of North Carolina and Tennessee, and a majority of seats in the Deep South states of Georgia and South Carolina, thereby eliminating sub-regional differences in party control of congressional delegations as the GOP became equally strong in both the Rim and Deep South. As Clinton swept to reelection as president, the GOP continued its romp across Dixie, picking up an additional 7 seats and winning a majority of seats from the Deep South states of Alabama, Louisiana, and (temporarily) Mississippi. Indeed, the Clinton reelection year of 1996 saw a new sub-regional pattern emerge with the GOP more likely to control the congressional delegations of Deep South rather than Rim South states. (Even after the 2006 elections, Republicans controlled 4 of the 5 Deep South congressional delegations but only 3 of the 6 Rim South delegations.) As occurred nationally, Clinton’s impeachment in 1998 did not hurt his party in Dixie any more than it had already been hurt, as the GOP maintained its narrow majority of 71 seats in the South. But over the course of his presidency, whereas Clinton had taken office with the GOP controlling only one house delegation in the South (Florida), he left office with GOP control of seven states’ house delegations!
Republicans continued to build on these gains during the Bush years. The GOP made a net gain of 2 seats in the disputed 2000 presidential election year, thanks to gains in Virginia where the GOP regained majority control of the state’s house delegation. Bush’s party gained 3 more seats two years later, picking up seats in growing Florida and Texas, though its loss of one seat in Tennessee also cost it majority control of that state’s delegation. Bush’s reelection in 2004 saw the GOP gain 6 seats, thanks to a mid-decade redistricting plan in Texas favorable to the GOP, which was engineered by a Republican-controlled state legislature and governor. Complaining over how the state’s U.S. house delegation remained Democratically-controlled despite GOP success in every presidential election starting with the 1980’s, Texas Republicans had eagerly awaited the fruits of their party’s gains in state government. The Lone Star State GOP cheered their party’s election and reelection of George W. Bush as governor in 1994 and 1998, their winning control of the state senate in 1996, and their achieving control of the state house in 2002 coupled with the election of a new Republican governor. Thanks to these gains in Texas, after the 2004 congressional elections Republicans controlled 82 of the South’s 131 house seats, and held majority control of 8 state delegations.
The national GOP debacle of 2006 eliminated nearly all of these 2004 gains in Dixie, as Republicans lost seats in the Rim South states of Texas, Florida, and North Carolina. Nevertheless, Republicans continued to control 77 U.S. House seats from Dixie even after this disastrous election year, a number that was its second highest regional total in history, and that constituted an impressive 59% of the South’s 131 U.S. House seats. Despite a national rout, Republicans lost majority control of only one southern state’s congressional delegation, the state of North Carolina. Republicans continued to show its greater dominance in the Deep South relative to the Rim South, as it controlled four of the five Deep South congressional delegations and “only” three of the six Rim South delegations. The Democratic rout in Dixie had become so total that even in the four states not “controlled” by the GOP after the 2006 elections, Republicans held 2 of Mississippi’s 4 seats, 4 of Tennessee’s 9 seats, 6 of North Carolina’s 13 seats, and 1 of Arkansas’ 4 seats. Republicans lost another five seats in its 2008 national defeat, however, including control of a majority of Virginia's U.S. house delegation. Republicans came roaring back in the 2010 national tsunami of voter dissatisfaction, as Republicans made a net gain of 22 house seats in Dixie, even higher than their 16 seat pickup in the 1994 GOP landslide. Republicans now controlled a majority of every southern state's U.S. house delegation except for North Carolina, eliminating sub-regional differences in party strengths between the Deep and Rim South states. The GOP now controlled an unprecedented 72% of congressional seats in the South.
Explanations for GOP gains in house seats in Dixie, as in the senate and the presidency, also revolve around ideology, with the addition of presidential coattails and the party’s effective targeting of campaign money. Using NES data from 1972 through 1996, Knuckey (2000) found that while southern voters before the 1990s had viewed Democratic house candidates in Dixie as more likely to be conservative than liberal, by 1992 southerners were now perceiving Democratic house candidates as more liberal than conservative. Voters therefore perceived an increasing similarity between Democratic presidential and house candidates, and their feeling thermometer ratings of the two sets of candidates became more highly interrelated in the 1990s. Republican party identifiers in the South began to behave in a more partisan fashion, increasingly voting for their party’s house candidates rather than merely backing Democratic congressmen because of their incumbency. Using aggregate U.S. House election data for 1992-1998, Prysby (2000) also finds an increase in voter consistency in partisanship in presidential and house voting, especially for Democratic-held seats, which benefited the GOP because of the strength of its presidential candidates in Dixie. He also attributes Republican house gains in Dixie in the 1990s to an increase in campaign spending by GOP house candidates, particularly in open seats vacated by Democratic incumbents.
Elections for the most visible state offices in the South, the chief executive, also illustrate the diminishing political relevance of sub-regional membership, and the differing effects of presidential administrations. In 1970 only 2 southern governors were Republicans, and both represented Rim South states (Tennessee and Virginia). Despite strong Democratic national forces in the 1974 midterm “Watergate” election, the GOP finally broke through into the Deep South, winning the South Carolina governorship. The only other GOP breakthrough in the Deep South before Reagan’s presidency occurred in Louisiana in 1979, as Republicans continued to show greater strength in gubernatorial elections in Rim South states than in the Deep South. Indeed, between 1970 and 1984, Republicans were able to win at least one gubernatorial election in every Rim South state except Florida. The Reagan victory in 1980 saw the GOP reach an historic high of 5 governors from Dixie, though this breakthrough was very temporary, as the party suffered a net loss of three southern governorships in the 1982 midterm elections during a national recession. After the 1984 elections, Republicans held only two governorships in the South, and both were in Rim South states (Table 3-5).
The second Reagan midterm election, in 1986, witnessed the GOP not merely reaching a more lasting high mark of controlling 5 southern governorships, but also saw the virtual elimination of sub-regional differences in party fortunes, as the GOP won the governorships of the Deep South states of Alabama and South Carolina, as well as the governorships of the Rim South states of Florida and Texas. Indeed, with the election in 1991 of the first GOP governor in Mississippi since Reconstruction and with a dip in the total number of southern Republican governors in 1992, the party temporarily held governorships only in two southern states, both in the Deep South.
The Democratic presidential administration of Bill Clinton was good to the southern GOP. In the 1994 midterm elections, the national GOP landslide swept in three new GOP southern governors, raising the party’s total across the entire South to 6 (A Republican governor was elected in Virginia in 1993). For the first time in history, the party historically hated by white southerners because of its role in post-Civil War Reconstruction now held a majority of the region’s 11 governors. Republicans achieved an historic high of 8 of the region’s governorships in 1996 after the 1995 election in Louisiana and a Democratic incumbent’s resignation in Arkansas, but such domination of Dixie’s governorships was quite temporary. Republicans suffered one net loss in southern governorships in both 1998 and 2000, picked up one governorship in 2002, and suffered one net loss in 2006. Nevertheless, even after the 2006 national Republican disaster, the GOP retained control of a bare majority of the South’s governorships,six to the Democrats’ five. Republicans proceeded to make gains in the next two elections from their bare majority of 2006, achieving an historic high after the 2010 elections of holding 9 of the South's 11 governorships. Furthermore, sub-regional differences in party strength in the 21st century were far less evident than they had been in the 1970s. Indeed, if any differences existed, it now appeared that Republicans were more likely to control governorships in Deep South than in Rim South states. Over the 2000-2010 election period, Republicans won a majority of all five of the Deep South states' elections, while winning a majority of only two Rim South states' elections (Florida and Texas). Indeed, after 2008, the GOP now controlled every Deep South governorship, while Democrats held on to four Rim South governorships after 2008 (losing two of them after the 2010 elections).
Republican gains in Dixie have come later in less visible state offices below the governorship. Except for a brief Tennessee state house party tie after the 1968 elections, Democrats held a majority of seats in each of the region’s 22 bicameral legislative chambers until 1992 (Bass and DeVries 1977: 34-35). Republicans made some state legislative gains in the decade of the 1990s, but gains in control of legislative chambers were more evident in the Rim South than in the Deep South. Republicans won a tie in the Florida senate in 1992 and then senate control in the next election, which they have retained in each successive election. The year of the 1994 Republican national landslide also saw the party win control of the North Carolina house, which they were only able to hold for four years. In 1996 the GOP gained control of the Florida house, giving them control of both chambers of the Florida legislature, and retained control of this chamber as well in subsequent elections. (Needless to say, during the disputed 2000 presidential election in Florida some Republican lawmakers were itching to merely “anoint” a Republican slate of presidential electors, if the courts had not been able to resolve the dispute to GOP satisfaction.) Republicans in 1996 also gained control of the Texas senate, which they have continually retained, and won a tie in the Virginia senate, which two years later became an outright GOP majority that persisted until the 2008 elections. The decade of the 1990s saw the GOP able to gain control of only one chamber in the Deep South. In the 1994 GOP national landslide, the South Carolina House fell to the Republicans, and has remained under GOP control since then.
Analyzing southern state legislative elections from 1990-1998, David Lublin and D. Stephen Voss (2000) conclude that GOP legislative gains were primarily because of the region’s ongoing realignment towards the Republicans. However, they also point out that “racial redistricting,” which created an increased number of black majority districts in an effort to elect more African American lawmakers, left other districts more heavily white in population and therefore more likely to elect Republicans. The losers in this redistricting process were moderate white Democratic lawmakers, who lost seats. Yet by the close of the 20th century after the 1998 and 1999 elections, Republicans still held only 5 legislative chambers among the 12 chambers in the 6 Rim South states (the GOP picked up the Virginia house after the 1999 state elections). Furthermore, the only chamber that Republicans held in the Deep South was the South Carolina house, which they had captured in the 1994 elections (Table 3-6).
Republican state legislative hopes improved during the George Bush presidency, though sub-regional differences in partisan strength persisted until the 2010 elections. Republicans picked up majority control of the South Carolina senate after the 2000 elections, and have retained it in subsequent elections, giving the party control of both of the state’s legislative chambers. After the 2002 elections, Republicans also won control of the Texas house and the Georgia senate, and have retained control of both bodies in subsequent elections. With Bush’s reelection in 2004, Republicans also gained control of the Tennessee senate and the Georgia house, and retained control of both bodies in subsequent elections. Indeed, even in the face of a national electoral disaster in 2006, Republicans did not lose control of any southern state legislative chamber. The 2008 elections were a wash, as Republicans gained control of the Tennessee house but lost control of the Virginia senate. After the 2004, 2006, and 2008 elections, the GOP controlled 11 of the region's 22 state legislative chambers. Over a period of only twelve years, the historic minority party in the South had gone from controlling not one state legislative chamber to control of half of the region’s legislative bodies. Republicans scored an even more impressive breakthrough in the national 2010 GOP tsunami, as they seized control of both chambers of the North Carolina and the Alabama state legislatures, as well as of the Louisiana house. Republicans now controlled an historic high of 16 of the region's 22 state legislative chambers, an impressive 73% of the South's state legislative chambers.
Some interesting sub-regional differences in partisan control of southern state legislatures persisted until the 2010 elections. After the 2004-2008 elections, Republicans controlled a slight majority of 7 of the Rim South’s 12 legislative chambers, compared to a slight minority of 4 of the Deep South’s 10 chambers. Indeed,in four southern states Republicans had never controlled any legislative chamber, and three of those were in the Deep South states of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi, with only one being in the Rim South state of Arkansas. Yet Republican legislative gains appeared to be quite lasting. Except for the North Carolina house and the Virginia senate, in each case where the GOP has gained control of a southern legislative chamber’s majority since 1990, it has kept control in subsequent elections (Table 3-6). The most severe test of the durability of GOP gains came with their pickups of control of the Tennessee senate and Georgia house in 2004, which they were able to retain two years later despite the party’s weak showing nationally. The 2010 elections appeared to end significant subregional differences in party control of state legislative chambers, as the GOP for the first time gained control of the Louisiana house and of both chambers of the Alabama legislature. Republicans now controlled a majority of the seats in 7 of the 10 legislative chambers in the Deep South, as compared to controlling 9 of the 12 legislative chambers in the Rim South, a very impressive GOP showing in both subregions.
State offices elected statewide other than governor (such as lieutenant governor, attorney general, etc.) are another arena where Democrats remain a competitive force in Dixie, though even there Republicans have made important gains, especially over the last four years. Before the 1994 midterm elections, Democrats held a majority of sub-gubernatorial offices in all ten of the southern states that elected non-gubernatorial state offices statewide (Table 3-7). The 1994 elections marked an important turning point, when the GOP first became a viable minority party in competing for these state offices that suffer from less visibility to voters and little study even by scholars (Lamis 1999 provides one of the few studies of such offices). After the first midterm election of the Clinton years, Republicans now held a majority of sub-gubernatorial offices in South Carolina, and half of these offices in Alabama, Florida and Virginia. That these gains were lasting is shown by the party being able to elect a majority of South Carolina sub-gubernatorial state officials in every succeeding election, and being able to gain a majority of Florida statewide officials in the 2000 election and retaining a majority in subsequent years. Furthermore, in Alabama and Virginia, Republicans in the post-1994 elections have always been able to retain at least half of these sub-gubernatorial offices, and has sometimes even won a majority. Another important gain for Republicans was in 1998 in Texas, when George W. Bush’s landslide reelection as governor swept in an all-GOP slate of sub-gubernatorial offices, boosting his presidential ambitions among the GOP faithful across the nation. Furthermore, Republicans have retained their monopoly of statewide offices in Texas in all elections held since then.
After Republicans made big gains in the 2006-2010 subgubernatorial statewide elections, the question remained whether Democrats would remain a competitive force in elections for these offices. In the 2005-2008 period, Republicans for the first time won a majority of subgubernatorial state offices in the Deep South states of Georgia, Mississippi, and Lousiana, and for only the second time gained a majority of such offices in Alabama. Republicans subsequently made gains in each of these states, even to the extent of winning all of the statewide offices elected below governor in three of these states in 2010. Indeed, after the 2010 elections, Republicans controlled all of the subgubernatorial offices elected statewide in a majority of southern states- the three Rim South states of Florida, Texas, and Virginia, and the Deep South states of Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina. Furthermore, the GOP controlled over 80% of the subgubernatorial state offices in the other two Deep South states of Louisiana and Mississippi. In only two states, both Rim South states (Arkansas and North Carolina) were Democrats able to retain at least half of the subgubernatorial state offices. Therefore, to the extent that any sub-regional party strength differences exist regarding subgubernatorial offices, it appears that the GOP today is somewhat stronger in Deep South compared to Rim South states.
A reader at this point may be tempted to throw up his or her hands and declare that the region has become the Solid South once again, only this time a Solid Republican South, particularly in federal elections for the presidency and the Congress. Such an assessment is entirely too premature. Surveying state party chairs across the nation in 1999, John Aldrich (2000: 661) points out that the growing GOP threat has resulted in “perhaps the strongest and most effectively organized dual party system in southern history,” comparable to that “currently found outside the South, if not even higher,” an assessment that hardly writes off southern Democratic electoral hopes. Earl Black (1998) has pointed to two avenues of Democratic electoral success in the New South, not merely victory by African American candidates in majority black constituencies, but also the ability of white Democrats to win office by assembling biracial coalitions.
As southern whites began to accept the inevitability of racial integration, the race issue became less important to them, making it possible for southern Democratic officeholders to assemble biracial electoral coalitions. Illustrating the decreased salience of racial issues to whites by the year 1970, Bass and DeVries (1977) found that support for candidates resisting racial integration persisted only among voters over 60 years old and among those with less than an 8th grade education. Indeed, the rising GOP electoral threat actually seemed to revitalize southern Democratic state parties in the early 1970s. Dale Bumpers in Arkansas, Reuben Askew in Florida, and Jimmy Carter and George Busbee in Georgia were only some of the progressive Democrats elected governor in those years. Lamis (1990) provides examples of how biracial Democratic coalitions formed around issues of common interest in virtually every southern state.
Earl and Merle Black (1992: 357) found that southern Democrats in the 1980s were able to pull out U.S. senate victories by making “some overtures towards the values and interests of moderate to conservative whites,” and by uniting Democrats of both races by offering “liberal positions on some issues with conservative positions on other issues.” Some winning Democratic campaign issues that they suggest for presidential races, such as stressing education investments, health care, infrastructure, and balanced budgets, also are relevant to contests for other offices. Alexander Lamis (1999: 388) reiterated that even in the 1990s, the “biracial southern Democratic coalition- despite its tensions- remains in place.” Lamis (1999: 389) points out that successful southern Democratic governors “stress fiscal responsibility, support public education, favor welfare reform, and promote efforts to fight crime.” Some issues, though, appear to have advantaged Republican electoral hopes, such as foreign policy “toughness,” as I suggested in the previous chapter. Earl and Merle Black’s (1992: 354) observations today appear quite prophetic: “Democrats need a foreign policy message that does not appear to concede protection of America’s international interests to the Republicans.”
Table 3-1
State Defections from the Democratic Party in Presidential Elections
YEAR RIM SOUTH STATES DEEP SOUTH STATES
|
1920 |
|
|
|
Tenn |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1928 |
|
Fla |
N.C. |
Tenn |
Tex |
Vir |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1948 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Alab* |
|
La* |
Miss* |
S.C.* |
|
1952 |
|
Fla |
|
Tenn |
Tex |
Vir |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1956 |
|
Fla |
|
Tenn |
Tex |
Vir |
|
|
La |
|
|
|
1960 |
|
Fla |
|
Tenn |
|
Vir |
Alab* |
|
|
Miss* |
|
|
1964 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Alab |
Ga |
La |
Miss |
S.C. |
|
1968 |
Ark* |
Fla |
N.C. |
Tenn |
|
Vir |
Alab* |
Ga* |
La* |
Miss* |
S.C. |
|
1972 |
Ark |
Fla |
N.C. |
Tenn |
Tex |
Vir |
Alab |
Ga |
La |
Miss |
S.C. |
|
1976 |
|
|
|
|
|
Vir |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1980 |
Ark |
Fla |
N.C. |
Tenn |
Tex |
Vir |
Alab |
|
La |
Miss |
S.C. |
|
1984 |
Ark |
Fla |
N.C. |
Tenn |
Tex |
Vir |
Alab |
Ga |
La |
Miss |
S.C. |
|
1988 |
Ark |
Fla |
N.C. |
Tenn |
Tex |
Vir |
Alab |
Ga |
La |
Miss |
S.C. |
|
1992 |
|
Fla |
N.C. |
|
Tex |
Vir |
Alab |
|
|
Miss |
S.C. |
|
1996 |
|
|
N.C. |
|
Tex |
Vir |
Alab |
Ga |
|
Miss |
S.C. |
|
2000 |
Ark |
Fla |
N.C. |
Tenn |
Tex |
Vir |
Alab |
Ga |
La |
Miss |
S.C. |
|
2004 |
Ark |
Fla |
N.C. |
Tenn |
Tex |
Vir |
Alab |
Ga |
La |
Miss |
S.C. |
|
2008 |
Ark |
Tenn |
Tex |
Alab |
Ga |
La |
Miss |
S.C. |
|||
|
2012 |
Ark |
N.C. |
Tenn |
Tex |
Alab |
Ga |
La |
Miss |
S.C. |
||
|
2016 |
Ark |
Fla |
N.C. |
Tenn |
Tex |
Alab |
Ga |
La |
Miss |
S.C. |
|
|
2020 |
Ark |
Fla |
N.C. |
Tenn |
Tex |
Alab |
La |
Miss |
S.C. |
Note: Cell entries reflect which states defected from the national Democratic party in the presidential elections listed in the first column. States not having asterisks voted Republican. The Solid Democratic South was maintained in all elections from 1880 through 1916, in 1924, and in 1932 through 1944, as every southern state voted Democratic.
Source: Shaffer, Pierce, and Kohnke (2000), and updated by the author.
* In 1948, these states voted for the Dixiecrat, States’ Rights Party.
* In 1960, an unpledged slate of electors carried Mississippi. Democrat Kennedy carried Alabama’s popular vote. All of Mississippi’s electors voted for Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia, as did 6 of Alabama’s 11 presidential electors.
* In 1968, these states voted for George C. Wallace’s American Independent Party.
Table 3-2
Republican Popular Vote for President Relative to the National Average
|
State |
1972 |
1976 |
1980 |
1984 |
1988 |
1992 |
1996 |
2000 |
2004 |
2008 |
2012 |
2016 |
2020 |
|
Rim South |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Arkansas |
+7 |
-13 |
-5 |
+2 |
+3 |
-7 |
-4 |
+3 |
+4 |
+13 |
+14 |
+15 |
+16 |
|
Florida |
+10 |
-1 |
+4 |
+6 |
+7 |
+4 |
+2 |
0 |
+2 |
+2 |
+2 |
+2 |
+4 |
|
North Carolina |
+9 |
-4 |
-4 |
+3 |
+4 |
+3.5 |
+8 |
+7 |
+5 |
+3 |
+3 |
+3 |
+3 |
|
Tennessee |
+7 |
-5 |
-5 |
0 |
+4 |
0 |
+4 |
+2 |
+6 |
+11 |
+12 |
+15 |
+14 |
|
Texas |
+5 |
0 |
+2 |
+5 |
+2 |
+5 |
+8 |
+11 |
+11 |
+9 |
+10 |
+6 |
+5 |
|
Virginia |
+7 |
+3 |
+2 |
+4 |
+6 |
+6 |
+6 |
+4 |
+3 |
0 |
0 |
-2 |
-3 |
|
Average of all Rim S. States |
+7 |
-2 |
0 |
+4 |
+4 |
+4 |
+5 |
+5 |
+6 |
+5 |
+5 |
+4 |
+4 |
|
Deep South |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Alabama |
+12 |
-5 |
-4 |
+2 |
+6 |
+7 |
+9 |
+8 |
+12 |
+14 |
+13 |
+15 |
+15 |
|
Georgia |
+13 |
-15 |
-13 |
+1 |
+6 |
+3 |
+6 |
+6 |
+7 |
+6 |
+6 |
+4 |
+2 |
|
Louisiana |
+8 |
-1 |
-2 |
+2 |
+1 |
0 |
-2 |
+4 |
+6 |
+12 |
+11 |
+11 |
+12 |
|
Mississippi |
+18 |
+1 |
-4 |
+3 |
+6 |
+8 |
+8 |
+9 |
+9 |
+10 |
+8 |
+10 |
+10 |
|
South Carolina |
+10 |
-5 |
-4 |
+5 |
+8 |
+8 |
+8 |
+8 |
+8 |
+8 |
+7 |
+9 |
+8 |
|
Average of all Deep S. States |
+12 |
-6 |
-6 |
+2 |
+5 |
+5 |
+6 |
+7 |
+8 |
+9 |
+9 |
+9 |
+8 |
|
GOP % of Nat’l Two Pty. Vote |
62% |
48% |
55% |
59% |
54% |
47% |
45% |
50% |
51% |
47% |
48% |
49% |
48% |
Note: Cell entries reflect the extent to which the state percentage of the two-party vote cast for the Republican presidential candidate exceeded (+) the national average for the GOP presidential nominee, or was below (-) the national average.
Sources: Bibby 2003: 341; Quirk 1989: 80; Pomper 1993: 137; Pomper 1997: 178; the state chapters of this book.
Table 3-3
Number of Republican U.S. Senators Elected or Serving in the Election Years Listed
YEAR RIM SOUTH STATES DEEP SOUTH STATES
|
|
Ark |
Fla |
N.C. |
Tenn |
Tex |
Vir |
Alab |
Ga |
La |
Miss |
S.C. |
No. of GOP Senators in South |
|
1970 |
|
1 |
|
2 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
5 |
|
1972 |
|
1 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
1 |
7 |
|
1974 |
|
|
1 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
1 |
6 |
|
1976 |
|
|
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
1 |
5 |
|
1978 |
|
|
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
|
|
|
1 |
1 |
6 |
|
1980 |
|
1 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
|
1 |
1 |
10 |
|
1982 |
|
1 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
|
1 |
1 |
11 |
|
1984 |
|
1 |
2 |
|
1 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
|
1 |
1 |
10 |
|
1986 |
|
|
1 |
|
1 |
2 |
|
|
|
1 |
1 |
6 |
|
1988 |
|
1 |
1 |
|
1 |
1 |
|
|
|
2 |
1 |
7 |
|
1990 |
|
1 |
1 |
|
1 |
1 |
|
|
|
2 |
1 |
7 |
|
1992 |
|
1 |
2 |
|
2+ |
1 |
|
1 |
|
2 |
1 |
10 |
|
1994 |
|
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
1++ |
1 |
|
2 |
1 |
13 |
|
1996 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
|
2 |
1 |
15 |
|
1998 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
|
2 |
1 |
14 |
|
2000 |
1 |
|
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
* |
|
2 |
1 |
13 |
|
2002 |
|
|
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
|
2 |
1 |
13 |
|
2004 |
|
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
18 |
|
2006 |
|
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
17 |
|
2008 |
|
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
15 |
|
2010 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
16 |
|
2012 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
16 |
|
2014 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
19 |
|
2016 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
19 |
|
2018 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
19 |
|
2020 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
18 |
|
2022 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
18 |
+ Reflects a special election in 1993.
++ Reflects a party switch after the 1994 election.
* The GOP loss of a seat is because of a death and the appointment of a Democrat.
Note: Cell entries reflect the number of Republican U.S. Senators elected in each year, plus those Republican senators continuing their terms in their non-election years.
Source: Shaffer, Pierce, and Kohnke (2000), and updated by the author.
Table 3-4
Number of Republican U.S. House Members Elected in Each Election Year Listed
YEAR RIM SOUTH STATES DEEP SOUTH STATES
|
|
Ark |
Fla |
N.C. |
Tenn |
Tex |
Vir |
Alab |
Ga |
La |
Miss |
S.C. |
No. of GOP Reps. in South |
|
1970 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
3 |
6 |
3 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
|
1972 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
5 |
4 |
7 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
34 |
|
1974 |
1 |
5 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
27 |
|
1976 |
1 |
5 |
2 |
3 |
2 |
6 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
27 |
|
1978 |
2 |
3 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
3 |
1 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
31 |
|
1980 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
3 |
5 |
9 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
39 |
|
1982 |
2 |
6 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
6 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
35 |
|
1984 |
1 |
7 |
5 |
3 |
10 |
6 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
43 |
|
1986 |
1 |
7 |
3 |
3 |
10 |
5 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
39 |
|
1988 |
1 |
10 |
3 |
3 |
8 |
5 |
2 |
1 |
4 |
1 |
2 |
40 |
|
1990 |
1 |
10 |
4 |
3 |
8 |
4 |
2 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
2 |
39 |
|
1992 |
2 |
13 |
4 |
3 |
9 |
4 |
3 |
4 |
3 |
0 |
3 |
48 |
|
1994 |
2 |
15 |
8 |
5 |
11 |
5 |
3 |
7 |
3 |
1 |
4 |
64 |
|
1996 |
2 |
15 |
6 |
5 |
13 |
5 |
5 |
8 |
5 |
3 |
4 |
71 |
|
1998 |
2 |
15 |
7 |
5 |
13 |
5 |
5 |
8 |
5 |
2 |
4 |
71 |
|
2000 |
1 |
15 |
7 |
5 |
13 |
8 |
5 |
8 |
5 |
2 |
4 |
73 |
|
2002 |
1 |
18 |
7 |
4 |
15 |
8 |
5 |
8 |
4 |
2 |
4 |
76 |
|
2004 |
1 |
18 |
7 |
4 |
21 |
8 |
5 |
7 |
5 |
2 |
4 |
82 |
|
2006 |
1 |
16 |
6 |
4 |
19 |
8 |
5 |
7 |
5 |
2 |
4 |
77 |
|
2008 |
1 |
15 |
5 |
4 |
20 |
5 |
4 |
7 |
6 |
1 |
4 |
72 |
|
2010 |
3 |
19 |
6 |
7 |
23 |
8 |
6 |
8 |
6 |
3 |
5 |
94 |
|
2012 |
4 |
17 |
9 |
7 |
24 |
8 |
6 |
9 |
5 |
3 |
6 |
98 |
|
2014 |
4 |
17 |
10 |
7 |
25 |
8 |
6 |
10 |
5 |
3 |
6 |
101 |
|
2016 |
4 |
16 |
10 |
7 |
25 |
7 |
6 |
10 |
5 |
3 |
6 |
99 |
|
2018 |
4 |
14 |
10 |
7 |
23 |
4 |
6 |
9 |
5 |
3 |
5 |
90 |
|
2020 |
4 |
16 |
8 |
7 |
23 |
4 |
6 |
8 |
5 |
3 |
6 |
90 |
|
2022 |
4 |
20 |
7 |
8 |
25 |
5 |
6 |
9 |
5 |
3 |
6 |
98 |
Note: Cell entries reflect the number of Republican U.S. House members elected in each year. Bold numbers reflect U.S. House delegations from that state controlled by Republicans (ties are excluded). In 2012 there were 138 congressional districts in the South (up from 131 the election before).
Source: Shaffer, Pierce, and Kohnke (2000), and updated by the author.
Table 3-5
Republican Governors Elected or Serving in the Election Years Listed
YEAR RIM SOUTH STATES DEEP SOUTH STATES
|
|
Ark |
Fla |
N.C. |
Tenn |
Tex |
Vir |
Alab |
Ga |
La |
Miss |
S.C. |
No. of GOP gover- nors in South |
|
1970 |
|
|
|
Rep |
|
Rep |
|
|
|
|
|
2 |
|
1972 |
|
|
Rep |
Rep |
|
Rep |
|
|
|
|
|
3 |
|
1974 |
|
|
Rep |
|
|
Rep |
|
|
|
|
Rep |
3 |
|
1976 |
|
|
|
|
|
Rep |
|
|
|
|
Rep |
2 |
|
1978 |
|
|
|
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
|
|
|
|
|
3 |
|
1980 |
Rep |
|
|
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
|
|
Rep |
|
|
5 |
|
1982 |
|
|
|
Rep |
|
|
|
|
Rep |
|
|
2 |
|
1984 |
|
|
Rep |
Rep |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2 |
|
1986 |
|
Rep |
Rep |
|
Rep |
|
Rep |
|
|
|
Rep |
5 |
|
1988 |
|
Rep |
Rep |
|
Rep |
|
Rep |
|
|
|
Rep |
5 |
|
1990 |
|
|
Rep |
|
|
|
Rep |
|
Rep* |
|
Rep |
4 |
|
1992 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
* |
|
|
Rep |
Rep |
2 |
|
1994 |
|
|
|
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
|
|
Rep |
Rep |
6 |
|
1996 |
Rep |
|
|
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
|
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
8 |
|
1998 |
Rep |
Rep |
|
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
|
|
Rep |
Rep |
|
7 |
|
2000 |
Rep |
Rep |
|
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
|
|
Rep |
|
|
6 |
|
2002 |
Rep |
Rep |
|
|
Rep |
|
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
|
Rep |
7 |
|
2004 |
Rep |
Rep |
|
|
Rep |
|
Rep |
Rep |
|
Rep |
Rep |
7 |
|
2006 |
|
Rep |
|
|
Rep |
|
Rep |
Rep |
|
Rep |
Rep |
6 |
|
2008 |
|
Rep |
|
|
Rep |
|
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
7 |
|
2010 |
|
Rep |
|
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
9 |
|
2012 |
|
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
10 |
|
2014 |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
10 |
|
|
2016 |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
8 |
|||
|
2018 |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
8 |
|||
|
2020 |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
8 |
|||
|
2022 |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
Rep |
9 |
Note: Cell entries reflect which states voted elected Republican gubernatorial candidates in November of the year listed in the first column, or states that had sitting Republican governors if the year was a non-election year for them.
Source: Shaffer, Pierce, and Kohnke (2000), and updated by the author.
* In Alabama, Democratic lieutenant governor Jim Folsom became governor in 1993 after Republican Hunt’s resignation.
* In Louisiana, Democratic governor Buddy Roemer switched parties late in his term.
Table 3-6
State Legislative Chambers Controlled by the Republicans
|
State |
19-92 |
1994 |
1996 |
1998 |
2000 |
2002 |
2004 |
2006 |
2008 |
2010 |
2012 |
2014 |
2016 |
2018 |
2020 |
2022 |
|
Rim South |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Arkan. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
|
Florida |
Sen. tie |
Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
|
North Car. |
|
House |
House |
|
|
Hse. tie |
|
|
|
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
|
Tenn. |
|
* |
|
|
|
|
Senate |
Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
|
Texas |
|
|
Senate |
Senate |
Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
|
Vir. |
|
|
Sen. tie |
Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House |
House |
House S. tie |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House |
|
|
Deep South |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Alab |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
|
Georgia |
|
|
|
|
|
Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
|
La. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
House |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
|
Miss. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sen. tie |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
|
S.C. |
|
House |
House |
House |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
House Senate |
|
No. of Chambers GOP Controls |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note: Cell entries denote the legislative chambers controlled by the GOP, reflecting the outcomes of the election years listed at the top of the columns (in Virginia, cell entries reflect election outcomes in the previous year).
* The GOP held a brief 17-16 senate majority in Tennessee after 2 members switched parties in September 1995 (Ashford and Locker 1999: 215-216).
Source: Shaffer, Pierce, and Kohnke (2000), and updated by the author.
Table 3-7
Sub-Gubernatorial Statewide Elected Offices Controlled by the Republicans
(% of statewide offices)
|
State |
1992 |
1994 |
1996 |
1998 |
2000 |
2002 |
2004 |
2006 |
2008 |
2010 |
2012 |
2014 |
2016 |
2018 |
2020 |
2022 |
|
Rim South |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Arkansas |
0% |
17% |
17% |
17% |
17% |
17% |
17% |
0% |
0% |
50% |
50% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
|
Florida |
33% |
50% |
50% |
50% |
67% |
100% |
100% |
67% |
67% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
75% |
75% |
100% |
|
North Carolina |
0% |
0% |
0% |
0% |
11% |
11% |
33% |
33% |
22% |
22% |
33% |
33% |
67% |
67% |
67% |
67% |
|
Tennessee |
* |
* |
* |
* |
* |
* |
* |
* |
* |
* |
* |
* |
* |
* |
* |
* |
|
Texas |
33% |
17% |
20% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
|
Virginia |
0% |
50% |
50% |
100% |
100% |
50% |
50% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
0% |
0% |
0% |
0% |
100% |
|
Deep South |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Alabama |
0% |
50% |
67% |
50% |
50% |
50% |
50% |
67% |
67% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
|
Georgia |
0% |
43% |
43% |
29% |
29% |
29% |
29% |
57% |
57% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
|
Louisiana |
14% |
14% |
14% |
14% |
29% |
29% |
17% |
17% |
67% |
83% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
|
Mississippi |
14% |
14% |
14% |
14% |
14% |
29% |
43% |
57% |
86% |
86% |
86% |
86% |
86% |
86% |
100% |
100% |
|
South Carolina |
38% |
75% |
88% |
63% |
63% |
75% |
75% |
88% |
88% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
|
No. of States that GOP Has Majority Control |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note: Cell entries denote the percentage of sub-gubernatorial statewide elected offices controlled by the GOP, reflecting the outcomes of the election years listed at the top of the columns (in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Virginia, cell entries reflect election outcomes in the previous year). Bold percentages reflect a majority of sub-gubernatorial state offices controlled by Republicans (ties are excluded).
Source: Shaffer, Pierce, and Kohnke (2000), and updated by the author.
* In Tennessee, no sub-gubernatorial state offices are elected statewide.