Chapter 7
Georgia: Biracial Democratic Governing Coalition Finally Breached
Georgia shares some important characteristics with its Deep South sister states of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Historically, its African American population has been higher than in all of the Rim South states (28%), and politically it was so dominated by the Democratic party that Republicans were not even able to elect a governor until the 21st century (Table 7-1). Like its sister Deep South states, whites in the Peach State practiced racial discrimination as they fought to maintain white supremacy over the political system. After the Second Reconstruction, Georgia Democrats behaved as their partisans in other southern states by creating a biracial party that continued to dominate state politics for decades. Yet Georgia also exhibits some very unique characteristics.
Until the Second Reconstruction, Georgia maintained a unique county-unit system that magnified the electoral power of rural counties and sustained the political dynasty of Eugene Talmadge, a dynasty that appealed to rural residents. Unlike the Huey Longs of Louisiana, this political titan did not pursue progressive policies, but instead adopted more conservative programs. Nevertheless, Democrats after the Second Reconstruction assembled an impressive governing coalition that united whites and blacks of diverse viewpoints, as did Democrats in sister states Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana. Republicans emerged as a competitive party by the early years of the 21st century, after the GOP breakthroughs in Alabama and Mississippi but before the isolated GOP gains made in Louisiana.
Though a Deep South state, Georgia’s segregationist racial climate was not as oppressive as sister states Alabama and Mississippi, and the level of black voter registration by the 1950s resembled that of Louisiana’s. Though voting devices were used to disfranchise a majority of African Americans, black voter registration in the Peach State remained at the 11-state regional average from the 1950s until the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Indeed, the percentage of voting age blacks registered to vote rose from 27% in 1956 to 44% in 1964 (Garrow 1978: 11, 19). Nevertheless, though not as oppressive as Alabama and Mississippi, whites in Georgia did historically employ discriminatory voting devices to maintain their political power until the Second Reconstruction.
The home state of renowned populist Tom Watson, Georgia was the center of major conflicts from the 1870s until the early 20th century between “radical” agrarian interests based in the northern hills, and conservative Democrats representing business interests and planters in the black belt. Fearing that conservatives would buy the black vote, populists engineered a popular vote on a constitutional amendment in 1908 that enacted a literacy and interpretation and understanding requirement (Key 1949: 549-550). This completed the disfranchisement of the great majority of African Americans, a process begun by the 1877 constitution that had included a cumulative poll tax, followed by an 1890 law that allowed state parties to establish a white primary (McDonald, Binford, and Johnson 1994: 68). After these discriminatory devices were enacted, progressive candidates courted the votes of those African Americans who remained on the registration books. Voter turnout rose in response to the 1936 gubernatorial campaign of a New Deal supporter, Governor Ed Rivers, as well as in the 1940s after the repeal of the poll tax and court invalidation of the white primary (Key 1949: 607). In Eugene Talmadge’s final campaign in 1946 after three non-consecutive 2-year terms as governor, Talmadge supporters resorted to having local boards of registrars purge the voting rolls of African Americans, prompting the anti-Talmadge forces to turn to “slowdown tactics” by hiring lawyers to represent blacks (Key 1949: 570).
When Eugene Talmadge’s son Herman was governor the legislature passed a purge for non-voting law in 1949, and required that those seeking to reregister after being purged who could not meet the literacy test show good character and pass a test proving their understanding of the duties of citizenship. A 1958 registration act increased the number of questions that had to be answered correctly to prove good citizenship, proving an “insurmountable barrier to illiterate blacks, particularly since the tests were administered by unsympathetic whites” (McDonald, Binford, and Johnson 1994: 71). Some counties, such as Terrell (dubbed “Terrible Terrell” by civil rights activists) and Sumter in southwest Georgia, were particularly energetic in disfranchising African Americans. Terrell county officials in the late 1950s used white voter application forms for white applicants and green forms for blacks, and generally refused to process green forms. In 1963 civil rights workers were jailed for “vagrancy” in Terrell county and for “insurrection” in Sumter county, prompting federal judges to step in to preserve civil rights activities (McDonald, Binford, and Johnson 1994: 71-72).
Born on a family farm, Georgia political legend Eugene Talmadge served three consecutive 2-year terms as Agriculture Commissioner beginning in 1926. He used the department's newspaper, the Market Bulletin, to give advice to farmers on how to improve their farming techniques, to build up his own reputation as a champion of the farmer, and to express his own political views centering around individual self-reliance. Talmadge served as governor after elections in 1932, 1934, and 1940
(http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org). He assembled an ideologically diverse coalition that included business leaders as well as farmers. Farmers were impressed by his “lambasting of the corporations… reminiscent of the Populists,” by the “calluses on his hands…from work in the fields,” and by his being a “country lawyer who had fought many a farmer’s cause at court” (Key 1949: 116). Business leaders were attracted by his support for low taxes, a balanced budget, and opposition to organized labor and government regulation of businesses. Indeed, Talmadge opposed the New Deal and Roosevelt’s renomination as president in 1936 (Key 1949: 117). In addition to Eugene Talmadge’s three terms as governor (he died before taking office after his 1946 win), the political faction that he created elected as governors his son Herman in 1948 and in 1950 (when the term was lengthened to 4 years), Marvin Griffin in 1954, and Ernest Vandiver in 1958 (Bernd 1972: 330-331).
For much of the first half of the 20th century, Georgia politics revolved around the split between Talmadge and anti-Talmadge factions, the latter backed by African Americans, the urban press and urban residents, and some labor union members (Key 1949: 126). Anti-Talmadge governors elected included E.D. Rivers in 1936 and 1938, Ellis Arnall in 1942 and 1944 (Lieutenant Governor Melvin Thompson, another anti-Talmadge figure, became governor after Talmadge’s death in 1946). Arnall supported the right of African Americans to vote, and gained a “national reputation as a fighting liberal” (Bernd 1972: 340). Thompson, who had vetoed the white primary and been backed by African Americans, even called a special session of the legislature to ensure that Truman in 1948 was listed as the official candidate of the state Democratic party, resulting in Georgia being the only Deep South state in November to reject the States’ Rights Party (Bernd 1972: 315-316).
Though the 1950s and 1960s were characterized by white southerners’ resistance to the civil rights movement, this hostility was moderated in Georgia because of the desire of people of both races to promote modernization and economic development. A biracial coalition was particularly evident in Atlanta, which became a regional headquarters for federal agencies and for many large corporations such as Coca-Cola (Bass and DeVries 1977: 150). Herman Talmadge, elected governor as a segregationist who proceeded to enact a regressive 3 percent sales tax, nevertheless pursued a modernizing agenda, increasing education and mental health spending, building new highways, and attracting new industry (Bass and DeVries 1977: 137). His successor, Marvin Griffin, also a staunch segregationist, raised the state income tax, boosted teacher salaries, and increased funding for education and roads (http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org). Ernest Vandiver, elected governor in 1958 as a segregationist, is more known as a modernizer who refused to fight federal court orders to integrate the University of Georgia and to end the county-unit system. Under his leadership, Georgia “expanded its port facilities, substantially beefed up its tourism efforts, actively promoted business and industrial development, expanded vocational-technical programs, and improved its treatment of the mentally ill” (http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/nge/Article.jsp?path=/GovernmentPolitics/Politics/PoliticalFigures&id=h-598).
Georgia’s two governors elected in the 1960s illustrate how diverse the governing Democratic party was, incorporating progressives as well as rabid segregationists. Carl Sanders, elected in 1962, is touted as the state’s first true New South governor. Sanders is credited with dramatic advances in funding and standards for public elementary, secondary, and higher education, important new economic development initiatives, state government reorganization and efficiency reforms, and cooperation with presidential administrations to ensure state compliance with civil rights measures
(http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org). Four years later, Lester Maddox, a man who had “brandished ax handles to prevent blacks from eating at his Pickrick restaurant,” was selected governor by the legislature (Bass and DeVries 1977: 148). At the zenith of white enthusiasm for Barry Goldwater, a conservative Republican Bo Callaway, known for driving a Cadillac with a bumper sticker that read, “I fight poverty- I work,” actually outpolled Maddox in the general election (Bass and DeVries 1977: 142). Because a write-in candidacy by the Democratic primary runoff loser prevented either Maddox or Callaway from winning the popular vote majority that was required by the state constitution, the legislature (which was overwhelmingly Democratic) chose the governor, and it selected Democrat Maddox.
In the face of the twin challenges of newly enfranchised African Americans and an emerging electoral threat from the Republican Party, Peach State Democrats showed an amazing ability to assemble an ideologically diverse, biracial coalition that won every gubernatorial election for the rest of the 20th century. The first governor of this Democratic dynasty in the post-segregation era was Naval Academy graduate and peanut farmer Jimmy Carter, a state senator who had run unsuccessfully for governor in 1966. Carter spent the next four years “literally crisscrossing the state to make speeches to small groups and to shake hands in every crossroad store, not once but many times” (Murphy and Gulliver 1971: 188). In the 1970 Democratic primary with former governor Carl Sanders, another racial moderate, Carter actively sought the support of those who had voted for Governor Lester Maddox and Independent presidential candidate George Wallace, blasting Sanders who as governor had once prevented the segregationist Wallace from speaking in Georgia at a state building. Carter also effectively painted himself as a common-man candidate compared to his wealthy “country club” corporate lawyer opponent, and swept the small towns and rural areas to gain the Democratic nomination (Lamis 1990: 98 quote; Murphy and Gulliver 1971: 186, 190). In the general election running against a Republican newscaster, Carter then won back most of the black vote, as he shook black as well as white hands, rare for a white southern politician at the time. As governor, Carter proclaimed that “the time for racial discrimination is over,” and proceeded to nominate the first African American to the state Pardons and Paroles Board (Murphy and Gulliver 1971: 196 quote, 195). In addition to black appointments, Governor Carter created a biracial commission, hung Martin Luther King Jr.’s portrait in the state capitol, met weekly with the state AFL-CIO president, extensively reorganized state government, and required that banks bid for state funds (Bass and DeVries 1977: 145-146).
After Carter’s single term, Democrats proceeded to elect three more governors, each to two successive 4-year terms, with Republicans offering only token opposition in the first four elections. In each case Democrats offered candidates with impressive resumes of political experience. Eighteen year state house veteran and eventual majority leader George Busbee was elected governor in 1974 and 1978, followed by another 18 year state house veteran and eventual House Appropriations Committee chair Joe Frank Harris, elected in 1982 and 1986, and ending with 4-term lieutenant governor Zell Miller, who was elected governor in 1990 and 1994. All built impressive ideologically inclusive, biracial coalitions.
In the 1974 Democratic runoff with Lester Maddox, Busbee assembled a winning coalition of urban residents, followers of former governor Sanders’, and blacks angered by Maddox’s attack on the memory of Martin Luther King (Bass and DeVries 1977: 147). A racial moderate who had proclaimed in his inaugural address that, “The politics of race has gone with the wind,” Busbee stressed “unity” and practiced a politics of consensus (Bass and DeVries 1977: 148). He promoted the interests of Atlanta and gained business support for his numerous economic development projects, while also working with labor to remove a waiting period for unemployment eligibility (Bass and DeVries 1977: 149). Busbee also established public kindergartens statewide (http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/nge/Home.jsp). Joe Frank Harris ran in 1982 as a conservative who opposed tax increases, preempting the Republican ideology and leaving his GOP opponent with the sole issue of Harris’ close ties to the powerful state house speaker, Tom Murphy. The Republican’s constant attacks on the “Democratic power structure” actually helped Harris by causing party officials to close ranks behind him (Lamis 1990: 104). As governor Harris, like his predecessor, pursued ideologically inclusive programs. He won business support with his no tax increase stance, his ambitious four-lane highway program, and his funding of the Georgia Dome sports arena which attracted the Super Bowl and the Olympics, while also dramatically increasing public elementary and secondary education funding (http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/nge/Home.jsp).
Georgia’s Democratic U.S. senators during this period also showed an impressive ability to assemble a diverse ruling coalition. Herman Talmadge was the son of the legendary Eugene, who like his father also boasted considerable support among rural whites. Herman had left the governorship after the 1954 election with the reputation of being a pro-business modernizer. He was drafted to run for an open senate seat in 1956 by such prominent business leaders as Coca Cola’s chairman, who had donated considerable money to civic projects in Atlanta (Bass and DeVries 1977: 138). While Talmadge maintained a conservative voting record in the Senate, by 1966 he had shed his segregationist image, was accepting speaking engagements before Atlanta’s black leadership groups, and was now regarded by political observers as a “cool, consensus-seeking political pragmatist” (Bass and DeVries 1977: 140 quote; 139; Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews 1972: 163). Georgia’s other Senator during the 1960s was the legendary Richard Russell, former state house speaker, governor, and since 1933 U.S. Senator. Russell had beaten the race-baiting Eugene Talmadge in the 1936 senate Democratic primary, and while a leader of the southern anti-civil rights forces in the senate he was most known for his aristocratic reputation of devoted public service. A senate power who rose to the positions of senate president pro tempore and chair of the powerful Appropriations Committee, Russell also built a reputation of strong support for national defense programs (Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews 1972: 160). Georgia Democrats would face their first major test in a post-Second Reconstruction senate election after Russell’s death in 1971.
Compared to these two Democratic titans able to connect with “powerful” as well as “average” voters, Governor Carter’s choice of his campaign’s finance chairman, David H. Gambrell, a “41-year-old scholarly Atlanta lawyer” with a Harvard law degree to fill Russell’s seat until the next year’s election invited many challengers (Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews 1972: 161). The victor in the Democratic runoff was Sam Nunn, a relatively unknown state house member with only four years of service, who held a law degree from Emery. Nunn may have benefited from his appeal to voter disillusionment with incumbents with his campaign slogan, “Get Tough in Washington.” Compared to the wealthy incumbent, Nunn’s rural roots as a cattle farmer also boosted his election prospects, as did late endorsements from two black state legislators (Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews 1973: 220; Duncan 1993: 390).
With the weaker Democratic candidate knocked off in the party primary, Nunn turned his attention to the general election campaign and faced a 3-term conservative Republican congressman, Fletcher Thompson. Thompson brought in national Republicans to campaign for him and tried to link Nunn with such unpopular liberal national Democrats as George McGovern and Ramsey Clark. Nunn promptly flew to Alabama to accept George Wallace’s endorsement, and proceeded to blast “judicial tyranny” and court-ordered school busing to achieve desegregation. Faced with a choice between Nunn and an even more conservative Republican, most African Americans voted Democratic for the “lesser of two evils,” and Nunn won with 54% of the vote (Lamis 1990: 100). Nunn’s voting record in the senate was basically moderate, evolving over the years from a moderate conservative posture to a moderate liberal position. Nunn, a leader of the moderate-to-conservative Democratic Leadership Council, was able to project a more conservative image than northern Democrats did on some social and defense issues important to southerners, such as support for a strong national defense and opposition to Clinton’s effort to lift the ban on gays in the military (Duncan and Lawrence 1995: 336-338). He went on to three landslide reelections with Republicans in 1990 not even offering a candidate to oppose him.
Democrats were less successful eight years later in 1980, when incumbent Talmadge attracted numerous Democratic challengers after receiving unfavorable publicity over a sensational divorce, his admitted battle with alcoholism, and his formal denunciation by the Senate after a senate investigation of charges that he had used “official funds for personal purposes” (Barone and Ujifusa 1981: 244 quote; Lamis 1990: 101). Talmadge nevertheless won the Democratic runoff over Lieutenant Governor Zell Miller, a moderate liberal at the time, though African American discontent over the incumbent senator was evident by Atlanta mayor Maynard Jackson’s warning to blacks that a vote for Talmadge was the equivalent of “spitting on the grave of Martin Luther King, Jr.” (Lamis 1990: 102). Talmadge proceeded to make some campaign errors, refusing to debate his GOP opponent and neglecting to replenish his campaign treasury (Bullock 2003: 56). Given a weakened Democratic candidate leading a divided party, Republican Mack Mattingly was able to win 51% of the vote in November. Though projecting a “country club” image and being blasted by Talmadge as a “carpetbagger” from Indiana, the GOP businessman won big in the Atlanta metropolitan area and received a sizable minority of the black vote to topple the Democratic legend (Lamis 1990: 102 quotes, 103).
Despite Mattingly’s “accidental” election, Georgia remained a heavily Democratic state. It had twice voted for favorite son Jimmy Carter for president, and was indeed the only southern state to back Carter over Reagan in 1980. Even more importantly, Democratic party identifiers outnumbered Republicans among eligible voters by at least a two-to-one margin throughout the 1980s (Table 7-2). Mattingly maintained a conservative voting record in the Senate and fought for Atlanta’s banking interests, but he pragmatically distanced himself from some of Reagan’s anti-civil rights policies (Ehrenhalt 1985: 364-365). In 1986 Democrats challenged Mattingly with Atlanta congressman since 1977, Wyche Fowler, a moderate liberal. The GOP incumbent proceeded to blast Fowler as a “tax-and-spend liberal,” though Fowler was able to counter this label with Senator Sam Nunn’s endorsement (Lamis 1990: 274). Most noteworthy was Fowler’s appealing “homestyle,” as he campaigned throughout the state with a soft-spoken, low-keyed personality that exuded humility and an ability to show empathy and identification with average voters (Fenno 1978, popularized this term). In one campaign swing, the Democratic challenger managed to relate his experiences as a soldier, how his grandfather had been a farmer, how his mother had been born just outside of one town he was visiting, and how a local fish hatchery was named after his uncle (Lamis 1990: 273). Fowler also personalized the campaign, running one television ad where he held up a puppy that eagerly licked his face (Ehrenhalt 1987: 355). The Democratic challenger proceeded to pull out a narrow 51% upset of the GOP incumbent, splitting the white vote with his opponent and garnering nearly 90% of the black vote (Lamis 1990: 296).
As the decade of the 1980s ended, Democrats appeared to remain the clear dominant party in Georgia. Except for a single term of one “accidental” GOP senator, Democrats had maintained a stranglehold over the governorship and both of the state’s U.S. senate seats (Table 7-1). Democrats held 80% of the seats in the state legislature, 9 of the state’s 10 U.S. House seats (Newt Gingrich, elected in 1978 from the Atlanta suburban district, was the only Republican), and all of the state’s subgubernatorial executive offices. The one bright spot for the GOP was landslide victories for Reagan and Bush in the 1984 and 1988 presidential elections (Table 7-2). In state elections, Peach State Democrats had shown an exceptional ability to offer politically experienced candidates, who were personable and able to identify with voters, and who pragmatically pursued ideologically diverse programs in their quest to construct broad-tent, biracial coalitions. The next decade would see a challenge by an increasingly competitive minority party that threatened Democratic hegemony, while the early years of the 21st century would usher in a Democratic “melt-down.”
Democrats retained the governorship in 1990 with four-term Lieutenant Governor Zell Miller, a “moderate liberal” who beat Republican businessman Johnny Isakson, a 14-year state representative who had risen to the house minority leadership position. A country music fan from rural north Georgia, Miller hired political consultants James Carville and Paul Begala and waged an aggressive television campaign that portrayed himself as a political “outsider” who had stood up to powerful long-time house speaker Tom Murphy. Miller focused on economic issues that Democrats had been associated with since the New Deal instead of on divisive social issues, urging adoption of a lottery to better fund education innovations and calling for repeal of the regressive sales tax on food that hurt poor people (Binford, Baxter, Sturrock, 1999: 109-113). Republicans had effectively used social issues to defeat Democratic presidential candidate Dukakis in Georgia two years earlier, with Speaker Murphy withdrawing his endorsement of the Democrat because of Dukakis’ liberal positions on the death penalty and gun control, and with former governor Lester Maddox blasting Dukakis as a “socialist and revolutionary leftist” (Abramowitz and Davis 1991: 65). While continuing their unending string of gubernatorial defeats, Republicans could take some comfort in garnering 46% of the two-party vote, their best showing since Bo Callaway’s near-victory during the Goldwater era.
Though the 1992 elections were two years before the national Democratic “meltdown” in Clinton’s first midterm election, problems were already emerging for Georgia Democrats. First, the continued exodus of conservative white southerners from the Democratic party was permitting Republicans to greatly narrow the partisan identification gap among eligible voters (Table 7-2). Second, an “unholy alliance” between Republican and African American state legislators had produced a congressional redistricting plan that added two black majority U.S. House districts to African American John Lewis’ Atlanta district, thereby making some of the remaining districts “whiter” and more likely to elect Republicans (Binford, Baxter, Sturrock, 1999: 114). Republican Newt Gingrich was joined after the 1992 elections by three new Georgia Republican congressmen, all of whom were white males who went on to compile “conservative” roll call voting records. All three black majority districts elected African American Democrats, as Sanford Bishop and Cynthia McKinney joined John Lewis, and all went on to compile “liberal” voting records. The ideological and racial polarization of the two parties’ house delegations was masked, though, by the election of two white male Democrats in open contests to join two other white male Democrats who had been elected in the early 1980s (Duncan 1993).
The third problem for Georgia Democrats in 1992 was the loss of Wyche Fowler’s Senate seat. Fowler had amassed a moderate liberal voting record in the Senate, opposing parental notification of minors’ abortions, backing the outlawing of certain semiautomatic weapons, and favoring continued funding of “obscene” art but less funding for SDI (Duncan 1991: 356). His Republican challenger, Paul Coverdell, offered a significant resume, being an Atlanta insurance marketing executive, an 18-year state senator who rose to minority leader for 14 of those years, and even serving as Peace Corps director under President Bush. Coverdell proceeded to blast the Democratic incumbent’s “liberalism,” pointing out that Fowler had voted against the death penalty and against the Gulf War, and also tried to tie the incumbent to the House bank scandal (Duncan 1993: 392). Though Fowler received 49% of the general election vote to Coverdell’s 48%, his failure to earn an absolute majority required a runoff election under the state constitution. With turnout sharply down in the runoff election and the national Republican party pouring money into this last remaining contest of the 1992 season, Coverdell pulled out a 51% runoff victory (Binford, Baxter, Sturrock, 1999: 116-117). The one positive note for Georgia Democrats was the narrow victory won by presidential candidate and fellow southerner Bill Clinton. Backed by Governor Zell Miller, House Speaker Tom Murphy, and Senator Sam Nunn, Clinton held his own among Georgia Democrats and even won a majority among political “moderates” (Lockerbie and Clark 1994: 41, 46).
If Democrats faced mere “problems” in 1992, by 1994 those problems had festered into true nightmares. When the dust settled, the moderate white Democratic faction of the U.S. House delegation had been liquidated and Democrats were reduced to holding only three of the state’s eleven districts, all of which were majority black districts represented by “liberal” African Americans. Moderate Democratic congressman Buddy Darden was knocked off by conservative GOP prosecutor Bob Barr, who had blasted the incumbent for supporting President Clinton’s economic stimulus plan and his tax-raising budget plan (Duncan and Lawrence 1995: 356; Duncan 1993: 412). Democratic congressman Don Johnson, who had also supported these Clinton policies, was unseated by Charlie Norwood, a retired dentist. Norwood favored tougher measures to fight crime than contained in the crime bill that Clinton had signed, and Johnson’s vote for the “moderate” bill won him the label “Judas Johnson” by one prominent newspaper that had previously endorsed the Democrat (Duncan and Lawrence 1995: 362). The retirement of moderate Democrat J. Roy Rowland produced yet another Republican victory, as law firm owner Saxby Chambliss blasted his Democratic opponent as a “liberal Democrat” who would “fall in line with the Clinton White House,” and who was a carpetbagging legislative aide for an Alabama congressman (Duncan and Lawrence 1995: 358). Seeing the handwriting on the wall, white Democrat Nathan Deal, who had compiled a moderate conservative voting record in his two years in the House by opposing abortion, gun control, gays in the military, and the Clinton budget plan, switched to the GOP months after winning re-election (Duncan and Lawrence 1995: 360-361).
Democrats breathed a sigh of relief that they were able to reelect Governor Zell Miller, though his mere 51% victory in 1994 was a disappointment. Miller as governor had amassed an impressive, ideologically inclusive record of accomplishment, enacting the lottery-based HOPE program providing full college scholarships for high school students with B averages, and being tough on crime by backing a tough DUI law, boot camps, and a 2 strikes and you’re out law (Binford, Baxter, Sturrock, 1999: 120). The Republican challenger was successful businessman Guy Millner, whose political inexperience was highlighted by his off-handed comment that he would avoid campaigning in small towns because the votes weren’t there, and whose wealth was constantly highlighted by the governor. The Republican did effectively tie Zell Miller to President Clinton, as his ads played the governor’s keynote address at the Democratic national convention praising Clinton as the “only candidate who feels our pain” (Binford, Baxter, Sturrock, 1999: 119. Miller may have also lost some voter support because of his effort to have the Confederate battle emblem removed from the state flag (an effort defeated in the legislature), and the cuts he made in state spending when faced with a national recession (Miller 2003: 47, 50-53). Republicans for the first time since Reconstruction also began to win subgubernatorial executive offices, electing Linda Schrenko school superintendent and party switchers incumbent Mike Bowers and challenger John Oxendine as attorney general and insurance commissioner, respectively (Binford, Baxter, Sturrock, 1999: 120). The GOP also continued to make state legislative gains, though Democrats continued to hold over 60% of the seats in both chambers.
The next three elections years produced some comebacks for the beleaguered “governing” Democratic party of Georgia. Democrats retained Sam Nunn’s U.S. senate seat after his retirement in 1996 by offering a Vietnam War hero and experienced state public official. Max Cleland had earned the Silver Star by falling on a loose grenade, a heroic action that cost him both legs and a hand (http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/). Elected a state senator after the war, he then served as President Carter’s director of Veterans Affairs, and returned to Georgia once again, this time to win four terms as secretary of state. Republicans suffered a divisive primary between their two previously unsuccessful gubernatorial nominees with the winner Millner (who defeated Isakson in the primary) again criticized by his Democratic opponent for being too rich. Indeed, reinforcing the old GOP party image dating back to the New Deal, Millner was accused of maintaining a “Florida vacation home with membership in an exclusive, and reportedly discriminatory, country club” (Binford, Baxter, Sturrock, 1999: 125). Despite a united Democratic party and high black turnout, Cleland won only 49% of the vote to Millner’s 48%, which was enough for victory since the Democratic legislature had abolished the absolute majority requirement after Coverdell’s “accidental” election four years earlier. Republicans took some consolation in narrowly winning Georgia for Bob Dole, as Clinton suffered a drop in support among white males. However, that Clinton won 85% of the Democratic vote and Dole won 90% of the Republican vote showed how far Georgia had moved from its one-party Democratic tradition into a modern era of intensely competitive two-party politics (Clark and Lockerbie 1997: 72-73).
Democrats also retained the governorship in 1998 after Zell Miller’s retirement. Roy Barnes boasted significant state government experience as a state senator for sixteen years and a state representative for six years. Focusing on the popular economic issues of education and health care reform, Barnes also benefited from a party so united that the Democrat who came in second place conceded instead of insisting on a runoff (Binford, Baxter, Sturrock, 1999: 134; http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/). Democratic voters had also offered a truly balanced ticket, nominating three experienced African American candidates for other statewide offices, which boosted black turnout to historic levels (Bullock 2003: 62). Not only did Roy Barnes make his Republican opponent Guy Millner a three time loser in statewide races, but the once segregationist Peach State elected African Americans Thurbert Baker and Michael Thurmond as attorney general and secretary of labor, respectively, with significant white support (Binford, Baxter, Sturrock, 1999: 134; Bullock 2007: 64). Both had first been appointed to state government positions by Governor Miller, with Thurmond directing the state’s welfare-to-work effort and Baker appointed to complete his predecessor’s term as attorney general. Republicans took some consolation from the reelection of Senator Paul Coverdell, who benefited from his leadership position as Republican Conference Secretary, his “tireless approach to campaigning,” and his conservative positions on cutting taxes and fighting drugs (Duncan and Nutting 1999: 358).
Democrats enjoyed their last hurrah with the death of Senator Coverdell, the appointment by Democrat Barnes of Zell Miller to the seat, and Miller’s easy election in 2000 to the four years remaining in the term. The popular Miller was a godsend to Democrats, as he had left office with an over 80% approval rating and such major policy accomplishments as welfare reform, anti-crime measures, repeated tax cuts, and the HOPE scholarship program. Promising to continue his state government record of “bipartisan cooperation,” Miller had accepted his appointment to the senate by pledging to “serve no single party, but rather seven-and-a-half million Georgians” (Miller 2003: 8). His Republican opponent, former Senator Mack Mattingly, suffered from low name visibility despite being supported by George W. Bush and Coverdell’s widow (Bullock 2002: 71-72). Once again, Republicans had to console themselves by carrying Georgia in the presidential race, as Bush was benefited by his tax cut proposal and his image of favoring a less active government, and the Democratic presidential nominee’s backing among whites fell to only 26% (Bullock 2002: 67, 69).
And then the Democratic meltdown occurred. Over the next two election cycles, Democrats went from controlling the governorship and both of the state’s U.S. senate seats to controlling none of these three critical statewide offices. Senator Max Cleland had compiled an overall “liberal” roll call record in the Senate, receiving an average 83% liberal ADA rating and a mere 8% conservative ACU score over a four-year period. He had voted to include sexual orientation in a federal hate crime measure, voted for some gun restrictions, and had opposed a ban on partial birth abortion (Nutting and Stern 2001: 256-257). Needless to say, it was not too difficult for 4-term conservative congressman Saxby Chambliss, who chaired the House Intelligence Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, to depict Cleland’s opposition to some provisions of President Bush’s Homeland Security Department as being “soft on national defense” (Hawkings and Nutting 2003: quote on 271, 270). Weeks before the election, fellow Democratic senator Zell Miller had publicly warning his party that it was political suicide to take on the President over the issue of “national security,” as it would paint the most “unattractive picture” possible of Democrats “undermining the president of the United States on terrorism” (Miller 2003: 71). Miller blamed the liberal national Democratic party’s subservience to the federal employees’ unions for the senate Democratic caucuses’ opposition to giving Bush the flexibility to move Homeland Security employees around. Republican Chambliss, depicting Cleland as “too liberal for Georgia” and benefiting from a massive GOP get-out-the-vote drive, went on to unseat the incumbent in 2002 with a respectable 53% of the vote (Bullock 2007: 61; Hawkings and Nutting 2003: 271).
The same year saw Republicans capture the governorship for the first time since Reconstruction. Governor Barnes had promoted such reforms as increased accountability in education, health care choice for patients, and holding insurance companies liable for denying care to people, but he became most famous for pushing the legislature to adopt without a public referendum a new state flag that greatly minimized the Confederate Emblem (http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org). State polls showed that less than 30% of whites liked the new flag and approved of how the governor and legislature had changed the flag, and that only about half of even Democrats approved of the new flag (Bason 2005: 14-15). Barnes was also hamstrung by teachers who believed that his accountability plan implied that they were “largely incompetent and uncaring,” and faced an opponent who organized an effective grassroots campaign that targeted swing counties that had split their votes four years earlier (Bullock 2007: 60). Needless to say, Barnes lost his reelection bid to Republican Sonny Perdue, a former Democrat who had served eleven years in the state senate. Georgia Democrats were further stunned by losing control of the Georgia state senate to the Republicans for the first time since Reconstruction. Senate Republicans proceeded to strip the Democratic lieutenant governor of his powers to make committee assignments and to control the scheduling of bills for senate consideration (Redmon 2006).
Republicans completed their sweep in 2004 by picking up Zell Miller’s senate seat. Miller had served as unofficial spokesman for many conservative white southerners who feared that the national Democratic party had become too liberal for them. Priding himself for his bipartisan approach, Miller had cosponsored President Bush’s tax cut and worked with Republicans on the President’s Homeland Security bill. Blasting the national Democratic party’s relentless drift to the ideological left, Miller (2003) in his biography explained why Democrats were A National Party No More. Republicans were poised to capture his seat with conservative Congressman Johnny Isakson, who offered an impressive resume of 14 years in the state house, 4 in the state senate, 6 in the U.S. House, and 3 years as state education board chairman. Furthermore, Isakson billed himself as a “compassionate conservative,” was pro-choice in some respects, and had achieved a more moderate image by defeating two candidates in the Republican primary who were even more conservative than him (Koszczuk and Stern 2005: 280-281).
Isakson’s Democratic opponent was first-term congresswoman (and previously 9-year state court judge) Denise Majette, who had upset the controversial Cynthia McKinney in the Democratic primary two years earlier. The African American Majette boasted “few accomplishments” in her single congressional term other than a “liberal voting record” which was anathema to Georgia conservatives, and was swamped in the television advertisement war by her well-funded GOP opponent (Bullock 2005: 50 1st quote, 53 2nd quote). The Republican was also likely aided by a constitutional amendment on the ballot that outlawed gay marriage, which may have accounted for bringing more evangelical voters to the polls. Isakson, drawing about 80% of the white vote, went on to win the seat with an impressive 59% of the two-party vote. Republicans added insult to injury by gaining control of the state house for the first time since Reconstruction, giving their party control of both state legislative chambers, and easily carrying the state for President Bush. Particularly chilling for Democrats was the strong relationship that emerged between race and election results, as Republicans swept all state senate contests where blacks made up less than 30% of the electorate, though several Democratic incumbents were able to hang on in the state house (Bullock 2007: 62-63).
One positive note for Democrats in the 2004 elections was their ability to reverse the divisive split of the state’s U.S. House delegation, which after the 1994 elections had been divided along racial lines, and to reach near-parity with the GOP. The 6 Democratic congressmen comprised a racially and ideologically diverse coalition of two white males, three black males, and one black female (McKinney won her seat back). Particularly interesting is that two African Americans, Sanford Bishop and David Scott, have both compiled “moderate liberal” rather than more rigidly liberal roll call records, have been able to win in districts having more whites than blacks, and achieved landslide (or unopposed) reelections. White male Democrat Jim Marshall also holds a moderate liberal voting record, and the other white male (John Barrow) was just elected (Koszczuk and Stern 2005). Indeed, that all 7 GOP congressmen were white males and five were clearly “conservative” in their roll call votes (two newly elected members are not yet rated) suggested that Republicans might be encountering some difficulty in transforming their party into a true “broad tent” governing party. One of the other few bright points for Georgia Democrats is that they continued to retain a majority of subgubernatorial executive offices with Republicans retaining only the insurance commissioner and school superintendent positions.
Republicans continued to flex their muscles in 2006 as they reelected Governor Sonny Perdue and their incumbent insurance commissioner and state school superintendent, and won the open contests for lieutenant governor and secretary of state. Democratic incumbents, including African Americans Baker and Thurmond, were victorious in the other three executive offices. The “folksy,” people-oriented Perdue was helped by a booming economy that produced a $580 million surplus and by his decisive leadership after Hurricane Katrina. His conservative first-term accomplishments had included passing a 24-hour waiting period for abortions, a state constitutional amendment banning gay marriage, diverting many Medicaid patients into managed care programs, enacting tort reform that limited monetary damages against doctors and hospitals, and cutting business taxes (Salzer 2006a; Salzer 2006b). Yet Perdue took a more progressive stance on some sensitive racial issues, as he personally escorted the casket of Coretta Scott King, Martin Luther King’s widow, into the state capitol where she became the first African American in state history to lie in honor (Associated Press 2006). He also angered Confederate heritage groups by accepting a Democratic legislative compromise that permitted a state flag referendum only between the two least controversial measures that did not include the 1956 flag with its large Confederate cross (Tharpe 2006). The Democrat Taylor spent much of the campaign attacking the governor for allegedly making money off of secret tax breaks and land deals, and the Democratic challenger promised a more activist government that would increase education funding and provide health insurance coverage for all children (http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/pages/results/states/GA/G/00/epolls.0.html; accessed December 20, 2006).
Republicans held their own in a bad year nationally for the party, 2008, narrowly carrying Georgia for McCain and reelecting Senator Chambliss after his mere 3% edge over Democratic former state legislator Jim Martin sent the election to a runoff. Echoing the charges of the Democratic challenger, the major state newspaper blasted Chambliss as a "loyal defender of President Bush and his policies and as a champion of corporate interests" (Atlanta Journal-Constitution 2008). In the first election, when Obama's candidacy brought slightly more Democrats (36% of exit poll voters) than Republicans (34%) to the polls, Martin won two-thirds of the 59% of exit poll voters who disapproved of Bush's performance as President as well as 57% of moderates (http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#GAS01p1). With the runoff election turning into a national war over a possible 60 Democratic seat, filibuster-proof margin in the Senate, big names like Bill Clinton, Al Gore, John McCain, Sarah Palin, and Mike Huckabee flocked to Georgia to campaign for their parties' hopefuls. Nevertheless, the absence of the presidential race on the ballot produced a sharp turnout drop, giving Republican Chambliss a comfortable runoff victory (Tharpe 2008).
Republicans had a very good year in 2010, reflecting the national GOP landslide, as they reelected one of their two U.S. senators, succeeded their first governor with a new Republican chief executive, picked up seats in the U.S. House and in both state legislative chambers, and swept all seven subgubernatorial state offices for the first time. Republican Nathan Deal, who as congressman was viewed positively as "a steady-at-the-wheel type of guy" defeated Democratic former governor Roy Barnes, who had lost his gubernatorial reelection bid eight years before after alienating people with his "hands-on, CEO, always-in-control style" (Seward 2010). GOP Senator Isakson easily won reelection over state labor commissioner Michael Thurmond, as most voters as early as an August Rasmussen poll had viewed the Republican incumbent as being more in line with their own mainstream conservtive values (http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/elections/election_2010/election_2010_senate_elections/georgia/election_2010_georgia_senate). Republicans also did well in 2012, carrying the state for Romney and making gains in each chamber of the state legislature so that they now outnumbered Democrats by 2-1 margins.
Republicans in 2014 retained their newfound dominance of state politics (established around ten years ago), reelecting GOP governor Nathan Deal and replacing a retiring senator with businessman David Perdue, though Democrats offered viable challengers that held the victors to only 54% of the two-party vote. Democrats offered a very viable senatorial candidate, Michelle Nunn, daughter of venerable former senator and defense hawk Sam Nunn, and CEO of the Bush-inspiried Points of Light nonprofit, but Republican Perdue nationalized the election by pledging to "stop the failed policies of President Obama and Sen. Harry Reid" (Barrow 2014). Democrats also offered a spirited challenger for governor, President Carter's grandson and state senator Jason Carter, while GOP governor Deal (the party switching, former longtime congressman) touted the state's job growth as being "the sixth-fastest rate in the country," and highlighted his bipartisan legislative support for shielding education from budget cuts and for reducing the African American prison population thru criminal justice reform (lighter sentences for non-violent crimes, and drug court non-prison alternatives)(Jones 2014). Though both Republicans were benefited by the majority of voters who disapproved of President Obama's job performance and by the 2% edge that Republican party identifiers held over Democrats, a decisive factor was that both Republican nominees won 59% of Independents (CNN exit polls).
Georgia Republicans continued their winning streak in 2016, as Senator Isakson easily won reelection over businessman Jim Barksdale. Isakson successfully divorced himself from the divisive presidential campaign by running ads that focused on his senate work. Democrat Barksdale was not only a newcomer to state politics, but he also ran a low-key campaign until a month before the election (Associated Press, 2016).
Though Republicans in 2018 swept all statewide offices once again, the gubernatorial race was a partisan and ideological cliffhanger. Secretary of State Brian Kemp won the GOP nomination after an endorsement from President Trump, knocking off the three-term lieutenant governor. Kemp's controversial ads during the primary included him "wielding a shortgun that, he vowed, 'no one's taking away'", and sitting in a truck pledging to use it "just in case I need to round up criminal illegals and take them home myself" (Blinder and Martin 2018). Democrats nominated the bright and articulate state house minority leader, Stacey Abrams, an African American who was spearheading a major voter registration project. Kemp blasted the liberal Democrat as an "'extremist outsider' who would force Georgia toward socialism," while Abrams accused the conservative Republican Secretary of State of using his office to promote his gubernatorial hopes through voter suppression (Bluestein 2018). With 97% of each party's identifiers backing their party's candidate, the 5% point GOP edge over Democrats among exit poll voters was decisive for Kemp, though Abrams ran a strong race by attracting 54% of Independents, 62% of moderates, and even 25% of whites (CNN exit poll: https://www.cnn.com/election/2018/exit-polls).
The 2020 senate runoff elections in Georgia saw a double victory for Democrats, which gave Democrats a Vice Presidential tie breaking control of the U.S. Senate. In this increasingly competitive two-party state, Republican Governor Kemp appointed businesswoman (WNBA Altanta Dream co-owner) Kelly Loeffler to the seat resigned because of health reasons by Senator Isakson, thereby passing over a more controversial conservative Trump loyalist leader Congressman Doug Collins (who had fought against Trump's impeachment on the House Judiciary Committee). The other candidate who made the special election runoff was an African American and senior pastor of Ebenezer Baptist Church (Martin Luther King's home), Raphael Warnock. In the regular senate election runoff, Republican incumbent David Perdue faced Democrat Jon Ossoff, a former journalist and media company owner, who had money and name recognition thanks to a recent unsuccessful congressional campaign. Both Republicans in the early January runoff blasted their Democratic opponents as socialists with Loeffer calling herself "the firewall for stopping socialism" and Perdue labeling himself as "the last line of defense against this radical socialist agenda" (Miao, 2021). Democrats emphasized such popular issues as Medicaid expansion, criminal justice reform, and the John Lewis Voting Rights Act. President Trump campaigned for them, raging that the election had been stolen from him, with some party officials afterwards claiming that he had inadvertently discouraged Republicans from voting. Indeed, exit polls found that Republicans had only a 1% edge over Democrats in the runoff election, a clear decrease from the 4-5% advantage that they had enjoyed in the first elections. With both Democrats polling 2-3% higher among their own partisans than were the Republicans, and with both Democrats winning 52% of Independents, the Republican dropoff became decisive in the twin 51-49% Democratic victories (https://www.cnn.com/election/2020/exit-polls/) .
The 2022 senate and state elections demonstrated how competitive Georgia has become with the two parties splitting the gubernatorial and senate races. Party identification reigned supreme, benefitting Republican Governor Kemp since his party comprised about 54% of exit poll voters identifying with one of the two major parties. Kemp won an identical victory margin, winning 98% of Republicans while Democratic challenger Stacey Abrams won 96% of Democrats (CNN exit poll). Kemp was also benefitted by his record, stressing the state's strong economy and budget surplus, which he attributed to his early lifting of pandemic restrictions. Kemp could be viewed as a competent manager of state government, as he first had to easily defeat a Trump-endorsed primary challenger (Angered by the governor's certification of Biden's Georgia win, Trump had backed former Senator David Perdue.). Kemp also attacked Abrams' liberalism, charging that she was backed by the "defund the police" movement, while he was endorsed by law enforcement groups (Greenwood, 2022). Democrats overcame the GOP exit poll advantage in the Senate, where incumbent Raphael Warnock won a narrow victory in the election runoff. Warnock "steered clear of Biden ... emphasizing bipartisanship" (Bluestein 2022). Indeed, Warnock had co-sponsored a successful senate resolution with Mississippi Republican Cindy Hyde-Smith honoring Gold Star Families, which he touted on his Senate website (itself titled: Reverend Raphael Warnock, U.S. Senator for Georgia). As his Republican opponent, Trump-backed football legend Herschel Walker, faced allegations of abuse of his ex-wife and other women and of paying for a woman's abortion (despite his pro-life posture), Warnock stressed that the election was about "competence and character." Walker's rambling campaign comments even led him to talk about a fright movie and whether vampires or werewolves were stronger, prompting a campaigning Obama to jokingly remark: "Since the last time I was here, Mr. Walker has been talking about issues that are of great importance to the people of Georgia... Like whether it's better to be a vampire or a werewolf... This is a debate that I must confess I once had myself- when I was 7. Then I grew up." (Folmar 2022). While 95% of Republicans nevertheless stuck with Walker, Warnock won 97% of Democrats and 53% of Independents (to only 42% for Walker). Indeed, the outgoing Republican lieutenant governor even admitted that he had left his ballot blank in the Senate runoff election.
Party Competition in Georgia in
the 21st Century
As Republicans began to make gains in other southern states beyond the presidential level, electing U.S. senators even in the Deep South state of Mississippi, Georgia along with Louisiana and Arkansas remained a heavily Democratic state. Democrats won every gubernatorial election of the 20th century, and over the first nine decades suffered only one “accidental” and temporary loss of a U.S. senate seat. As late as 1986, Democrats outnumbered Republicans among adult Georgians by a two-to-one margin, and outnumbered GOP state legislators by an even greater four-to-one margin.
As the governing, majority party of Georgia, Democrats were adroit in offering politically experienced and respected candidates who could “connect” with the average citizen. The three consecutive, two-term governorships of George Busbee, Joe Frank Harris, and Zell Miller illustrate the impressive political resumes that Democrats could offer voters. Ranging from a state house majority leader to an 18-year state house representative to a four-term lieutenant governor, Democratic candidates typically blew away their politically inexperienced GOP opponents (Table 7-3). Successful Democratic candidates were also quite adroit at projecting a personal image that voters could identify with, as Jimmy Carter in the gubernatorial primary painted himself as a “common man” fighting a rich opponent, Sam Nunn played up his rural roots when facing a rich opponent in the senatorial primary, and Zell Miller projected a folksy image as a country music fan to win the governorship and then to win reelection against a “rich” Republican.
Peach State Democrats before the turn of the century were also quite effective in divorcing themselves from the “liberal” image of their national party. Jimmy Carter won the governorship by openly courting supporters of segregationists George Wallace and Lester Maddox. Two years later Sam Nunn rebuffed Republican efforts to paint him as a liberal by blasting federal judges, opposing court-ordered busing, and winning George Wallace’s endorsement (Table 7-3). Democratic governors gained fame for opposing increased taxes (Joe Frank Harris) and even cutting taxes (Zell Miller). Democrats skillfully created broad-based coalitions, reflected in the rural-oriented Herman Talmadge being propelled to the U.S. senate by prominent business leaders. When the majority Democratic party unified behind its candidates, as in the case of Joe Frank Harris and Roy Barnes’ first gubernatorial race, they won. The Democratic party was so dominant in the first nine decades of the 20th century that it lost only one major campaign (1980 senate), and only because of a combination of personal and political scandals involving their candidate, various campaign errors, the alienation of black voters, and a bitterly split party primary.
By the 1990s Georgia voters and political activists were finally following the regional trend, as white conservatives moved in great numbers towards the GOP. The state Democratic party itself virtually flip-flopped ideologically. In 1991 53% of Democratic county chairs had regarded themselves as “conservatives,” with 28% moderates and only 20% liberal. By 2001, 39% of Democratic chairs now called themselves “liberals,” 38% were moderates, and only 22% conservative (Clark, Haynes, Lockerbie, and Seitz 2003: 45). The result of the ideological realignment of the Georgia parties, given the large numbers of conservatives among southern voters, was intensely competitive parties and historic electoral gains for the GOP. Over only a three year period from 2002 through 2004, Republicans won the governorship, both U.S. senate seats, and control of both state legislative chambers. Not only had the state Democratic party become a more “liberal” party, but also it was now less dominated by whites. In the 2002 and 2004 Democratic primaries, African Americans made up about 45% and 47% of the party’s primary electorate (Bullock 2007: 65).
As elected Democrats sought to represent their more liberal voter base, Republican challengers took aim at their leftward drift. Republican Paul Coverdell unseated Senator Wyche Fowler, blasting him for his opposition to the Gulf War and to the death penalty. Saxby Chambliss unseated Senator Max Cleland, painted as soft on defense for opposing portions of President Bush’s Homeland Security bill. Governor Roy Barnes committed the ultimate sin to many conservative whites by ditching the Confederate emblem on the state flag and was himself ditched by Republican Sonny Perdue. As in Louisiana, voters rejected an African American member of congress in favor of a white Republican, this time for the U.S. senate in 2004. Indeed, the even greater conservatism of Johnny Isakson’s two Republican primary opponents helped to paint the conservative Congressman as a “moderate” in comparison.
An objective assessment of the roll call voting records of Georgia’s U.S. Senators by liberal and conservative interest groups underscores how Georgia’s Democrats have shifted toward the left ideologically. Old-time Democrats such as Herman Talmadge and the state’s Democratic delegation to the U.S. House had maintained pretty conservative records, receiving higher scores from the conservative Americans for Constitutional Action than from the liberal Americans for Democratic Action (Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews 1972). Senator Sam Nunn’s career illustrated how the Democratic delegation began to shift, as his ratings migrated from a moderate conservative tendency at the start of his senate service in 1973 to a moderate liberal orientation in the 1990s near its end. Senator Wyche Fowler compiled a moderate liberal record, while Max Cleland over a four year period earned an average 83% “liberal” ADA rating and a mere 8% conservative ACU rating (Nutting and Stern 2001: 257). The new home of white conservatives had now become the Republican Party with Senators Mattingly, Coverdell, Chambliss, and Isakson all boasting a voting record that was conservative at least 80% of the time (Table 7-4).
Another key to recent Republican victories was their ability to finally provide a sizable “farm team” of GOP state legislators and congressmen who could offers voters impressive records of political experience and leadership. Sonny Perdue, Paul Coverdell, and Johnny Isakson had all served in the state senate with Isakson also serving in the state house (Table 7-3). Isakson and Saxby Chambliss both won promotions from the U.S. House to the Senate with congressional Republican leaders providing Chambliss with a platform as a subcommittee chairman on Terrorism and Homeland Security that enhanced his senate campaign message. Republican candidates often brought even more life experiences to the table, with Coverdell having been a businessman and a former state party chair and Isakson serving as chairman of the state board of education. Republicans have also behaved as pragmatically as Democrats once elected to office, as they have moved beyond mere ideological purism to fight for their constituents’ diverse concerns. Senator Coverdell fought to protect the state’s peanut subsidy, Chambliss has worked to protect Georgia’s military bases and has chaired the Agriculture Committee, and Isakson has fought to deliver federal funds to the state (Duncan and Nutting 1999: 357; Koszczuk and Stern 2005: 278, 281).
Democrats have some reason to hope that they will remain at least a “competitive” major party in Georgia politics, though no longer a majority governing party. As late as 2009 with a diverse set of officers they continued to control three of the seven subgubernatorial executive offices. Indeed, Attorney General Thurbert Baker and Labor Commissioner Michael Thurmond were both African American males who had been elected three times to their positions, and who before their retirements in 2010 had been quite successful at divorcing themselves from any possible link with the “liberal” image of the national Democratic party. Avoiding the “liberal” label is a special concern for African American politicians, given the Congressional Black Caucuses’ strident liberalism that alienates many white voters. Attorney General Baker in his official biography on his website pointed to his previous service as a state representative who took the lead in helping Governor Zell Miller enact the popular HOPE program and the tough DUI and 2 strikes and you’re out law. Thurmond has been praised by Governor Miller for doing “a superb job” because “under his guidance, the state welfare rolls dropped to their lowest levels in a quarter of a century” (Miller 2003: 112). Democrats in 2004 regained nearly half of the state’s U.S. house seats with a similar racially and ideologically diverse delegation, and reelected all except the controversial Cynthia McKinney two years later, replacing her with a less divisive African American man. Compared to the diversity of the Georgia Democratic Party, state Republicans still have a similar problem to Louisiana Republicans, resembling a plane that tries to fly with only one wing, the “right” wing. A 2001 study showed that among GOP county chairs in the Peach State, 65% regarded themselves as “very conservative,” 31% were “somewhat” conservative, and only 4% were moderate and none liberal (Clark, Haynes, Lockerbie, and Seitz 2003: 45). The portrait of Georgia politics that emerges is therefore one where Democrats are no longer the dominant, “ruling” party, but neither are the Republicans, despite their dramatic recent gains.
To remain a competitive major party, Georgia Democrats should look to the examples of their governors of the last three decades of the 20th century, who maintained political dominance with a host of popular programs that spanned the ideological spectrum and that benefited a large number of people. Progressive programs to improve public education by establishing kindergartens, increasing education funding, or establishing college scholarships were established by Governors Busbee, Harris, and Miller (Table 7-4). Ideologically neutral programs promoting economic development were evident in Busbee’s promotion of Atlanta’s interests and Harris’ attraction of sporting events, building of highways, and attraction of new industry. Conservative policies of keeping taxes down or reducing them were accomplished by Governors Harris and Miller, while Miller also became famous for such tough anti-crime measures as boot camps and two strikes and you’re out laws. Peach State Democrats should heed their legendary Zell Miller’s warning to avoid any identification with the left-wing Democratic partisan excesses of Washington Democrats, and instead draw on their own long tradition of serving the diverse needs of the broad range of their state’s residents (Miller 2003).
Table 7-1
Governors and U.S. Senators and Their Parties in Modern Georgia
|
|
Democrats |
|
Republicans |
||||
|
|
Governors |
Senators |
Senators |
|
Governors |
Senators |
Senators |
|
1970 |
Carter* |
Russell |
Talmadge |
|
|
|
|
|
1971 |
Carter |
Gambrell+ |
Talmadge |
|
|
|
|
|
1972 |
Carter |
Nunn* |
Talmadge |
|
|
|
|
|
1974 |
Busbee* |
Nunn |
Talmadge* |
|
|
|
|
|
1976 |
Busbee |
Nunn |
Talmadge |
|
|
|
|
|
1978 |
Busbee* |
Nunn* |
Talmadge |
|
|
|
|
|
1980 |
Busbee |
Nunn |
|
|
|
|
Mattingly* |
|
1982 |
Harris* |
Nunn |
|
|
|
|
Mattingly |
|
1984 |
Harris |
Nunn* |
|
|
|
|
Mattingly |
|
1986 |
Harris* |
Nunn |
Fowler* |
|
|
|
|
|
1988 |
Harris |
Nunn |
Fowler |
|
|
|
|
|
1990 |
Miller* |
Nunn* |
Fowler |
|
|
|
|
|
1992 |
Miller |
Nunn |
|
|
|
|
Coverdell* |
|
1994 |
Miller* |
Nunn |
|
|
|
|
Coverdell |
|
1996 |
Miller |
Cleland* |
|
|
|
|
Coverdell |
|
1998 |
Barnes* |
Cleland |
|
|
|
|
Coverdell* |
|
2000 |
Barnes |
Cleland |
Miller+ |
|
|
|
|
|
2002 |
|
|
Miller |
|
Perdue* |
Chambliss* |
|
|
2004 |
|
|
|
|
Perdue |
Chambliss |
Isakson* |
|
2006 |
|
|
|
|
Perdue* |
Chambliss |
Isakson |
|
2008 |
|
|
|
|
Perdue |
Chambliss* |
Isakson |
|
2010 |
|
|
|
|
Deal* |
Chambliss |
Isakson* |
|
2012 |
|
|
|
|
Deal |
Chambliss |
Isakson |
|
2014 |
|
|
|
|
Deal* |
Perdue* |
Isakson |
|
2016 |
|
|
|
|
Deal |
Perdue |
Isakson* |
|
2018 |
|
|
|
|
Kemp* |
Perdue |
Isakson |
|
2020 |
|
|
|
|
Kemp |
||
|
2022 |
|
|
|
|
Kemp* |
||
Note: Cell entries indicate the governors and U.S. Senators elected in or serving during the years listed at the left.
* Indicates that the officeholder was elected in that year.
+ David Gambrell was appointed in 1971 after Richard Russell’s death.
+ Zell Miller was appointed and then elected in 2000 after Coverdell’s death.
+ Raphael Warnock defeated the interim appointed Senator Kelly Loeffler, who replaced Isakson (who resigned in 2019 for health reasons).
Table 7-2. Republican Growth
in Georgia
|
Year of Election |
Pres. Vote (% Rep of 2 pty) |
U.S. Senate Seats* (% Rep
of 2 pty) |
Gov. Pty.* |
Party Ident. (% Rep of 2
pty.) |
U.S. House Seats (% Rep) |
State Senate Seats (% Rep
of 2 pty) |
State House Seats (% Rep
of 2 pty) |
Sub-Gov. Office (% Rep) |
|
1970 |
NA |
0 |
D-41 |
NA |
20 |
11 |
11 |
0 |
|
1972 |
75 |
0 (46) |
Dem |
NA |
10 |
14 |
16 |
0 |
|
1974 |
NA |
0 (28) |
D-31 |
NA |
0 |
9 |
13 |
0 |
|
1976 |
33 |
0 |
Dem |
NA |
0 |
9 |
14 |
0 |
|
1978 |
NA |
0 (17) |
D-19 |
18 |
10 |
9 |
11 |
0 |
|
1980 |
42 |
50 (51) |
Dem |
NA |
10 |
9 |
13 |
0 |
|
1982 |
NA |
50 |
D-37 |
22+ |
10 |
13 |
13 |
0 |
|
1984 |
60 |
50 (20) |
Dem |
NA |
20 |
16 |
14 |
0 |
|
1986 |
NA |
0 (49) |
D-30 |
33+ |
20 |
18 |
15 |
0 |
|
1988 |
60 |
0 |
Dem |
NA |
10 |
20 |
20 |
0 |
|
1990 |
NA |
0 (0) |
D-46 |
NA |
10 |
20 |
19 |
0 |
|
1992 |
50 |
50 (51) |
Dem |
43 |
36 |
27 |
29 |
0 |
|
1994 |
NA |
50 |
D-49 |
49 |
64* |
38 |
37 |
43 |
|
1996 |
51 |
50 (49) |
Dem |
43 |
73 |
39 |
43 |
43 |
|
1998 |
NA |
50 (54) |
D-46 |
NA |
73 |
41 |
43 |
29 |
|
2000 |
56 |
0 (39) |
Dem |
47+ |
73 |
43 |
41 |
29 |
|
2002 |
NA |
50 (53) |
R-53 |
NA |
62 |
54 |
40 |
29 |
|
2004 |
58 |
100 (59) |
Rep |
55+ |
54 |
61 |
55 |
29 |
|
2006 |
NA |
100 |
R-60 |
58+ |
54 |
61 |
59 |
57 |
|
2008 |
53 |
100 (57) |
Rep |
49+ |
54 |
61 |
58 |
57 |
|
2010 |
NA |
100 (60) |
R-55 |
51 |
62 |
63 |
60 |
100 |
|
2012 |
54 |
100 |
Rep |
51 |
64 |
67 |
66 |
100 |
|
2014 |
NA |
100 (54) |
R-54 |
51+ |
71 |
68 |
66 |
100 |
|
2016 |
53 |
100 (57) |
Rep |
51 |
71 |
68 |
66 |
100 |
|
2018 |
NA |
100 |
R-51 |
54+ |
64 |
63 |
58 |
100 |
|
2020 |
49.9 |
0 (49) |
Rep |
53++ |
57 |
62 |
57 |
100 |
|
2022 |
NA |
0 (49) |
R-54 |
54+ |
64 |
58 |
56 |
100 |
Note:
NA indicates not available or no election held.
Source:
The Almanac of American Politics, 1972-1984; CQ=s Politics in America,
1984-2006; Lamis (1990); Binford, Baxter, and Sturrock (1999); Wright,
Erikson, and McIver (1985); Binford (1988); Bullock and Rozell (2007b);
Bullock (2014); Jones (2011, 2017); and
websites: http://www.sos.state.ga.us/elections/election_results/
and
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/pages/results/states/GA/G/00/epolls.0.html
+
Based on exit poll of voters, not all adults.
++
Fox poll, reported in Buchanan and Kapeluck, The 2020 Presidential Election in the South, p. 11.
*
Total does not include Cong. Deal who switched to GOP after election.
Table 7-3
Factors Affecting Elections of Georgia Governors and U.S. Senators
|
Officeholder (party-year 1st, imp.
elections) |
Issues |
Candidate
Attributes |
Party/Campaign
Factors |
Performance
Factors |
Governors |
|
|
|
|
|
Jimmy Carter (D-1970) |
Common man vs. rich Dem. |
4 year personal campaigning |
Black, Wallace-Maddox backers |
GOP newscaster, pol. inexper. |
|
George Busbee (D-1974,1978) |
Dem. Maddox attacks M.L. King/ |
|
Urban, black support/ |
State house majority leader/incumbent |
|
Joe F. Harris (D-1982,1986) |
Conservative, no tax increase |
|
Dem unity after GOP attacks |
18 year state house rep. |
|
Zell Miller (D-1990, ‘94) |
Lottery for education, anti-food sales tax/ |
Country music fan, folksy/ Rep. rich |
Anti-establish, aggress. camp/ Rep avoid rural |
Mod. liberal 4 term lieut. gov./ Rep pol. inexper. |
|
Roy Barnes (D-1998) |
Education, health reform |
|
United Dems, balanced ticket |
St. sen 16 yrs, st. rep. 6 years |
|
Sonny Perdue (R-2002,2006) |
Flag changed/ good economy |
/GOP folksy, leader |
GOP grassroots effort/ party id |
St. sen. Dem. turned Rep./ |
|
Nathan Deal (R-2010,2014) |
/GOP job growth, criminal justice reform |
Steady, reliable beats control freak/GOP bipartisan leader |
Nat'l GOP landslide/GOP wins Independents |
18 year congressman beats 1-term governor |
|
Brian Kemp (R-2018,2022) |
liberal vs. conservative/Rep pro-police |
politically incorrect GOP/ |
5 point GOP exit poll edge/6 point GOP advantage |
/good economy, governor certifies Biden win |
Senators |
|
|
|
|
R. Russell
(D-1932) |
|
Aristocratic |
Beat racist Talmadge |
State house speaker, gov. |
|
H. Talmadge (D-1956) |
|
Legend’s son- Eugene Talm. |
Business-rural coalition |
Governor |
|
Sam Nunn |
Uses Wallace race issues |
Rural, not rich Dem |
Black support |
|
|
M. Mattingly (R-1980) |
|
Dem problems, camp errors, GOP rich |
Dem split, anti-Talmadge vote, urban vote |
|
|
Wyche Fowler (D-1986) |
Mod. liberal |
Empathy, localism |
Birace coalition, Nunn endorse |
Atlanta congressman |
|
Paul Coverdell (R-1992,1998) |
Dem. liberal- Gulf War and death penalty/ taxes, drugs |
Dem. bank scandal hurt/ tireless campaigner |
Low turnout runoff, GOP activism/ |
Experience- state senate, business, pty chair/ GOP confer. sec. |
|
Max Cleland (D-1996) |
|
Disabled Viet vet, rich Rep. |
United Dems, Divided GOP |
GA sec. of state, VA director |
|
Zell Miller (D-2000) |
Promises bipartisanship |
40 years of public service |
Appointed by Dem. gov. |
Popular former governor |
|
S. Chambliss (R-2002,'08) |
Dem anti-def., Homelnd. Sec. |
|
Hi GOP turnout/low turnout in runoff helps GOP |
Conser. Cong., terrorism comm. |
|
J. Isakson (R-2004) |
Liberal black Dem opponent |
Compassionate conservative |
Beats 2 extreme conser. Reps. |
Exper- st. hse, sen., educ board |
|
David Perdue (R-2014) |
GOP blasts Obama policies |
businessman beats Nunn daughter |
nat'l GOP landslide |
|
|
Jon Ossoff (D-2020) |
Dem stresses jobs, health care, voting rights |
GOP blasts socialism, Trump depresses GOP |
Dem journalist, businessman |
|
|
Raphael Warnock (D-2020,2022) |
Dem for jobs, health care/Dem works for Georgia |
Dem preacher/Rep personal "woman" problems |
GOP blasts socialism, Trump depresses GOP/Rep erratic campaign |
Rep businesswoman /Dem Senator bipartisan work |
Table 7-4
Programs of Georgia Governors and U.S. Senators
|
Officeholder (party-year 1st elected) |
Progressive
Policies |
Neutral Policies |
Conservative
Policies |
|
Governors |
|
|
|
|
Jimmy Carter (D-1970) |
Black appointments, biracial commiss., King portrait, labor |
Gov. reorgan., bank deposit reform |
|
|
George Busbee (D-1974,1978) |
Work with labor, kindergartens est. |
Econ. develop., race moderate, pro-Atlan |
Business support |
|
Joe Frank Harris (D-1982,1986) |
Education funding rise |
Attracts businesses, sports, highways |
No tax increase, business support |
|
Zell Miller (D-1990, 1994) |
HOPE scholarships, anti-Confed. Flag/ |
Tough DUI, welfare reform |
2 strikes and out, tax cuts, boot camps |
|
Roy Barnes (D-1998) |
Changes state flag |
Health choice, insur. co. liable for no care |
Education accountability |
|
Sonny Perdue (R-2002) |
Honor King widow, flag compromise |
Attract business and jobs, Katrina leader |
Tort reform, anti gays and abortion |
|
Nathan Deal (R-2010) |
Criminal justice reform |
Job growth |
No tax increase |
Senators |
|
|
|
Richard Russell
(D-1933) |
|
Aristocratic, Senate power |
Nat’l defense, Anti-civil rights |
|
Herman Talmadge (D-1956) |
|
Late race moderate, pragmatic consensus |
Conservative |
|
Sam Nunn |
|
Mod. conser. start, mod. lib. ending |
Pro-defense $, gay military ban, DLC |
|
Mack Mattingly (R-1980) |
Anti-Reagan on civil rights measures |
Pro-Atlanta banks |
Conservative votes |
|
Wyche Fowler (D-1986) |
Mod. Liberal, pro- choice, anti-guns |
|
|
|
Paul Coverdell (R-1992) |
|
Protect peanut subsidy |
Conservative votes, anti-abortion & gays |
|
Max Cleland (D-1996) |
Liberal vote record, guns, abortion, gays |
Protects state military, textiles |
|
|
Zell Miller (D-2000) |
Prescription drugs, teacher tax breaks |
Protects Ga. peanut farmers |
Mod. conser. votes, pro-Bush, tax cuts |
|
Saxby Chambliss (R-2002) |
|
Protects Ga mil. Bases, Agri. chair |
Conservative votes, pres-party loyalty |
|
Johnny Isakson (R-2004) |
Not anti-abortion |
Fed. funds for Ga. |
Conservative, fiscal, taxes, defense, guns |
Source: See text references. Also, Duncan and Nutting (1999:
357); Hawkings and Nutting (2003: 268-269); Koszczuk and Stern (2005: 278,
280-281); Nutting and Stern (2001: 256).