Chapter 6

Louisiana: Democratic Titans Huey Long and Edwin Edwards Dominate

Louisiana shares some important similarities with its sister states of Mississippi and Alabama. It is also a Deep South state with a high concentration of African Americans (32% of the population is black, second only to Mississippi), who for a century after slavery was abolished were subjected to apartheid-like measures by their white neighbors. As in its sister Deep South states, political disputes in the early decades of the 1900s often revolved around progressive versus conservative lines. After the Second Reconstruction of the 1960s and the emergence of a viable Republican party, these political differences were now reflected in the battle lines drawn between the modern Democratic and Republican parties. As in Alabama, one Democrat was politically dominant in the modern era—in this case governor Edwin Edwards—

though in Louisiana’s case this dominant political figure had always been a racial moderate.

Louisiana is unique from its sister states in some important respects, however. Many Canadian French migrated to Louisiana after the British seizure of the Acadia territory of Canada just before the French and Indian Wars, providing the state with a sizable Catholic population (unlike the rest of Dixie) referred to as Cajuns (a corruption of the word Acadia). Cajuns are known for their tolerance for “race, gambling, alcohol, casual sex, and political corruption” (Bass and DeVries 1977: 159). Consequently, discrimination against African Americans was not as complete or as violent as in the states of Mississippi and Alabama. Allegations of public corruption have been so frequent that V.O. Key entitled his chapter, “Louisiana: The Seamy Side of Democracy,” and legendary four-term governor Edwin Edwards departed from a life of public service to enter federal prison.

Louisiana is also unique from its sister southern states by remaining a fairly heavily Democratic state, at least until recently, a trait shared only with the Rim South state of Arkansas. Since Reconstruction, only three governors have been elected as Republicans, and not until 2004 was a Republican finally elected U.S. senator (Table 6-1). Until 2006 the GOP held less than 40% of the seats in each state legislative chamber, and not until 2008 did Democrats lose control of a majority of sub-gubernatorial statewide officials. Democrats continue to outnumber Republicans in the general population, uniting many white Cajuns and blue-collar workers with the vast majority of African Americans. The presence of this sizable Catholic-Cajun population, a generally Democratic group, is unique to Louisiana, and has helped to maintain the dominance of the Democratic party statewide, at least until very recent years.

Segregation the Louisiana Way: The Longs, Tolerance and Corruption

In the Deep South, “tolerance” towards African Americans is reflected in whites permitting about as many blacks to register to vote as in the less race-obsessed Rim South states. As the civil rights movement began to heat up, 31% of Louisiana voting age blacks were registered to vote in 1956, higher even than the [11 state] regional average of 25% and far higher than the 5% and 11% of Mississippi and Alabama blacks registered (Garrow 1978: 11). White resistance to the Second Reconstruction was as evident in Louisiana as in these other Deep South states, however, and by 1964 voter registration had risen to only 32% of voting age African Americans and was now lower than the 11-state regional average of 43% (Garrow 1978: 19). Black registration in Louisiana the year before the Voting Rights Act remained higher than in Mississippi and Alabama, but had now become lower than in Georgia and South Carolina where black registration had increased since 1956. This uneven experience of African Americans in Louisiana provides another justification for examining Louisiana after the two most racially obsessed states but before two Deep South states that exhibit more of the modernizing features of the Rim South states.

Disfranchisement of African Americans was pronounced in the Louisiana state constitution of 1898, written at a convention where presiding delegates pledged the “purification of the electorate” by requiring voter registration schemes that met the test of: “Doesn’t it let the white man vote, and doesn’t it stop the negro from voting?” (Engstrom, Halpin Jr., Hill, and Caridas-Butterworth 1994: 105). The new state constitution required that voters be of “good character,” to “understand the duties and obligations of citizenship,” to be able to “write” by completing a voting application form without any assistance, and to be able to “read any clause” in the state or federal constitution and give a “reasonable interpretation” of it (Key 1949: 559). A person unable to read and write could qualify to vote by being “attached to the principles” of the state constitution, being “well disposed to the good order and happiness” of the state and nation, and being able to “understand and give a reasonable interpretation of any section of either constitution when read to him by the registrar” (Key 1949: 559).

As in its sister states, these requirements were enforced in a racially discriminatory manner by local white registrars to disfranchise most African Americans, leading V.O. Key (1949: 559) to point out that “thousands of Cajuns have qualified under tests that would fluster a Supreme Court justice.” Local registrars would violate the requirement that application forms be completed without assistance by often aiding “whites in dealing with the tricky questions,” such as the computation of one’s “exact age in years, months, and days” (Key 1949: 574). The constitutional interpretation test was finally struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court, which found that it was employed by white registrars “not [as] a test but a trap… sufficient to stop even the most brilliant [black] man on his way to the voting booth” (Engstrom, Halpin Jr., Hill, and Caridas-Butterworth 1994: 107-108).

Louisiana pioneered the grandfather clause exempting from these new requirements those who were permitted under state law to vote before 1867 and their sons and grandsons. Since state law at that time banned African Americans from voting, this grandfather clause only benefited whites, and was struck down as unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1915. The subsequent 1921 Louisiana state constitution helped to create a white primary by giving state political parties the authority to require that registered voters possess “other and additional qualifications,” whereupon “the state’s Democratic party decided that being white was an additional qualification” to participate in its party primary (Engstrom, Halpin Jr., Hill, and Caridas-Butterworth 1994: 106). Unlike Alabama and Mississippi, Louisiana did not try to get around the 1944 Supreme Court decision striking down the white primary. Louisiana also resisted the urge to fight disfranchisement of blacks to the bitter end by being the second southern state (after North Carolina) to abandon its poll tax, which it dumped in 1934 (Key 1949: 578). However, as in its more repressive Deep South sister states, the threat of violence, particularly in rural areas, kept most Louisiana blacks from even trying to register to vote. Bragged one local politician, when 18 African Americans had tried to vote years earlier, the deputy sheriff “cracked the head of one of the niggers open with a pistol butt” (Key 1949: 573).

After the 1965 Voting Rights Act, Louisiana joined Mississippi and other southern states in the inventiveness that its virtually all-white state legislature showed in devising legislative district lines that would dilute the vote of newly enfranchised African Americans. Rather than maintaining single member districts in black majority areas, the legislature combined majority black areas with majority white areas into large multimember districts. African American voters were also split between majority white districts. A final device was over-concentration, whereby the one African American lawmaker serving in the 1971 legislature was given a “nineteen-sided house district” that had a 91% black population (Engstrom, Halpin Jr., Hill, and Caridas-Butterworth 1994: 111). The legislature also split the majority black population of New Orleans into two congressional districts, in each of which whites maintained population majorities. Federal court decisions finally struck down these vote dilution mechanisms. A black majority New Orleans congressional district was finally created, which at first reelected the white liberal Lindy Boggs and then in 1990 elected African American liberal William Jefferson. African American representation in the state legislature went up to 12 members or 8% of the membership in 1980 (Menifield, Shaffer, and Brassell 2005: 162).

With most African Americans removed from the voting electorate, whites in the Democratic primary in the early-to-mid 1900s were able to divide along progressive-conservative lines. The most prominent leader of the progressives was Huey P. Long, whose relatives and allies dominated Louisiana politics until the end of the century. Long, who had been born to a lower income family living in the north Louisiana town of Winnfield, decried the concentration of 65% of the nation’s wealth into the hands of only 2% of Americans, and proposed programs that would “share the wealth” (Kane 1941: 89 quote, 39). Elected to the state utility regulation board in 1918, he compelled the telephone and electric companies to reduce their rates, and strove to prevent the big oil companies from squeezing out their smaller independent competitors (Kane 1941: 50; Key 1949: 158). Elected governor in 1928, Long championed programs that provided free textbooks to all school children, built highways and free bridges, and created charity hospitals for the poor, paying for these programs by raising taxes on such businesses as the oil and natural gas industry (Kane 1941: 63, 81, 141, 142).

Needless to say, conservative business interests, who had politically dominated the state and had kept taxes down, opposed Long’s policies. V.O. Key (1949: 159) lists these powerful conservative interests as the “mercantile, financial, and shipping interests of New Orleans,” the sugar growers, cotton planters, lumber industry, big oil companies, the railroads, and the gas and electric utilities. They were joined by the large newspapers that defended the “dominant economic interests,” each of which was blasted by Long with his one-word term “lyingnewspaper” (Key 1949: 163, 1^st quote; Kane 1941: 74, 2^nd quote). To counter the economic power of these interests, Long and some of his successors were accused of enriching themselves or their campaigns by assessing public employees’ salaries, or granting gambling or oil production concessions to their political allies (Key 1949: 163). Huey Long exercised so much power as governor, directing legislative allies how he wanted them to vote and vetoing the appropriations of programs and agencies of political opponents, that one newspaper depicted him as a dictator in the mold of a Mussolini or a Napoleon (Kane 1941: 64, 65, 68). Becoming the first Louisiana governor to be impeached by the state house, Long was acquitted by the state senate, and promoted to the U.S. senate by the people of Louisiana after his gubernatorial term (Kane 1941: 70-76). He continued to wield extraordinary power over Louisiana politics and was assassinated in 1935 by a man who feared that a state dictatorship existed and whose friends and relatives had suffered retaliation at Long’s hands. Long’s bodyguards promptly retaliated by pumping 61 bullets into the fallen assassin (Kane 1941: 134-135).

Other progressives allied with Huey Long succeeded him. Huey Long’s brother Earl, who briefly succeeded to the governorship in 1939 and was elected in his own right to two non-consecutive terms in 1948 and 1956, even defended the practice of assessing the salaries of state employees for his own political support. Acknowledging that “They’re calling me Earl Kangaroo Slickum Crookum Long,” Earl Long in his 1948 campaign responded: “Is it worse to take contributions from the little people so we can give them the benefits, or have the big shots put up the money so they can control the government” (Key 1949: 167)? Regarded as a “welfare liberal,” Governor Earl Long raised taxes and increased state spending (Howard 1972: 547). Two other governors were also elected who reflected the Huey Long progressive tradition, his senate floor leader Oscar Allen in 1932 and the leader of the Long faction, Richard Leche, in 1936. Allen increased taxes for public works programs, while Leche worked with the federal government to obtain the Social Security program for the elderly and federal unemployment insurance (Kane 1941: 93, 194). Leche became Louisiana’s first governor to go to jail, after his resignation, indictment, and then conviction by the federal government for public corruption (Kane 1941: 321, 403-404).

Conservatives won their fair share of governorships during this period, often being elected as “reform” candidates after voters finally rebelled against well-publicized allegations of public corruption. Such conservative reformers focused on instituting competitive bidding practices and civil service reform, rather than on increased spending for social welfare types of programs. Reform governors included Sam Jones elected in 1940, Jimmie Davis in 1944, and Robert Kennon in 1952 (Kane 1941: 436; http://www.sos.louisiana.gov/tabid/358/Default.aspx). They were victorious despite “progressive” opponents accusing them of being out of touch with the average voter. Indeed, Jones beat Earl Long in 1940 despite being mocked by Long as: “High Hat Sam, the High Society Kid, the High-Kicking, High and Mighty Snide Sam, the guy that pumps perfume under his arms” (Kane 1941: 434). Jimmie Davis, a hillbilly singer, defused opponents’ efforts to paint him as “going high hat” by singing “three or four songs” at each campaign stop, and co-authoring the state’s official song, “You are My Sunshine” (http://www.sos.louisiana.gov/tabid/358/Default.aspx).

Compared to its sister Deep South states of Mississippi and Alabama, the struggle over granting equal rights to African Americans was less bitter and violent. Whites in the southern part of the state were largely French Catholic (Cajun), and though they backed segregation, as did other southern whites, they were regarded as “less hostile to blacks voting, a trait attributed to the influence of the Catholic clergy” (Engstrom, Halpin Jr., Hill, and Caridas-Butterworth 1994: 107). Bass and DeVries (1977: 161) point out that Long’s programs helped blacks as well as poor whites, since they aided those “’farthest down’, and although the Negro was seldom mentioned in Huey’s speeches, blacks were included in the ‘farthest down program’.” Indeed, Governor Earl Long in the late 1950s even appeared before the state legislature to oppose a leading segregationist state senator’s efforts to disfranchise those African Americans who were still voting, recognizing that blacks backed his political program (Bass and DeVries 1977: 162).

Louisiana was not immune to the forces of white reaction against the Second Reconstruction, however. World War 2 price controls on crops as well as northern black demands for the federal government to outlaw racial discrimination prompted some Louisiana conservatives, including Governor Jones in 1943, to warn against the New Deal, and produced some voter disaffection in northern Louisiana with President Roosevelt in his last reelection bid (Howard 1972: 545). Conservatives such as Jones and segregationists like judge Leander Perez persuaded the state Democratic party in 1948 to list Strom Thurmond as the “official” presidential nominee of the party, nearly denying President Truman any place on Louisiana’s ballot (Howard 1972: 548). Jimmie Davis, elected to a second term as governor in 1960, “called five special sessions of the legislature to pass bills aimed at combating school desegregation,” though his supporters claimed that his inflammatory rhetoric opposing desegregation merely provided “an emotional outlet for the more violence-prone whites” (Bass and DeVries 1977: 166). Though Louisiana ended up voting for such political opposites on the race issue as Davis and President Kennedy, a common geographic thread was that the “liberal” Kennedy was most popular in Catholic South Louisiana while the “conservative” Davis was weakest in parishes (counties) with larger Catholic and African American populations.

The campaigns and administrations of Governor John McKeithen reflect the contradictory orientation that Louisiana exhibited on the race issue. McKeithen was first elected in 1964 as a “one-hundred per cent segregationist,” though “not a ‘hater’”, who made the folksy plea to voters of “Won’t you he’p me?” (Howard 1972: 564 1^st quote; Bass and DeVries 1977: 166 2^nd quote). Yet as governor his primary goal was to promote economic development, built the New Orleans Superdome, and to reform government by instituting a state ethics commission and a central purchasing system. McKeithen also created a biracial state commission, called out the National Guard to protect civil rights marchers, and urged the Highway Department to hire more black employees. One prominent racial moderate explained that McKeithen was just a “master politician” who on one occasion met with “some black people in the front room of the mansion” and then went “into a back room for a meeting with some leaders of the Klan” (Bass and DeVries 1977: 167). Having successfully fought for a state constitutional amendment that would permit a governor to immediately seek reelection, McKeithen won reelection in 1967 without Republican opposition. McKeithen is viewed as having successfully united the Long and anti-Long factions in state politics, given his reform programs and his “Longite roots in northern Louisiana” and business interests in north Louisiana’s Caldwell Parish (http://www.sos.louisiana.gov/tabid/358/Default.aspx).

Republicans began to make some gains in the 1950s and 1960s in presidential elections, though the state remained heavily Democratic in other elections. After backing the Dixiecrats in 1948, Louisiana briefly returned to the Democratic column in 1952, but Eisenhower’s personal popularity and the defection of African Americans to his camp after the Brown decision put the state in the GOP column in 1956 (Howard 1972: 554). After briefly returning to the Democratic side once again to back the Catholic John Kennedy in 1960, Louisiana voted for Republicans Goldwater and Nixon in 1964 and 1972 and Independent George Wallace in 1968. Democratic presidential candidates were strongest in 1960 and 1964 outside of Protestant north Louisiana, while in the 1968 and 1972 elections when the Democratic statewide vote fell below 30%, popular support for Democrats was highest in parishes with the highest concentration of African Americans (Lamis 1990: 108).

In gubernatorial elections, Republicans reached a temporary high of 39% of the popular vote in 1964 with oil company owner Charlton Lyons, who brought in Alabama and Mississippi Republicans James Martin and Rubel Phillips to campaign for him, as well as actor Ronald Reagan who chastised “liberal welfare philosophy” (Lamis 1990: 109). Prior to that race, Republican hopefuls had scored such unimpressive vote totals as 20% when opposing Senator Allen Ellender’s 1960 reelection and 24% in losing to Senator Russell Long in his 1962 reelection race (Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews 1972: 300). The depth of Republican despair as the decade of the 1960s closed was shown by both of these Democratic Senators running unopposed in 1966 and 1968 and Democratic Governor McKeithen being reelected in 1967 without GOP opposition.

Edwin Edwards Governs with a Biracial Coalition

As the Second Reconstruction began to transform Louisiana society and the race issue became less salient to whites, Louisiana Democrats were successful in creating a governing biracial coalition of working class whites, Cajuns, and the vast majority of the state’s sizable African American population. The leader of this coalition for much of the last three decades of the 20^th century was four-term governor Edwin Edwards. Edwards, a French-speaking Catholic from south Louisiana and the first governor of Cajun descent in the century, came from a humble background as a tenant farmer’s son. Growing up during the Great Depression, his hero was Franklin D. Roosevelt, and he praised governmental programs that provided him bus service, electricity, a free school lunch, and school books, as well as the “butter, beans, flour, and other staples” that kept his family alive (Bridges 1994: 198 quote, 199). Edwin Edwards was especially known for being a “witty and charismatic campaigner” (Lamis 1990: 110). When reporters at the start of his first reelection campaign asked him whether he would be able to keep his New Year’s resolution to stop gambling, Edwards joked: “The odds are eight to five” (Bass and DeVries 1977: 175). Responding to stories about his alleged womanizing during his third successful gubernatorial election campaign, the handsome Edwards quipped that the only way he could lose the election was if he was caught “in bed with a dead girl or a live boy” (Bridges 1994: 200).

In his first election as governor in 1971, Edwards ran with a moderate conservative roll call voting record earned as a Congressman representing the district in southwest Louisiana, and was forced to survive tough battles for the Democratic nomination and then the general election (Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews 1972: 311). In the Democratic runoff primary Edwards, with strong support from Cajun country in south Louisiana and heavy black support, narrowly defeated state senator Bennett Johnson from North Louisiana. He then faced a strong, articulate GOP challenger David Treen, a New Orleans suburbanite who had unsuccessfully run for Congress. Facing a conservative Republican opponent who blasted the Medicare program and upheld an “uncompromising social, economic, and philosophical conservatism,” Edwards was able to portray himself as a moderate liberal (Lamis 1990: 110). Though Edwards held his Republican opponent to 43% of the vote, the victorious Democrat was able to garner only 47% of the white vote. This election heralded the rise of a modern Republican party in Louisiana that posed a serious challenge to the governing Democrats (Bass and DeVries 1977: 172). Angered at the “unfairness” of Democrats having to wage three major campaigns (in the first primary, runoff, and then general election) while Republicans would typically waltz to nomination without opposition, Edwards convinced the nearly all-Democratic state legislature to create a unique open primary system. In such a system, all candidates of all parties would run in one primary, and if none received a popular vote majority, the two top candidates regardless of party would be in the runoff. Hence, even Republicans would be forced to do battle in a competitive primary before earning the chance to compete in a two-person runoff election.

Edwards in his first term as governor pursued a mix of progressive and reform policies. In a progressive vein, he raised the oil and gas severance tax while eliminating the sales tax on food and medicine, increased support for vocational-technical education and the education of the handicapped, granted pay raises to teachers and state employees, and appointed a black press secretary. He also increased spending on such infrastructure as roads, ports, bridges, and hospitals. One prominent racial moderate explained that unlike crafty politicians such as McKeithen who would use the race issue for their own political purposes, for the racially moderate Edwards, “really in his heart, race means nothing to him… If you’re black and doing your job or he likes you, he’s got no problem” (Bass and DeVries 1977: 167-168 quote; 172-173; Bridges 1994: 199; Parent and Perry 2007: 119). As a reformer, Edwards reduced the patronage system, and cleaned up the scandal-ridden Revenue Department. His popularity was such that he faced no Republican opposition in his 1975 reelection bid, and easily dispatched five Democratic opponents in the first primary. Yet hints of corruption had already surfaced, including allegations of the sale of government appointments to campaign contributors, stories of Edwards holding stock in a company that planned to build an office building by drawing tenants that might be attracted by the governor’s influence, and charges that Edwards’ wife had received free rent in Washington from an architect “friend” who potentially could do business with state government (Bass and DeVries 1977: 175).

Republicans elected their first governor since Reconstruction in 1979, Congressman David Treen, thanks to bitter divisions among the Democratic candidates and the Democrat making the runoff having a reputation as a “liberal.” In a field with five prominent Democrats, Treen narrowly led the first primary, while “liberal” Public Service Commission chairman, Louis Lambert, who had become famous for tirelessly fighting utility rate increases, came in third in the unofficial vote (after the lieutenant governor). The official vote placed Lambert narrowly in second place, leading the bitter lieutenant governor to claim that the election was “stolen from me” (Lamis 1990: 116). Lambert was so unpopular among these prominent losing Democrats that all four endorsed Republican Treen in the two-man runoff election. Pointing to Treen’s congressional roll call record, the “populist” Lambert blasted his GOP opponent as a “heartless conservative” who voted against the sick and elderly, prompting another disgruntled Democratic gubernatorial hopeful, the secretary of state, to brand Lambert as “lying Louie” (Lamis 1990: 116). Despite being backed by outgoing Governor Edwards (constitutionally barred from a third consecutive term), labor unions, and African Americans, Lambert lost a cliffhanger to Treen, who benefited from his business support and his great popularity in his suburban New Orleans congressional district.

Democrats quickly resurrected their biracial governing coalition in the next election (in 1983), when Edwards unseated Governor Treen in a landslide (Table 6-2). The well-funded Edwards skillfully played on public dissatisfaction with the economic problems plaguing the state, ushered in by the 1982 national recession. Blasting Treen as an inept, “do-nothing” governor, Edwards described the Republican governor as “having a lack of anything between your ears,” and of being “so slow, it takes him an hour and one-half to watch Sixty Minutes” (Lamis 1990: 118, 1^st quote; Renwick, Parent, and Wardlaw 1999: 285, 2^nd quote). Treen touted his black appointments to state government and tried to contrast his own integrity with Edwards’ image of corruption, but was swamped by the Democrats’ powerful biracial coalition of whites with modest incomes and of blacks, and by the public perception of being a failed leader in this economic crisis (Parent 1988: 212; Parent and Perry 2003: 128; Parent and Perry 2007: 135).

Democrats retained the governorship in the 1987 election by showing how they were such a broad tent party that they could replace their own “tainted” incumbent governor with a “moderate conservative” alternative. Governor Edwards was plagued by budget problems caused by an economic downturn, plus fallout from a massive tax increase. His deathblow was the corruption issue, reflected in Edwards having been the target of thirteen federal investigations, and tried twice (finally acquitted) for the indictment of allegedly illegally using his influence in selling permits to hospitals and nursing homes (Renwick, Parent, and Wardlaw 1999: 285-286). In a crowded field smelling blood, a “telegenic” challenger, a moderate conservative congressman from North Louisiana, Buddy Roemer, effectively used television ads and numerous newspaper endorsements to amass a first primary lead over Edwards with the Republican candidate placing a distant third (Hadley 1991: 76). Reeling from this rebuke by the voters, Edwards graciously withdrew from the race, making a runoff election between the two Democrats unnecessary.

Democrats meanwhile had retained a stranglehold on both of the state’s U.S. senate seats. Since 1936 and 1948, Democrats Allen Ellender and Russell Long had represented Louisiana in the Senate. Both maintained moderate conservative roll call voting records and had Longite ties, Russell Long as Huey’s son and Allen Ellender as his political ally. Russell Long was the more genuine “populist” who backed Social Security and income tax deductions while defending the state’s oil industry, while Ellender was most known for his Washington influence as chair of the Appropriations Committee and as Senate President Pro Tempore (a position held years later by fellow Democrat Stennis in Mississippi, placing the occupant fourth in line for the presidency)(Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews 1972: 297-298).

In 1972, Ellender was followed as Senator by J. Bennett Johnston, who had run a close race for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination the previous year, and benefited from being the only prominent Democrat willing to “take on” the 82 year old incumbent in the party primary (this was before Louisiana adopted the open primary). The 82-year-old Ellender died after the filing deadline had passed and before the Democratic primary, allowing two-term state legislator Johnston to coast to the Democratic nomination, and to win an easy victory in the general election over a little-known Republican and over former governor McKeithen (running as an Independent). Johnston compiled a moderate-to-moderate conservative voting record in the Senate, aggressively defending the state’s oil and gas industry and taking a conservative posture on such emotional cultural issues as gays in the military and gun control (Duncan and Lawrence 1995: 547-548). How Democratic the state of Louisiana remained would be determined by whether such moderate conservative Democratic Senators as Long and Johnston would, upon retiring, be replaced by conservative Republicans (as in the case of Mississippi) or by fellow Democrats.

Republicans got their first chance in 1986 with the retirement of Senator Long. A well-funded Republican Congressman, W. Henson Moore, a conservative representing the district containing the state capital of Baton Rouge, led the open primary. Moderate conservative Democratic congressman John Breaux, representing the southwest Louisiana district, led four Democrats to make the runoff election. Breaux skillfully blamed Republicans in power in Washington for the poor state economy, caused by a decline in oil prices: “You know, they told me six years ago that, if I voted for the Republicans and the Republican party, things would start picking up… they were right… Last month, they picked up my car, my truck, my house and my boat” (Renwick, Parent, and Wardlaw 1999: 284-285). Republican Moore was tarnished by the national Republican party’s hiring of a Ballot Integrity Group to target heavily Democratic precincts for a voter registration purge, and by a GOP staff memo that asserted that this program “could keep the black vote down considerably” (Hadley 1991: 75). On election day, black turnout surged and voters divided along economic class lines as Democrat Breaux overtook the frontrunner and was elected with 53% of the vote (Parent 1988: 212). With a reputation for representing the interests of Louisiana and for building bridges between both parties and for being respected among Democrats and Republicans, Breaux was easily reelected twice, both times in the first primary (Parent and Perry 2007: 126).

The governing Democratic party was further assisted by the hapless Republicans in Bennett Johnston’s last race as U.S. Senator in 1990. David Duke had resigned from the Ku Klux Klan to create the National Association for the Advancement of White People (Bridges 1994: 54). After two unsuccessful state senate campaigns running as a conservative Democrat, Duke went on to file as a Republican in a special 1989 election for the state house in the overwhelmingly white Metairie suburb of New Orleans, and managed to eek out a 51% victory (Bridges 1994: 56, 80). To the consternation of Republican party and public officials, the next year he entered the U.S. senate race as a Republican. Hoping to end this agony by delivering the incumbent Democrat a first primary majority, Republican officials prevailed upon the “official” Republican candidate, Ben Bagert, Jr. to drop out of the race. Johnston did indeed win the first primary outright, but Duke’s 44% of the total vote and 59% of the white vote shocked most Americans (Bridges 1994: 191-193). Duke had convinced many white voters that he had abandoned his extremist past and was now merely a “right-wing populist,” as he opposed affirmative action and minority set-aside programs as discrimination against whites, and called for welfare recipients to be tested for drugs and to work for their welfare checks (Bridges 1994: 177). One poll confirmed that Duke had attracted voters with his conservative positions on racial issues, such as minority set-asides and government aid to minorities. The winning issue, though, was that more voters “felt comfortable” with Johnston (Renwick, Parent, and Wardlaw 1999: 288-289).

The last hurrah of the Edwin Edwards years for Democrats was the 1991 gubernatorial election. Democrat Buddy Roemer, who had been a moderate conservative congressman, as governor unsuccessfully sought to shift state taxes from the sales tax to the more progressive income tax, and had his veto of a strict anti-abortion law overturned. Facing declining popularity, Roemer pronounced himself an economic conservative but a social liberal, and switched parties. His conversion to the GOP did not convince conservative Congressman Clyde Holloway, who had served his central Louisiana district since 1986 as a Republican, to withdraw from the race. Neither did it deter David Duke, buoyed by his strong showing the previous year, from entering the fray as a Republican. And Edwin Edwards was just itching for a rematch with the man who had beaten him four years earlier, claiming that he was on “a mission” to prove that Roemer “was lying about me and that he could not do what he said he was going to do” (Renwick, Parent, and Wardlaw 1999: 291 quote, 290).

Edwards narrowly led the first primary with 34% of the vote to Duke’s 32%, setting up “the race from hell” between the “crook” and the “bigot” (Bridges 1994: 194 1^st quote; 217 other quotes). With Louisiana political and economic leaders terrified that a victory by Duke would produce a massive national boycott by lucrative conventions and businesses (considering where to locate), bumper stickers backing Edwards jokingly urged: “Vote for the Crook. It’s Important!” (Bridges 1994: 220-221, 232 quote). In a televised debate, Edwards effectively compared his own record of public service with Duke’s controversial history: “While David Duke was burning crosses and scaring people, I was building hospitals to heal them. When he was parading around in a Nazi uniform to intimidate our citizens, I was in a National Guard uniform bringing relief to flood and hurricane victims” (Bridges 1994: 229). Needless to say, Edwards won his fourth and final term as governor with a sizable 61% of the vote, as one poll found that fully 60% of voters believed that Duke’s racial views hadn’t changed since his days with the KKK and that an overwhelming 91% of those voters ended up backing Edwards (Rose and Esolen 1992: 229-230). The Edwards era in Louisiana politics ended with his retirement from public life after serving this last term, his subsequent indictment and conviction for a federal crime, and his commitment to a federal prison.

Democrats remained the clear majority party among Louisiana voters in Edwards’ final years as governor (Table 6-2). In 1994, for instance, Democrats held over 80% of the seats in both the state house and the senate, and Republicans held only one sub-gubernatorial executive office, secretary of state, due to a party switch by Secretary of State Fox McKeithen in 1990 (Renwick, Parent, and Wardlaw 1999: 287). Democrats also began to put up a valiant effort in presidential races, after losing the state in the three Reagan-Bush elections. Elected Democrats led by Edwards unified behind fellow southerner Bill Clinton in 1992. Campaigning in Louisiana, Clinton invoked the memory of such Democratic “giants” as FDR, Truman, and Kennedy, drew a parallel between Bush’s economic recession and the Great Depression, and championed such popular domestic issues as jobs, education, and health care. Meanwhile, Louisiana Republicans were bitterly split between their moderate conservative and very conservative factions, with one moderate warning that the party was becoming the “captive of the extreme right” (Hadley 1994: 61 quote, 54-55). On election day, Louisiana joined Georgia and the Clinton-Gore home states in backing the Democratic presidential candidate. Republicans were nevertheless soon buoyed by their gains in the U.S. House after the 1994 elections. Not only did Republicans continue to hold 3 of the state’s 7 districts (all represented by white male conservatives), but also switches to the GOP immediately after the national landslide election by two moderate conservative white male Democratic congressmen served as a further signal that the era of near-Democratic monopoly on political power in nonpresidential elections was at an end (Renwick, Parent, and Wardlaw 1999: 301).

Emergence of a More Competitive Republican Party

The realignment of political parties across the South along ideological lines, with most conservative whites now thinking of themselves as Republicans and with more liberal residents such as newly-empowered African Americans becoming loyal Democrats, has had a profound impact on the composition of party organizations in Louisiana (as in Alabama and Mississippi). In 1991 the Louisiana Democratic party was a true, broad tent party. A plurality of 37.5% of county executive committee members regarded themselves as “moderates,” and self-identified “conservatives” actually outnumbered “liberals” (35% to 27.5%)(Hadley and Horan 1995: 158). Ten years later, the single largest faction among Democratic executive committee members was self-identified “liberals” (41%) with 36% being moderates and only 23% of Democratic activists calling themselves conservatives (Hogan 2003: 61). The Republican party organization remained a “plane with only one wing,” as nearly 90% of GOP activists regarded themselves as “conservatives” with the only dispute being “how” conservative they were (51% were “very” conservative and 37% only “somewhat” conservative). The real question in the post-Edwards era would turn out to be—which party could best camouflage its increasingly ideological nature by nominating pragmatic candidates who could appeal to average voters, and which party would be captured by its partisan base and offer voters a “choice instead of an echo” by nominating candidates who were ideological “true believers.”

The first gubernatorial race of the post-Edwards era (in 1995) saw a runoff election between white Democrat-turned-Republican state senator, Mike Foster, who offered an ideologically inclusive program, and liberal African American Democratic congressman Cleo Fields. As a former Democratic state senator from “Cajunland” in south Louisiana, “Republican” Mike Foster was able to attract some Democratic support. A millionaire businessman who was pro-business, pro-life, and pro-guns, Foster campaigned as a “populist” by wearing a welder’s cap and by backing an initiative and referendum measure that would allow voters to directly place proposed laws and constitutional amendments on the ballot (Renwick, Parent, and Wardlaw 1999: 294-295; Parent and Perry 2003: 120).

Democrat Cleo Fields, a bright lawyer and the youngest person ever elected to the state senate, had been elected in 1992 to represent the state’s second majority black congressional district, a gerrymandered Z-shaped district that included Baton Rouge, finally struck down by federal judges and prompting Fields’ retirement in 1996 (Duncan and Lawrence 1997: 617). One of the state’s two African American congressmen, Fields had compiled a roll call record that was over 90% liberal (Duncan and Lawrence 1995: 560-561). Democrats were also hamstrung by the preceding bitter open primary during which fellow Democrat Mary Landrieu, the state treasurer whose father Moon Landrieu had been a racial moderate as mayor of New Orleans, had claimed that Fields could not win the runoff election. Fields accused her of playing the “race card … by raising the issue that a black candidate could not win,” and Landrieu declined to endorse her fellow Democrat after the primary because of “unfair racial tactics” allegedly used by the Fields camp (Renwick, Parent, and Wardlaw 1999: 295 first quote; p. 296 second quote). The combination of Foster’s ideological inclusiveness, Field’s liberalism, and the Democratic party split produced a landslide for the Republican.

As governor, Republican Mike Foster focused on such non-controversial and popular programs as education improvements and efforts to attract new businesses, enacting such measures as tort reform and education reform (Knuckey and Hadley 2002: 79-80). Democrats in the 1999 election turned to the state’s sole remaining African American congressman, William Jefferson, who like Fields also sported a liberal roll call voting record (Duncan and Nutting 1999: 574). Campaigning as a “reform-minded conservative from Cajun country with a disarming good-ol’-boy patter,” Foster won the first primary outright with a landslide reelection vote (Knuckey and Hadley 2002: 79).

Yet Republicans also suffered from the ideological extremes in their own party. With Bennett Johnston retiring as U.S. Senator in 1996, David Duke launched his third bid for an office elected from a statewide constituency, terrifying state Republican party elders enough that such GOP powers as U.S. House Appropriations Chairman Robert Livingston and former governor David Treen tried to unify Republicans around a more electable candidate, state representative “Woody” Jenkins. Jenkins led the first primary and helped to knock Duke out of the runoff, but he had his own baggage to deal with. He had authored an anti-abortion bill that was so extreme that it would have outlawed abortions even in the cases of rape and incest and was vetoed by Republican governor Roemer. Jenkins gained further fame during legislative debate by “holding up plastic models of fetuses at various stages of development” (Renwick, Parent, and Wardlaw 1999: 297). State treasurer and Democrat Mary Landrieu, trailing her GOP rival by only 5% in the first primary, won the runoff election in a cliffhanger. Analysts and exit polls found Landrieu winning the votes of two-thirds of political “moderates” with Jenkins viewed by voters as so conservative that he was strongest among rural but not suburban conservatives (Parent and Perry 2007: 125). In addition to her opponent’s extremism, Landrieu also benefited from strong support in the black community, and from President Clinton’s coattails in Louisiana, as the booming economy had helped the Democratic president to easily carry the state (Hadley and Knuckey 1997: 89).

Both parties, particularly Democrats, appeared to learn their lessons of how a blind commitment to ideological purity or extremism merely helps the other party win elections. The first two U.S. senate races and the first governor’s race of the 21^st century were all quite competitive with the victor winning only 52% of the two-party vote and with neither party winning all three contests. Senator Landrieu won reelection in 2002 as someone more concerned with representing her state than with being a blind party loyalist. Her image was reinforced by her support for the Bush tax cut, her frequent votes against a majority of her own party’s senators, and by her delivering federal dollars to programs that helped Louisiana, such as funds for conservation projects and for school districts having many poor children (Hawkings and Nutting 2003: 430-431). Landrieu’s pragmatic record as a first-term senator included crafting a compromise that protected development of a missile defense system, fighting for a farm relief bill that helped Louisiana farmers hurt by a drought, and backing an early childhood development initiative that would ensure that all pre-schoolers were prepared to enter school (Mikulski et al., 2000: 226-228).

Competing in the 2002 runoff election one month after the national midterm elections, Landrieu may have been unwittingly helped by President Bush, who campaigned in Louisiana for the GOP candidate, State Elections Commissioner Suzanne Terrell. Bush’s interest in a Louisiana election may have reinforced the impression that unlike the incumbent, the GOP challenger might act in the Senate as a blind party loyalist rather than as someone who had the best interests of the state at heart. This concern was especially salient to voters given Landrieu’s claim that Terrell supported a secret White House deal that would cripple the state’s sugar cane industry by doubling sugar imports from Mexico. Landrieu also benefited from Democratic voters being mobilized by automated telephone messages made by President Clinton and by Congressional Black Caucus members who campaigned for her in black churches (Knuckey, Day, and Hadley 2005: 66).

Experience with Louisiana’s unique problems also seemed to help Democrats in the 2003 governor’s race, when Kathleen Blanco, who had served the state for twenty years as state representative, public service commissioner, and finally lieutenant governor, defeated in the runoff election the son of immigrants from India, Bobby Jindal, who had never served in elected office but had served in appointive positions in health departments in the state and federal governments (Koszczuk and Stern 2005: 443). Jindal may have also been hurt by a perception that he was “too conservative” for voters, as Blanco blasted him for opposing abortion in every case, even when the mother’s life was at stake, and accused him of hurting low income patients when he had cut costs while serving as head of the state health department (Knuckey, Day, and Hadley 2005: 67).

The GOP finally elected their first U.S. Senator in Louisiana history the next year, when Democrats split their efforts and energy among four Democratic candidates and Republicans unified behind two-term state representative and three-term Congressman David Vitter, a Rhodes Scholar and graduate of Harvard and Oxford Universities (Koszczuk and Stern 2005: 441-442). Vitter, a conservative representing a part of East Louisiana that included the New Orleans suburb of Metairie, won the first primary outright, outdistancing second place finisher Chris John, a moderate Democratic congressman representing the southwest district (Hawkings and Nutting 2003: 444). Vitter effectively introduced himself to voters with “several warm personal-introduction television spots,” and also promised to fight for their right to buy cheaper American-made prescription drugs imported from other countries (Parent and Perry 2007: 130). The victorious Republican also benefited from his strong grassroots organization in every parish and his great popularity in his suburban New Orleans congressional district. The clincher for Vitter was President Bush’s coattails, as Bush not only won a landslide 57% of the state vote, but also a growing number of voters cast a straight ticket ballot for the President and his party’s senate candidate (Knuckey, Day, and Hadley 2005: 76-77).

Hurricane Katrina’s devastation of New Orleans, a Democratic stronghold, seemed to breathe even more life into the once-weak Republican Party. A 2007 poll confirmed 2004 exit polls that the numbers of identifiers of the two major parties was now relatively equal (Scott 2007). Democrats failed to even offer a major gubernatorial candidate in 2007, as Governor Blanco, whose leadership during and after the hurricane was found wanting by many voters, declined to seek reelection, and former U.S. senator John Breaux declined to run because of a dispute over his legal residency. (As a Washington D.C. lobbyist, he now lived and was registered to vote in Maryland.) Elected and reelected to represent the New Orleans suburban Metairie congressional district, Republican Bobby Jindal skillfully built on his 48% showing in the previous gubernatorial election by spending weekends traveling across the state and giving speeches even before officially renewing his gubernatorial candidacy, especially focusing on conservative north Louisiana where he had been weak four years earlier (Moller 2007a). A bizarre state Democratic attack ad that charged that Jindal had insulted Protestants when ten years ago he had written in a Catholic journal about his soul-searching as a young man transitioning from his parents’ Hindu faith to his current “deeply religious Roman Catholic” faith seemed to backfire, as a prominent Protestant leader concluded that he appreciated “his honesty, his transparency and his vigorous faith” (Moller 2007b). Republican Jindal breezed to victory with 54% of the vote to 29% for two Democratic opponents (a state senator and a New Orleans businessman) and 17% for other candidates. In addition to reelecting the GOP secretary of state and insurance commissioner, Republicans also picked up the treasurer’s position through a party switch (before the election) and the agriculture commissioner’s position after the incumbent Democrat withdrew from the runoff election, leaving Democrats with only two statewide offices (lieutenant governor and attorney general).

Democrats fought back in 2008 and held their own, reelecting Senator Mary Landrieu over recent GOP convert, state Treasurer John Kennedy. One Landrieu television ad explained that she was "not looking for Democratic solutions or Republican solutions" but for "solutions that work" for Louisiana's problems, and recounted her successful fights for federal sharing of revenue from mineral exploration in offshore waters and for funds for a state defense contractor (Anderson 2008a). Her Republican opponent, meanwhile, desperately backtracked after being accused of siding "with a conservative Oklahoma senator who single-handedly derailed a bill that sought to provide $1.1 billion in disaster aid to farmers in Louisiana and other states affected by recent natural disasters" (Moller 2008). The state's first GOP governor since Reconstruction, Dave Treen, proceeded to endorse Landrieu as someone who "is respected by Republicans and Democrats in the Senate," who "has always worked across the (political) aisle to get the job done for Louisiana" (Anderson 2008b). To add insult to injury, the national GOP pulled the plug on its financial support for Kennedy, as it desperately sought to prop up its vulnerable incumbents in other states in a year that promised to be a Democratic 1994 tsunami (Barrow 2008). With Democrats outnumbering Republicans by 42-38% among exit poll voters and Landrieu winning 51% of the votes of Independents and 63% of moderates, as well as winning majorities among the two-thirds of voters who cited the economy or Iraq as the most important issue of the campaign, the incumbent won a 53% reelection victory (http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#val=LAS01p1).

Republicans did well in 2010, the year of the national GOP landslide, reelecting Senator Vitter, picking up yet another subgubernatorial statwide office, and gaining control of the state house of representatives for the first time since Reconstruction. Despite having to apologize after being linked to a Washington D.C. "escort service," Vitter easily won reelection over moderate liberal Democratic congressman Charlie Melancon. In a reversal of two years earlier, Republicans outnumbered Democrats by 40% to 36% among voters in exit polls, and this time the Republican garnered 62% of the votes of Independents. Eighty percent of self-identified conservatives and 85% of those disapproving of President Obama's job performance backed Vitter, and these groups comprised 47% and 60%, respectively, of voters (http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2010/results/polls/#val=LAS01p1). Republicans picked up their fifth of the state's six subgubernatorial state offices, winning the lieutenant governorship in a special election after the Democratic incumbent resigned to become mayor of New Orleans. Party switches by former Democrats also gave the GOP control of the state house and left Democrats with only a 19-18 seat advantage in the state senate.

The 2011 state election year solidified Republican dominance of state government. Governor Bobby Jindall faced four no-name Democrats- a lawyer, a special education teacher, a high school teacher, and a victim advocacy group member- who combined achieved only 28% of the vote to Jindall's 66% landslide (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louisiana_gubernatorial_election,_2011). Louisiana's sole Democratic statewide elected officer, the attorney general, had switched to the Republican Party in February, and he and five other Republicans swept the subgubernatorial statewide elected offices in the blanket primary. Indeed, the Republican Party had become so dominant in Louisiana that two of six subgubernatorial statewide officers were elected without opposition, and two other offices offered voters a choice between two Republicans and no Democratic candidate. In addition to retaining control of the state house of representatives, Republicans gained control of the state senate for the first time since Reconstruction after a March 2011 special election, and easily kept control in the general election (http://staticresults.sos.la.gov/). The 2012 federal elections reaffirmed GOP dominance of federal elections as well, as Romney easily carried Louisiana, and Republicans retained all except one of the state's U.S. house seats.

The national GOP tsunami in 2014 completed the Republican sweep of major offices in Louisiana, as Democratic U.S. Senator Landrieu who had previously on three occasions been able to narrowly win election, finally went down to defeat in the runoff primary (a December runoff necessitated after a Tea Party favorite and retired Air Force colonel held conservative Republican congressman Bill Cassidy to 41% in the first primary to Landrieu's 42%). Though the state remained sufficiently competitive that Republicans outnumbered Democrats among voters by only 1%, fully 59% of voters disapproved of President Obama's job performance and 57% believed that Landrieu agreed with Obama too often (CNN exit poll for first open primary). Cassidy proceeded to nationalize the campaign in an anti-illegal immigration ad that concluded with: "Remember: Mary Landrieu, Barack Obama, 97 percent. I'll stand up to Obama" (Schwarz 2014). Landrieu did not distance herself from the President when trying to mobilize black voters, as her chief of staff was caught by a hidden-camera video telling a roomfull of African American supporters that the senator's reelection was vital to the Obama agenda: "She will go on to support Barrack Obama 97 percent of the time" (Hohmann 2014). Meanwhile, the sole remaining Deep South Democratic senator received precious little support from the national party, as the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee anticipating defeat in the runoff pulled its ads after the first primary, and the great majority of Senate Democrats voted down the Keystone oil pipeline project favored by the state's oil and gas industry. Cassidy's 56% runoff total suggested that as expected he had indeed won over 90% of the first primary Tea Party candidate voters. Cassidy won a 59% re-election victory in 2020 with a vote margin mirroring the GOP party identification advantage among exit poll voters, as he used his massive war chest to beat Shreveport mayor and African American Adrian Perkins (a West Point and Harvard Law graduate with three combat tours).

The 2015 elections saw a Democratic comeback for Governor, but Republican retention of every other statewide office as well as of both state legislative chambers. Democratic gubernatorial candidate John Bel Edwards' noteworthy career had included graduation on the Dean's List at West Point Military Academy, service as an Army Ranger, and state House service as the Veterans Affairs Committee chair and as House Democratic caucus chair. Republicans were burdened by an outgoing governor hurt by a budget deficit that necessitated both tax increases and budget cuts, and a divisive first primary where one GOP loser remained neutral in the runoff and the other backed the Democrat. Surviving Republican, Senator David Vitter, already tarred by the "escort" scandal, was blasted by an Edwards ad accusing the Republican of skipping a 2001 House vote honoring troops killed in a Desert Storm missile strike but being on the phone with the escort service 39 minutes later, with the ad concluding: "David Vitter chose prostitutes over patriots." (O'Donoghue 2015)

Republicans surged back in 2016 to easily hold Vitter's senate seat with former Democrat John Kennedy. Kennedy had significant statewide name visibility, having been elected as state treasurer five times beginning in 1999, and having run two unsuccessful U.S. senate races and one failing gubernatorial race. His opponent in the runoff election was Democrat Foster Campbell, the public service commissioner for the 5th district, who had lost three races for U.S. house and one race for governor. Republican president elect Trump and vice president elect Pence both visited Louisiana to campaign for Kennedy, while the Democratic senatorial campaign committee declined to fund any advertising for their party's candidate. Kennedy's ads were most notable for pledging to work with Trump and blasting Campbell for supporting Obamacare (Robillard 2016). Kennedy easily won reelection in 2022 with 62% of the vote, knocking off 12 little-known challengers. Kennedy stressed his support for the police in one controversial ad where in his sleepy southern drawl he argued that, "Violent crime is surging in Louisiana. Woke leaders blame the police. I blame the criminals... Look, if you hate cops just because they're cops, the next time you're in trouble, call a crackhead" (Duhe, 2022).

The 2019 state elections maintained the status quo, as Governor Bel Edwards won reelection with 51% of the vote, while Republicans swept all other statewide offices and won about two-thirds of the seats in the state legislature. With a 56% job approval rating, the non-ideological Edwards, who had signed a tough anti-abortion bill and supported gun owner rights, boasted his ability to work in a bipartisan manner with the GOP controlled state legislature. During his term, he balanced the state budget by raising the sales tax to deal with the fiscal crisis that he had inherited, expanded Medicaid under Obamacare, and signed a criminal justice reform bill that reduced the prison population. Republicans were bitterly divided in the first blanket primary, as millionaire businessman Eddie Rispone, touting himself as the true “outsider� and Trump supporter, edged GOP Congressman and party establishment candidate Ralph Abraham out of the runoff election. Though the losing Abraham then endorsed Rispone, his son-in-law donated to the governor’s campaign and about 10% of Rispone’s supporters ended up voting for Edwards in the runoff election. Edwards also won about one-third of the white vote overall, and benefitted from aggressive get-out-the-vote drives in the black community waged by the Democratic Party and by New Orleans political operatives connected with Urban League organizations and historically black private colleges (Craig, 2019; Webster, 2019; Bridges 2019).

Republicans dominated the 2023 statewide elections, regaining the governorship without a runoff election, sweeping the six other statewide offices, and retaining both state legislative chambers by two-to-one margins. Two-term state attorney general Jeff Landry, sporting endorsements from former President Trump and House GOP Leader and fellow Louisianian Steve Scalise, won 52% of the vote to only 26% for Democrat Secretary of Transportation and Development (under the outgoing governor Edwards) Shawn Wilson. Landry's $9 million spent on advertisements was compounded by the $4.7 million that the Republican Governors Association spent on blasting the Democrat, while Democrats faced low turnout among African Americans and Orleans Parish residents, dismal pre-election poll numbers, dissatisfaction with their state party leadership, and disappointment over the state party's perceived lack of support for reproductive freedom (Montellaro 2023a; Ryan 2023). Republicans were unopposed for two statewide offices, and won the other four with 65-67% of the vote (though three of them went to a runoff). Republicans may also have benefitted by avoiding right-wing extremes, with Landry promising to not reverse the Democratic governor's expansion of Medicaid, prompting the defeated Wilson to admit that he believed that Landry "wants to try to do the right thing, and it's our job as Louisianians to make that happen" (Louisiana Illuminator 2023).

How to Win Elections in 21^st Century Louisiana

Despite Republicans holding a majority of Louisiana’s U.S. house seats since the mid-1990s and carrying the state in the first two presidential elections of the 21^st century, Democrats remained the dominant party until Hurricane Katrina. Stronger than in sister Deep South states Mississippi and Alabama, Louisiana Democrats continued to outnumber Republicans in terms of the party identification of the population, and until the 2007 state elections they held over 60% of the seats in both legislative chamber and retained all except one sub-gubernatorial statewide elective office. Democrats have inherited the progressive coalition created by Huey Long in the early decades of the 20^th century, and have met the challenge posed by a growing Republican party by revitalizing their coalition with the increased number of black voters enfranchised by the Second Reconstruction. Governor-elect Kathleen Blanco, like Bill Allain in Mississippi, acknowledged the importance of her African American constituency at a Black Legislative Caucus breakfast by throwing her support to two African American legislators, Senator Diana E. Bajoie and Representative Sharon Weston Broome, in their successful bids to be elected by their peers to the senate president pro tempore and house speaker pro tempore positions (Menifield, Shaffer, and Brassell 2005: 162). Nevertheless, the closeness of the first three elections of the 21^st century for governor and the U.S. senate dramatically illustrates how far Louisiana has come from its one-party Democratic heritage into a much more competitive two-party environment and set the stage for major GOP gains beginning in 2007.

Voters and political party organizations in the South realigned in the closing decades of the 20^th century, bringing their party identifications into line with their liberal-conservative ideologies. In Louisiana, the Republican party organization always was a pretty conservative group, while Democrats were an ideologically inclusive party that became more liberal with the influx of African American voters. Candidates of the ideological extremes of each party sought high office in Louisiana, and each time they were rebuffed by voters, many of whom held more moderate and pragmatic views than the candidates. Former Klansman David Duke, running as a Republican seeking to unseat Senator Johnston in 1990 and defeat three-term governor Edwin Edwards in 1991, lost both elections (Table 6-3). Voters were so alienated by his extremism that in the second campaign they even joked that they would rather “vote for the Crook!” Republicans also lost two open U.S. senate seats to Democrats John Breaux in 1986 and Mary Landrieu in 1996 by offering candidates who were either too associated with such religious right causes as an extreme anti-abortion position, or linked in the public mind with efforts to suppress the black vote. Democrats lost the governor’s race to Republican Mike Foster in both 1991 and 1995 after offering African American congressmen whose roll call records were clearly “liberal.” Louisiana is the first of the southern states that we have examined, but not the only one, where parties in recent years have flirted with ideologically extreme candidates for major offices, producing disastrous outcomes on election day.

Louisiana along with Arkansas is a state that in the early years of the 21^st century remained a generally Democratic state in terms of the public’s partisan ties, at least until Hurricane Katrina. When one party is a clear “majority” party, it typically wins elections as long as it remains united. David Treen became the first Republican governor of Louisiana since Reconstruction after a bitter primary that resulted in every losing Democratic candidate endorsing him, with two of them charging either vote fraud or referring to the Democrat who had made the runoff as a “liar.” Republicans in 1995 elected their second governor, Mike Foster, after a bitter racial split between a white female and a black male Democratic candidate with the loser refusing to endorse the winner (Renwick, Parent, and Wardlaw 1999: 296). Offered yet another liberal African American Democrat in the next election, many white voters took a walk and reelected Republican Foster. Yet Democrats remained such a dominant party that they were able to sometimes resolve bitter disputes within their own ranks. In 1987 Democratic governor Edwards was bleeding from corruption charges, and rather than be unseated by a Republican he lost to another Democrat, Buddy Roemer. Republicans also suffered some intra-party divisions, most notably when David Duke sought office and the party establishment launched “anyone but Duke” efforts.

With Republicans becoming more of a political threat to Democrats, unity has become even more important to both parties. Edwin Edwards, the heir to Huey Long’s legacy of progressive economic programs and racial tolerance, dominated Louisiana politics by uniting African Americans and working class whites. This powerful governing coalition was particularly evident in Edwards’ successful 1971 and 1983 elections, and it was so dominant that Republicans refrained from even running a candidate against him in 1975 (Table 6-3). John Breaux was also successful in reassembling the Long/Edwards coalition to win election to the U.S. Senate in 1986. Despite Breaux having a moderate conservative voting record in the U.S. House of Representatives, African Americans stuck with him in the face of a Republican opponent who was even more conservative, much like African American voters in Alabama were willing to vote for George Wallace in his last elections rather than for his Republican opponent. Louisiana Republicans have begun to take a leaf from the Democrats’ playbook by offering popular candidates who can unite diverse people. Mike Foster was twice elected governor by sporting a “populist” appeal, wearing a welder’s cap and projecting a “good old boy” image. David Vitter was elected in 2004 as the first GOP Louisiana U.S. Senator ever by running warm personal television ads that introduced him to voters.

It is interesting that despite the bitter partisan slugfests that occur during contemporary campaigns, the differences between the parties in how they govern once they’re in office are not that great. Ideological differences are most evident in the U.S. senate, where ideological interest groups rate the roll call voting records of Democrats John Breaux and Mary Landrieu as generally moderate liberal, while Republican Senator David Vitter is rated a more solid conservative (Table 6-4). Yet the Democrats have been able to blur their ideological image by taking conservative positions on some emotional issues. Breaux backed President Bush and voted for the Iraqi War and for drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, while Landrieu favored a ban on partial birth abortion and opposed a ban on assault weapons (Hawkins and Nutting 2003: 429; Koszczuk and Stern, 2005: 440). Over the 20^th century, Louisiana Democrats in the U.S. senate have drifted to the left ideologically, as Breaux and Landrieu’s moderate liberalism is a contrast to the overall moderate conservative voting records of their predecessors Senators Ellender, Long, and Johnston. It should be pointed out, though, that even those older generation Democrats deemphasized their ideological images by backing programs benefiting the state, such as Social Security and the oil industry. Republican Vitter, like these five successful Democrats, has also moderated his image (in his case, a clearly conservative one that opposed abortion and gay marriage) by fighting for the interests of his state’s sugar farmers and by opposing steel tariffs that would hurt revenue received by the port of New Orleans (Koszczuk and Stern, 2005: 441).

Policy differences between Democratic and Republican governors of Louisiana are even harder to discern. Economic development and attracting jobs is such a vital concern to any state that governors of both parties have been active, from Democrat McKeithen's backing for construction of the Superdome to Republican Foster's backing of tort reform. Education is a similarly critical issue championed by both parties, with Buddy Roemer as a Democrat raising teacher salaries and Republican David Treen creating the state Math-Science-Arts School. Even racial inclusion has been adopted by both parties, with Democrat Edwards and Republican Treen particularly receiving credit for making prominent African American appointments.

Perhaps the most unique policy position was championed by the first woman governor in Louisiana’s history, Kathleen Blanco. Asserting the power of the state’s governor, far more influential than in such sister states as Mississippi, Blanco persuaded the state legislature to elect two “skilled … admired and respected” African American women to the second most powerful leadership posts in the state house and state senate (Menifield, Shaffer, and Brassell 2005: 163). It is nearly impossible for any Republican party in the South to offer such an important power-sharing arrangement to a minority racial group, since nearly every African American state legislator is a Democrat. As both parties battle for political supremacy in 21^st century Louisiana, the historically dominant Democratic party under such former governors as Edwards and Blanco continued to show a tremendous resilience in preserving a governing biracial coalition that pursues ideological pragmatic policies. How much “staying power” the Democrats have, particularly after Republican gains in the 2007 state elections in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and in subsequent years, remains a wild card in this equation.

Table 6-1

Governors and U.S. Senators and Their Parties in Modern Louisiana

	Democrats			Republicans
	Governors	Senators	Senators	Governors	Senators	Senators
1970	McKeithen	Ellender	Long
1971	Edwards*	Ellender	Long
1972	Edwards	Johnston*	Long
1974	Edwards	Johnston	Long*
1975	Edwards*	Johnston	Long
1976	Edwards	Johnston	Long
1978	Edwards	Johnston*	Long
1979		Johnston	Long	Treen*
1980		Johnston	Long*	Treen
1982		Johnston	Long	Treen
1983	Edwards*	Johnston	Long
1984	Edwards	Johnston*	Long
1986	Edwards	Johnston	Breaux*
1987	Roemer*	Johnston	Breaux
1988	Roemer	Johnston	Breaux
1990		Johnston*	Breaux	Roemer+
1991	Edwards*	Johnston	Breaux
1992	Edwards	Johnston	Breaux*
1994	Edwards	Johnston	Breaux
1995		Johnston	Breaux	Foster*
1996		Landrieu*	Breaux	Foster
1998		Landrieu	Breaux*	Foster
1999		Landrieu	Breaux	Foster*
2000		Landrieu	Breaux	Foster
2002		Landrieu*	Breaux	Foster
2003	Blanco*	Landrieu	Breaux
2004	Blanco	Landrieu				Vitter*
2006	Blanco	Landrieu				Vitter
2007		Landrieu		Jindal*		Vitter
2008		Landrieu*		Jindal		Vitter
2010		Landrieu		Jindal		Vitter*
2011		Landrieu		Jindal*		Vitter
2012		Landrieu		Jindal		Vitter
2014				Jindal	Cassidy*	Vitter
2015	J.B. Edwards*				Cassidy	Vitter
2016	J.B. Edwards				Cassidy	Kennedy*
2018	J.B. Edwards				Cassidy	Kennedy
2019	J.B. Edwards*				Cassidy	Kennedy
2020	J.B. Edwards				Cassidy*	Kennedy
2022	J.B. Edwards				Cassidy	Kennedy*
2023				Landry*	Cassidy	Kennedy

Note: Cell entries indicate the governors and U.S. Senators elected in or serving during the years listed at the left. In Louisiana, governors are elected in the odd-numbered year before a presidential election, so those years are included in this table.

* Indicates that the officeholder was elected in that year.

+ Roemer switched parties in early 1991.

Table 6-2. Republican Growth in Louisiana

Year of Election	Pres. Vote (% Rep of 2 pty)	U.S. Senate Seats (% Rep of 2 pty)	Gov. Pty.*	Party Ident. (% Rep of 2 pty.)	U.S. House Seats (% Rep)	State Senate Seats (% Rep of 2 pty)	State House Seats (% Rep of 2 pty)	Sub-Gov. Office (% Rep)
1970	NA	0	Dem	NA	0	3	1	0
1972	70	0 (26)	D-43	NA	13	3	4	0
1974	NA	0 (0)	Dem	NA	25	3	4	0
1976	47	0	D-0	NA	25	3	4	0
1978	NA	0 (0)	Dem	18	38	3	8	0
1980	53	0 (1)	R-50	NA	25	0	10	0
1982	NA	0	Rep	NA	25	3	11	0
1984	61	0 (14)	D-37	NA	25	3	15	0
1986	NA	0 (47)	Dem	31	38	13	15	0
1988	55	0	D-19	NA	50	13	17	14
1990	NA	0 (45)	Rep**	NA	50	13	15	29+
1992	47	0 (12)	D-39	NA	43	13	15	14
1994	NA	0	Dem	NA	43	15	17	14
1996	43	0 (50)	R-64	35+++	71	36	26	14
1998	NA	0 (33)	Rep	NA	71	33	27	14
2000	54	0	R-65++	41+++	71	33	32	29
2002	NA	0 (48)	Rep	NA	57	38	33	29
2004	57	50 (52)	D-48	49+++	71	38	36	17
2006	NA	50	Dem	NA	71	38	41	33***
2008	59	50 (47)	R-65	48+++	86	41	48	67
2010	NA	50 (60)	Rep	48	86	49	53	83
2012	59	50	R-70	60	83	62	56	100
2014	NA	100 (56)	Rep	51+++	83	67	58	100
2016	60	100 (61)	D- 44	53	83	59	59	100
2018	NA	100	Dem	NA	83	64	62	100
2020	60	100 (59)	D- 49	59+++	83	69	66	100
2022	NA	100 (64)	Dem	NA	83	69	68	100
2024	NA	100	R-67	NA	NA	72	70	100

+ Reflects a party switch.

++ Includes 3% won by minor GOP candidate in first primary.

+++ Reflects exit polls of voters instead of all adults.

* Louisiana statewide elected state offices are elected in the year before a presidential election. Results are placed in the next year.

** Democratic governor Buddy Roemer switched parties late in his term.

*** Reflects a special election in September 2006.

Note: NA indicates not available or no election held (entries for 2000 reflect 1999 state elections).

Source: The Almanac of American Politics, 1972-1984; CQ=s Politics in America, 1986-2000; Lamis (1990); Renwick, Parent, and Wardlaw (1999); Parent and Perry (2007); Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1985), Parent (1988), Hadley and Knuckey (1997), Bullock and Rozell (2007b), Bullock (2014), Jones (2011, 2017), and http://www.sos.louisiana.gov/index.htm.

Table 6-3

Factors Affecting Elections of Louisiana Governors and U.S. Senators

Officeholder (party-year 1^st, imp. elections)	Issues	Candidate Attributes	Party/Campaign Factors	Performance Factors
Governors
J. McKeithen (D-1963,1967)	Segregationist, GOP conser.			/no GOP opponent
Edwin Edwards (D-’71,’75)	Moderate Dem. vs cons. Rep./	Witty, charismatic	Unites blacks, poor whites/	Congressman/ no GOP cand.
David Treen (R-1979)	Conservative vs. liberal	N.O. suburb popularity	Bitterly divided Dems.	Congressman
Edwin Edwards (D-1983)		Dem. popular, dishonest	Well funded, blacks & poor	Bad economy, poor perform
Buddy Roemer (D-1987)	Mod cons wins, Gov. tax incr.	Telegenic on TV	Dem gov. and Dem. challenger	Bad economy, gov. trials
Edwin Edwards (D-1991)	Keep business, conventions	GOP racist, Dem. crook	Divided GOP	3 term governor
Mike Foster (R-’95,’99)	Pro-life, guns, initiative, bus, Dem. liberal/ Dem. liberal	Rep. cajunland, “welder’s cap”/ “Good old boy” image	Dems. race split, black Dem nominee/ Black Dem.	Dem. state sen. switch to GOP/
K. Blanco (D-2003)	GOP too pro-life, anti-health	Female beats India candidate		State official for 20 years
Bobby Jindal (R-2007,'11)	GOP ethics leg.	GOP India, Catholic	No strong Dem, GOP state visits/ No strong Dem	GOP cong./ bipartisan, hurricane leader/
John Bel Edwards (D-2015, 2019)	GOP escort scandal/inclusive bipartisan Dem	Democrat military career	bitter GOP losers in 1st primary/divisive GOP primary	Unpopular GOP governor, budget problems/Dem social conservative, Medicaid expanded
Jeff Landry (R-2023)	Pragmatic Medicaid Rep, Trump endorsed	GOP 2-term attorney general	GOP campaign $, low Dem turnout
Senators
Allen Ellender (D-1936)			Huey Long ally
Russell Long (D-1948)			Huey Long son
B. Johnston (D-1972,1990)	/GOP racist, Dem moderate	/“comfortable” with incumb.	Incum. dies/ GOP vs. Duke
John Breaux (D-1986)	Mod. cons. Dem. vs. Conser. Rep.		Dem. state, blacks & poor, GOP anti-black	Poor nat’l econ, 7-term congressman
Mary Landrieu (D-1996, 2002)	Rep. too conser, pro-life/ Mod. liberal	/independent image	Clinton win, black vote/Bush camp. backlash	St. treasurer, good economy/
David Vitter (R-2004,2010)	For cheap drugs	Warm intro ad, Rhodes Scholar	United Reps., 4 Dems. compete, Bush landslide/Dem Pres. unpopular, conser Reps vote	St. legis, U.S. House
Bill Cassidy (R-2014)	Conservative Rep vs. pro-Obama Dem		GOP nationalize election, Obama unpopular, nat'l Dems abandon Dem	Rep U.S. House member, Dem Keystone pipeline ineffective
John Kennedy (R-2016, 2022)	pro-Trump Rep. vs. pro-Obamacare Dem/Pro-police Rep.	/Rep sleepy southern drawl	nat'l Dems decline Dem funding/GOP party id advantage	Rep is 5-term state Treasurer, more name visibility/Rep incumbent Senator

Source: see references in text of this chapter.

Table 6-4

Programs of Louisiana Governors and U.S. Senators

Officeholder (party-year 1^st elected)	Progressive Policies	Neutral Policies	Conservative Policies
Governors
John McKeithen (D-1963,1967)	Biracial commission	Econ. development, Superdome built, gov. reform
Edwin Edwards (D-1971, 75)	Black appointment, tax reform	Infrastructure spending
David Treen (R-1979)	Made black appointments/Math-Science-Arts school	Economic recession occurs	Tough teacher certification
Edwin Edwards (D-1983, 1991)		Federal indictments, oil recession/casino gambling legalized
Buddy Roemer (D-1987)	Tax reform fails, vetoes pro-life bill; teacher pay raise, environment protect	Campaign finance reform	Switch to GOP, claims econ. conser.
Mike Foster (R-1995, 99)	Education improvements	Backs improving business climate	Backs tort reform
Kathleen Blanco (D-2003)	Backs black legis. leaders	Katrina indecisiveness
Bobby Jindal (R-2007, 11)		Bipartisan appointments, Hurricane Gustav leader
John Bel Edwards (D-2015)	Expands Medicaid under Obamacare	Criminal justice reform, balanced budget with taxes	Pro-life, pro-guns
Senators
Allen Ellender (D-1936)		Chairs Appropriations Com	Mod. conservative
Russell Long (D-1948)	Populist- pro-Soc. Sec., tax deductions	Oil industry defends	Mod. conservative
J. Bennett Johnston (D-1972)		Mod cons-moderate, Pro-oil-gas indust.	Anti-gun control, gays in military
John Breaux (D-1986)	Mod. liberal votes	Builds bridges between 2 parties	For Arctic drilling, pro-Iraq war
Mary Landrieu (D-1996)	Mod. liberal, pro education	Moderate on Bush tax cuts, pro farm aid	For assault weapon, anti-partial birth abortion
David Vitter (R-2004)		Pro-sugar farmers, N.O. port	Conservative, vs. abort.-gay marriage

Source: text references and Website http://www.sos.louisiana.gov/tabid/358/Default.aspx