Chapter 8

South Carolina: Republican Titan Presages GOP Domination

South Carolina is the final Deep South state that we examine. It shares the key attributes of other Deep South states, having a high concentration of African Americans who comprise 29% of the state’s population, and a history of racial segregation with whites using the ruling Democratic Party to aggressively prevent black voting and political power. As in the other Deep South states, the enfranchisement of African Americans with the 1965 Voting Rights Act led to a biracial and ideologically diverse Democratic Party that dominated state elections, and a virtually lily-white Republican Party that sought to challenge its near-monopoly of political offices.

More unique among the Deep South states is that South Carolina, like Georgia, is a more modernistic Deep South state. At the start of the 21^st century, both states boasted higher household incomes than Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, and a greater commitment to public education reflected in higher per student expenditures and teachers’ salaries (NEA 2005 website rankings). South Carolina was also a leader among the Deep South states in the realignment of the state parties along national ideological lines, as conservative U.S. Senator and former segregationist Democratic governor Strom Thurmond switched to the GOP in 1964, giving Republicans their first U.S. senator from the Deep South since Reconstruction. This signal of a rising Republican party that would challenge Democratic political hegemony prompted white Democrats to welcome African Americans into their party more quickly than was the case in the rest of the Deep South. This more rapid development of a genuine two-party system led to the state being the first in the Deep South (since Reconstruction) to elect a Republican governor, to experience GOP control of a state legislative chamber and then of both legislative chambers, and to even witness Republicans winning a majority of statewide elected offices below governor (Tables 8-1, 8-2).

Segregationist Democrats Lead the South

South Carolina shares the Deep South characteristic of vigorous white efforts to maintain political power by preventing most blacks from voting. Though the proportion of voting-age blacks registered to vote rose to 27% by 1956, similar to the 11-state regional average of 25%, white reaction against the Civil Rights movement diminished black registration to only 16% by 1960, a lower level of African American political empowerment than in any state except Alabama and Mississippi (Garrow 1978: 11). By 1964 the racial climate had moderated somewhat, as African American registration rose to 39%, only slightly below the regional average of 43% and higher than in any Deep South state except Georgia (Garrow 1978: 19). South Carolina had served as a regional leader in fighting to preserve its “white primary” and in furnishing its governor, Strom Thurmond, as the presidential nominee of the 1948 States’ Rights Party. The state also led the region in the exodus of such racially obsessed white Dixiecrats as Thurmond from the old Democratic party into the emerging Republican party. After the Voting Rights Act, South Carolina’s white Democratic officeholders finally began to lead other Deep South states in a very different direction from its past- resorting to more racially moderate policies that permitted Democrats to preserve political hegemony in the state through the creation of a biracial party.

Palmetto state whites were historically so obsessed with maintaining white supremacy in a state where African Americans comprised a majority of the population until the 1930 census that V.O. Key (1949: 130) entitled his chapter on South Carolina politics, “the Politics of Color.” Whites were united in their support for segregation across geographic lines, while an occasional “economic-based” bifactionalism in the first half of the 20^th century pitted small farmers and industrial workers centered in the cotton mills in the northwestern “upcountry” Piedmont plateau counties against the conservative planters, bankers, and lawyers in the coastal plain “low country” counties (Key 1949: 139). When conservatives in 1890 sought black support to prevent the election as governor of “Pitchfork” Ben Tillman, the upcountry leader of the poor white farmers, the victorious Tillman led the effort to “legally” disfranchise African Americans through the 1895 state constitutional convention. Tillman’s legislative floor leader and upcountry ally Cole Blease also played on the race issue to be elected governor, while also broadening his electoral coalition to include mill workers. Their demagoguery on the race issue was so effective among voters that neither man, after being elected, felt the need to pursue economic programs that benefited the poor. Blease opposed “all social welfare measures,” and Tillman after being elevated to the U.S. senate was viewed as a “conservative of the conservatives” in that institution (Key 1949: 143 1^st quote, 144 2^nd quote; Moore 2006a: 79-80).

Many African Americans were disfranchised by the 1895 state constitution, which required payment of a modest $1 noncumulative poll tax six months before the election, instituted a literacy test or constitutional understanding alternative with registrars given unlimited discretion in implementing them, and disqualified persons convicted of petty crimes from voting (Burton, Finnegan, McCrary, and Loewen 1994: 194). A South Carolina innovation according to Key (1949: 538) was an exception to the literacy clause for those who owned and paid taxes on property worth at least $300, a provision that benefited some illiterate whites. Another significant barrier to African American voting was the white primary, a state Democratic Party rule barring blacks from voting in the party’s primary. When the U.S. Supreme Court struck down this rule, South Carolina officials as did Mississippi’s went to great lengths to restrict African American voting in the Democratic primary by a “nonracial” measure. The state Democratic convention proposed that blacks could vote in their party’s primary if they swore an oath to such party principles as “States’ Rights” and “the social and educational separation of races,” but this last ditch defense of the white primary was struck down by the federal courts in 1948 (Key 1949: 630). After national Democrats the same year adopted a civil rights plank in their party platform, South Carolina Democratic governor Strom Thurmond was awarded the presidential nomination of the “Dixiecrats” or States’ Rights Party, a third party committed to preserving racial segregation through protecting “states’ rights” from an increasingly powerful federal government.

As the civil rights movement transpired, South Carolina governors began to offer a more racially moderate image to the nation than did the governors of sister Deep South states like Alabama and Mississippi. James Byrnes, elected governor in 1950, and other white officials increased funding for the education of black children in an effort to equalize the facilities of white and black schools, financed by a 3% sales tax (Burton, Finnegan, McCrary, and Loewen 1994: 196; Graham 2006: 115). Ernest “Fritz” Hollings, elected governor in 1958, cautioned that the state should “realize the lesson of 100 years ago” and choose “a government of laws rather than a government of men,” as African American Harvey Gantt integrated Clemson University (Bass and DeVries 1977: 258). Rather than futilely fighting for racial segregation, Hollings’ administration is credited with such progressive programs as establishing technical education colleges that helped to promote industrial development (Bass and DeVries 1977: 250).

Challenging the race issue head-on in a very personal way, Donald Russell, a former University of South Carolina President who was elected governor in 1962, held a barbecue “open to all” at the governor’s mansion. The mansion’s location adjacent to a low income African American area resulted in participants being racially mixed and very diverse in social classes (Bass and DeVries 1977: 258). Robert McNair, who as lieutenant governor succeeded Russell after his resignation to become U.S. Senator, and who was then elected governor in 1966, responded to a school desegregation order by reiterating that the state had “run out of courts, run out of time, and must adjust to new circumstances” (Bass and DeVries 1977: 260). McNair’s administration was most known for such education accomplishments as instituting public kindergartens and compulsory school attendance, for attracting tourism and seeking foreign investment, and for appointing the first blacks to state commissions and boards (Grose 2006: 616).

Republican Titan Strom Thurmond Cracks Democratic Hegemony

Other whites in South Carolina were far more incensed than these moderate governors at the efforts by northern liberals to overturn racial segregation in the South. Journalist William Workman Jr. amassed 43% of the vote in an unprecedented GOP bid in 1962 to unseat veteran Democrat Olin Johnston, who had served in the U.S. Senate since 1945. The segregationist Johnston had been elected as a New Deal Democrat, and won renomination in 1962 despite being blasted as pro-labor by his Democratic primary challenger, Governor Ernest Hollings. Despite Johnston’s racially conservative views, Workman accused the senator of promoting “liberalism” and being “the man that the Kennedys want in the Senate” (quotes in Bartley and Graham 1975: 97; Bass and DeVries 1977: 253).

Incensed by the 1964 Civil Rights Act backed by Democratic President Lyndon Johnson, which outlawed racial discrimination in public accommodations and employment, Democratic U.S. Senator Strom Thurmond blasted the law as “the worst, most unreasonable and unconstitutional legislation that has ever been considered,” which has been passed because of “Negro agitators, spurred on by communist enticements to promote racial strife” (Cohodas 1994: 351). Thurmond was further incensed in 1964 by Johnson’s selection as his Vice Presidential running mate of Minnesota U.S. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, who was a liberal leader of the Americans for Democratic Action, a group regarded by Thurmond as “Socialist” (Cohodas 1994: 359). Presented with a happy alternative of a national Republican party led by conservative presidential candidate Barry Goldwater, Thurmond switched to the GOP, blasting Democrats for allegedly forsaking the people and becoming the party of “minority groups, power-hungry union leaders, political bosses, and businessmen looking for government contracts and favors” (Cohodas 1994: 359). Thurmond proceeded to praise Goldwater, not for being sympathetic to segregationists, but for his conservative principles reflected in the Republican’s support for “fiscal sanity,” in his belief in “Constitutional government,” and in his understanding of the “communist enemy” (Cohodas 1994: 362).

In retrospect, Thurmond’s defection should not be viewed merely as a welcome Democratic Party loss of an embarrassing racist, but also as a signal of the growing appeal to successful white politicians in Dixie of the national Republican party’s conservatism. Thurmond’s comfort at personally meeting with his constituents dated back to his father’s political work for Governor Ben Tillman, when the young Strom was coached by Tillman in such political skills as how to offer a good grip when shaking hands with people (Cohodas 1994: 29, 85, 452). Thurmond’s combat service in the Army during World War 2 earned him medals for bravery and favorable publicity in South Carolina (Cohodas 1994: 82). An FDR supporter who was elected governor in 1946, Thurmond was hailed as a “progressive” (Cohodas 1994: 84, 90). As chief executive, he backed measures to protect workers’ health, to establish kindergartens, and to improve educational facilities for blacks (Cohodas 1994: 97). Governor Thurmond also publicly condemned lynchings and urged that perpetrators be brought to justice, appointed the first woman to the South Carolina Industrial Commission, and approved the first African American appointment to the Hospital Advisory Council. This latter appointment was used against him in a 1950 campaign, when he unsuccessfully sought to unseat U.S. Senator Olin Johnston (Cohodas 1994: 99, 200, 212).

In 1954 Thurmond became the only non-incumbent ever elected to the U.S. senate in a write-in movement, as voters and Governor James Byrnes were incensed by the state Democratic Executive Committee’s selection of a political boss to fill a senate vacancy, and their failure to call for a special primary to let the people decide (Cohodas 1994: 265). True to his 1954 campaign pledge, Thurmond resigned from the Senate in 1956 in order to let the people decide who should be Senator without any candidate enjoying the benefit of incumbency. He was promptly reelected in both 1956 and to a full term in 1960. At a time when Republicans were so scarce that analysts joked that their party could hold meetings in a phone booth, Thurmond’s risky switch to the GOP in 1964 was hailed by the state press as showing his “courage and independence,” and how unlike a “machine politician” he had always made a “direct appeal to the people” (Cohodas 1994: 360). Thurmond, using multi-page newspaper inserts touting his career and virtues, won reelection in 1966 as a Republican over Democratic state senator P. Bradley Morrah with a landslide 62% of the vote. His first senatorial campaign as a Republican, though, was marred by the race card being played, as a state GOP newsletter printed a picture of Democratic Governor McNair shaking hands with a black lawyer, and an independent group distributed brochures accusing national Democrats of promoting “Black Revolution” which had allegedly led to urban riots (Cohodas 1994: 385 quote, 384).

Despite the loss of the party’s leading Dixiecrat, Democrats remained the dominant party in South Carolina, as they continued to resolve important conflicts over political ambitions within their party’s primary and even began to build a biracial coalition centered on economic issues. In 1966 Lieutenant Governor Robert McNair, who had become governor after Governor Donald Russell’s resignation and self-appointment to the U.S. Senate in 1964 (after Olin Johnston’s death), won election as governor over GOP state representative Joseph Rogers, Jr., who garnered a respectable 42% of the vote (Lamis 1990: 66). The year 1966 also saw former governor Fritz Hollings, who had lost the Democratic senate nomination in 1962 to incumbent Senator Johnston, upend Russell in a Democratic primary special senate election because of the unpopular “self-appointment” controversy, and go on to narrowly defeat Republican candidate Marshall Parker. Two years later after an easy renomination battle, Hollings comfortably defeated the same Republican candidate, increasing his election margin from 51% to 62% (Lamis 1990: 66-67).

Hollings in 1968 skillfully united liberal blacks and conservative whites with an ideologically pragmatic image, maintaining distance from the national Democratic party and presidential nominee Hubert Humphrey, voting against black Supreme Court nominee Thurgood Marshall, and pledging to African Americans that he supported them on “pocketbook” issues (Lamis 1990: 67). After his 1968 reelection, Hollings went on “poverty tours” with NAACP field secretary, Reverend I. DeQuincey Newman, and proceeded to vote in a more liberal fashion on domestic social legislation (Bass and DeVries 1977: 261). As South Carolina entered the decade of the 1970s, Democrats also continued to hold over 90% of the seats in the state legislature and all of the statewide elected offices (Table 8-2).

Democrats retained the governorship in 1970 with Lieutenant Governor John West. As a state senator before that, the racially moderate West had fought the Ku Klux Klan and opposed repeal of the compulsory school attendance law, and as lieutenant governor he had spoken at a dinner honoring NAACP Executive Director Roy Wilkins. West in 1970 narrowly defeated Congressman Albert Watson, a former Democrat who had been stripped of his seniority by House Democrats for backing Barry Goldwater (Watson had promptly resigned his seat, switched parties, and won a special election in 1965 to become the first GOP congressman in South Carolina since Reconstruction). Watson had been viewed as playing the race card, publicly urging use of “every means” to oppose an “illegal” school desegregation order in Lamar that was rocked by white violence nine days after his speech there, and two of his aides were later “linked to an attempt to stage a racial confrontation at a high school in Columbia” (Bass and DeVries 1977: 262). As governor, the progressive West promised a “totally color-blind” government, pursued affirmative action hiring in state agencies, expanded low and middle income housing and the food stamps program, promoted industrial development, and even opposed the death penalty (Bass and DeVries 1977: 263).

The modern biracial Democratic Party did suffer one major defeat in addition to Thurmond’s defection during this period of their domination of most political offices. Harvard graduate and businessman Charles D. “Pug” Ravenel, who favored reform in ethics and campaign finance laws, backed public employee collective bargaining, and opposed the state’s death penalty law, had won the Democratic gubernatorial primary in 1974, but then been disqualified by the state supreme court for failing to meet a five-year state residency requirement (Moore 2006b: 776). Ravenel refused to support the primary runner-up and subsequent state party convention designee for governor, Congressman William Jennings Bryan Dorn. Ravenel was particularly bitter over Dorn’s wife’s alleged support of the supreme court lawsuit, and over Dorn’s backing by Old Guard state senators whom the reformer Ravenel had alienated. In the face of this intra-party split, Republicans narrowly elected as their first governor since Reconstruction, Charleston oral surgeon and first-term state senator James B. Edwards. After Ravenel’s deposing, Edwards claimed to be a reformer and a candidate of change, though he was in fact so conservative that in the GOP primary he had blamed inflation on the federal food stamp program (Bass and DeVries 1977: 266-271). As governor, Edwards was most known for being tough on crime, signing a death penalty law, curbing welfare fraud, and establishing a state reserve fund (Bass and DeVries 1977: 264; Ruff 2006: 291; Website http://sciway.net/hist/governors/edwards.html).

A reunited Democratic party won back the governorship in 1978 with Richard (Dick) Riley, a legislative veteran who had served four years in the state house and ten in the state senate. The moderate Riley, who worked hard gaining support in the black community and was acceptable to the business community, won a convincing 61% vote over GOP former congressman Ed Young. Riley was so popular that voters approved a constitutional amendment permitting governors to serve two consecutive terms, and he won reelection in 1982 with 70% of the vote over now retired editor William Workman (Lamis 1990: 70-73). As governor, Riley was most known for a 1-cent sales tax increase to fund such public school reforms as “a longer school day, merit pay for teachers, and school accountability measures,” and President Clinton recognized his commitment to education by appointing him as U.S. Secretary of Education (Lesesne 2006: 803).

Democrats was also buoyed by the continued popularity of U.S. Senator Fritz Hollings, who won easy reelections in 1974, 1980, and 1986 with at least 63% of the vote. Hollings’ moderate voting record impressed many African Americans with his support for food stamps and extension of the Voting Rights Act, while mollifying conservatives with his relentless support for fiscal restraint and a balanced budget. Hollings also sought to serve the needs of the state through efforts to curb textile imports and to prevent railroad and trucking industry deregulation proposals that might reduce services to South Carolina (Ehrenhalt, 1987: 1369-1371). In the mid-1980s Democrats could also boast controlling over three-fourths of the state’s legislative seats and all of the statewide elective offices (Table 8-2).

Republicans could gain some hope from the continued easy reelections of Senator Strom Thurmond, a product of his assiduous attention to constituency service and his quick recognition of political realities. In 1971 he beat Democratic Senator Hollings to the punch by appointing a black staff member, and also began to dispense scholarships to black students through his Strom Thurmond Foundation (Cohodas 1994: 412, 428). In Thurmond’s reelection year of 1972 his Washington office was described as a “fountain of press releases announcing grants to communities around the state” (Cohodas 1994: 427). Indeed, he would even come back home to announce some grants himself or to attend dedication ceremonies. Thurmond also aggressively sought and obtained expressions of thanks from local officials, which were then put into his campaign ads (Cohodas 1994: 427).

Thurmond’s relatively modest 56% vote margin over Pug Ravenel in 1978 also was a product of a campaign stressing his Washington experience and ability to secure federal projects that helped South Carolina, as well as his leadership posts on three important committees (Cohodas 1994: 444-445). The 75-year-old Senator sought to neutralize the age issue by sliding down a fire pole at a fire station and by having his four young children campaign for him (Cohodas 1994: 446-447). On the potentially explosive race issue, Thurmond was helped by the federal money he had channeled into black as well as white communities, as he even won the endorsement of the state’s black mayors. National columnists covering the campaign reported encountering two African Americans who had personally benefited from Thurmond’s constituency service, an example of which was the senator’s diversion of an Air Force plane to transport a burn victim to a Cincinnati hospital (Cohodas 1994: 448-449). Nevertheless, the conservative Thurmond was also quite willing to use the L word, blasting his Harvard-educated opponent as a “big-spending liberal” bankrolled by northerners (Cohodas 1994: 447). In 1984 Thurmond won an easy two-to-one victory over a lesser-known opponent, a landslide duplicated in his 1990 reelection bid.

Republicans Emerge as the New Ruling Party

The second half of the 1980s began an era when the state GOP first emerged as a truly competitive political force, which generally controlled the governorship and by the early years of the 21^st century even controlled both of the state’s U.S. senate seats and both of the state legislative chambers (Table 8-1). Voters themselves were fundamentally changing with the 1980s marking a decade when Republicans surpassed the 40% mark of public identification with the two major parties, and the 1990s characterized by state residents more likely to identify with the GOP than with the Democrats (Table 8-2). Party activists were realigning along ideological lines, as surveys of state party convention delegates showed that about two-thirds of Democrats in 1988 and 1992 described themselves as “liberals” and only about 20% regarded themselves as “conservatives,” while over 95% of Republican delegates labeled themselves as conservatives (Moreland, Steed, and Baker 1991b: 123-124; Moreland 1994: 84). One important explanation for the GOPs emergence in the early years of the 21^st century as the new ruling party of South Carolina is that conservative white voters increasingly felt more comfortable with the party of Strom Thurmond than they did with an increasingly liberal party that was to the left of even moderates such as Senator Hollings.

This shift towards the GOP began in 1986, when Republicans won the governorship in their own right, without a bitterly divided Democratic party and without benefiting from a mere party switch. Republican Carroll Campbell, a congressman from urban Greenville since 1978 with a conservative voting record who had first gained notoriety by leading a public protest against court-ordered busing in 1970, proceeded to defend the state’s flying of the Confederate battle flag at the Capitol as part of “our heritage” (Lamis 1990: quote on 282, 281). Blasting Democratic tax increases and their good-ole-boy system in state government, Campbell promised reform in order to promote economic development, and also backed such consumer issues as lowering car insurance rates (Broach and Bandy 1999: 53). Campbell’s narrow victory can also be attributed to a strong vote margin in his congressional district, as well as the blandness of his Democratic opponent, Lieutenant Governor Mike Daniel (Moreland, Steed, and Baker 1991b: 122; Lamis 1990: 281). Democrats remained dominant in all other respects, however, sweeping all other statewide elective offices, easily reelecting Senator Hollings, and even picking up Campbell’s old Congressional district to restore their two-thirds majority of the state’s U.S. house seats.

Carroll Campbell proved a popular governor, attracting a large BMW automobile plant to the state, making education a budget priority, and creating an executive budget proposal for state government that he would submit to the powerful state budget committee (Moore 2006c: 127). Campaigning for reelection in 1990, the Republican governor promised more state government reform, this time through stronger disclosure and ethics laws and increased executive control of state government. Lacking a strong challenger, Democrats nominated a controversial black state senator, Theo Mitchell. Mitchell was outspent nearly 5-to-1, was viewed as “wooden and inarticulate” on the campaign trail, and unwisely played the race card by accusing some African American supporters of his GOP opponent of selling out their race (Broach and Bandy 1999: quote on 58, 56-59). Not only did Campbell garner over two-thirds of the vote, but also Republicans defeated two incumbents and gained a party switcher in the contests for secretary of state, education superintendent, and agriculture commissioner. Republican Senator Thurmond coasted to his usual easy reelection with nearly a two-to-one victory over his virtually unfunded Democratic challenger (Duncan 1991: 1344). A reelected Campbell proceeded to consolidate 145 state agencies into a cabinet of 13 agencies, whose heads were appointed by the governor (Moore 2006c: 127).

Republicans had become such a competitive party that they even started to offer credible challenges to long-time Senator Ernest Hollings. In 1992 the moderate Democrat used his 4-1 spending advantage in a wave of television advertisements to narrowly beat former congressman Thomas Hartnett. The conservative Hartnett had blasted the Democratic incumbent for voting against Desert Storm and for backing gay rights legislation, and gained some support exploiting a national anti-incumbent mood by depicting the 70-year-old officeholder as arrogant and entrenched (Moreland 1994: 95; Broach and Bandy 1999: 60-61; Duncan 1993: 1372). Over the next six years, the veteran Democrat’s roll call record did indeed move to the left, confirming state GOP claims, as he consistently gained higher ratings from the liberal ADA than he did from the conservative ACU (Duncan and Nutting, 1999: 1224; Kuzenski 2003: 27). In 1998 Hollings, using an over 2-1 spending advantage and churning out numerous press releases about the federal grants he had won for South Carolina, won his last reelection campaign by overcoming a challenge from conservative GOP congressman Bob Inglis (Duncan and Nutting, 1999: 1225, 1533). Inglis’ record as a congressman appeared to help the incumbent Democratic senator to make his case for his superior constituency service work, as Inglis had “opposed bringing federal funds into the state,” voting on one memorable occasion “against federal financing of a transportation project” for the “traffic-filled metropolitan area” of Greenville-Spartanburg (Glaser 2005: 178).

The year 1994 saw not only a national GOP tsunami but also the party’s growing emergence as the governing party in South Carolina. Republicans nominated for governor David Beasley, a former Democratic speaker pro tem of the state house, who had switched to the GOP in 1991 after blasting the national Democratic Party for its “liberal agenda” and its drift towards “socialism” (Broach and Bandy, 1999: 63). South Carolina Democrats proceeded to reduce their own electoral chances by nominating after a closely-divided primary runoff two-term lieutenant governor and longtime former state representative Nick Theodore, who many viewed as a product of the Democratic good-ole-boy establishment taken on by Governor Campbell. Some business leaders backed Beasley as another reformer in Campbell’s image, who would continue to attract economic development. Ideological issues were also prominent in the campaign, as Beasley called for lower taxes, reducing government’s size, and getting tough on crime and welfare spending, while Theodore stressed his pro-choice position on abortion (Broach and Bandy, 1999: 64-65). Narrowly retaining the governorship for the third successive election, Republicans also retained their three other statewide elective offices and picked up the offices of lieutenant governor, attorney general, and treasurer, leaving Democrats with only two statewide offices. Also historic, enough election victories and party switches gave the GOP control of the state house for the first time since Reconstruction (Broach and Bandy, 1999: 66-67). As governor, Beasley slashed business and property taxes, and enacted welfare reform that stressed a work requirement (Moore 2006d: 59).

Democrats fought back by offering a spirited challenge to 93-year-old Strom Thurmond in 1996, and by winning back the governor’s office two years later. Though wealthy businessman Elliott Close was able to nearly close the spending gap with the entrenched senatorial incumbent and to hold Thurmond to his narrowest reelection margin ever, Thurmond’s “superb constituent service and attention,” reflected in the numerous congratulatory notes that he sent high school graduates, the countless ceremonies that he attended, and the long list of facilities named after him swayed many voters, including 21% of African Americans (Moreland and Steed 1997: quote on 120, 121). Republicans offered Democrats one opening, though, when Governor Beasley, whose first election had been backed by the Christian Coalition, explained how biblical virtues had led him to believe that the Confederate battle flag should be removed from the statehouse, a proposal promptly killed by the Republican-controlled state house (Broach and Bandy 1999: 63, 78, 80). As white turnout declined in 1998, particularly among conservatives, Democratic state representative and house minority leader Jim Hodges was able to use his issue of creating a state lottery to improve public education to unseat the GOP governor, a promise that Hodges delivered on after becoming governor (Kuzenski 2003: 36; Moreland and Steed 2002: 114). Governor Hodges also championed an improved pre-school measure, more school construction, higher teacher pay, and a prescription drug plan for the state’s elderly (Romine 2006: 450).

Republicans returned to their winning ways as the 21^st century began, capturing control of the state senate in 2000 to give the GOP control of both legislative chambers. African American lawmakers, being solidly Democratic, became the biggest losers, losing all except one or two minor committee chairmanships. Indeed, by 2003 all legislative institutional leadership positions were held by white males, even on the Democratic side (Menifield, Shaffer, and Brassell 2005: 169-170). In 2002 Republicans denied Governor Hodges a second term, as a conservative former Congressman, Mark Sanford, unseated him (Duncan and Nutting 1999: 1226). Hodges may have been hurt by his signing a legislative measure that followed an NAACP boycott of the state, which moved the Confederate flag from atop the statehouse dome to a Confederate soldiers’ monument. The Republican challenger also benefited from the increasing strength of the GOP in the state, reflected in exit polls showing more Republican than Democratic voters turning out to vote, and from Democrats’ “overreliance on high-tech tactics over traditional campaign methods that may have diminished black turnout” (Steed and Moreland 2007: 39-40 quote; Bullock and Rozell 2007b: 13). As governor, Republican Sanford attracted new automotive and aerospace industries to the state, and enacted a fiscally conservative program that eliminated a massive state deficit (Munson 2006). Sporting an “outsider” image, Sanford vetoed much of the 2004 state budget and was promptly overridden by the legislature. Sanford then brought pigs into the state house chambers to dramatize his critique of lawmakers’ pork barrel measures (Riddle 2006: 837).

Republicans not only reelected Sanford as governor in 2006 with 55% of the vote over long-time Democratic state senator Tommy Moore, but they also won seven of the eight other statewide elected executive offices. With a campaign warchest of $8 million, Governor Sanford was able to run months of positive television ads promoting his reelection, such as one in which average voters gave such reasons for backing his reelection as his “leadership” and his “moral courage to make change” (Thestate.com 2006). With a warchest of less than $3 million, the Democratic challenger was unable to run television ads until October 12, making it hard for him to raise his low name visibility among voters (Sheinin 2006). Though Moore blasted the incumbent as unable to work with the legislature because of his “my way, no way or the highway” leadership style, Sanford retorted that he was an “agent of change” who sought “sustainable spending” by holding spending down (Washington 2006). On election day, the only ray of hope for Democrats was their razor-thin victory by 455 votes in the Education Superintendent race, which the victor Jim Rex called a “referendum in support of public education” and a “denunciation of distractions like vouchers and tax credits” (Robinson, 2006). Voters also by an overwhelming 78% popular vote enacted a state constitutional ban on same-sex marriage (http://www.scvotes.org/).

Republicans were also showing their newfound political dominance by contesting more state legislative seats than was the formerly ruling Democratic party. Among the 124 state house seats up for election in 2006, for example, Democrats were able to run without Republican opponents in the general election in only 37 districts, while Republicans were able to run without Democratic opposition in 56 districts. Even when both parties offered candidates, Republicans tended to fare better. Among the 14 races where both parties offered candidates but where Democrats won, the Democratic victor received over 60% of the vote in 7 races and under 60% in the 7 other races. Among the 17 races contested by both parties but where Republicans won, Republicans won 11 with over 60% of the vote and only 6 by less than 60% (see state government website: http://www.scvotes.org/). It is impossible for a party to win elections if they neglect to even offer candidates, but this Democratic shortcoming is more understandable in light of the tendency of incumbents of both parties to seek legislative redistricting plans that protect incumbents, as well as the desire of African American lawmakers to create a greater number of black majority districts in order to elect more black legislators. Indeed, while African Americans lawmakers in 1980 constituted only 11% of the state house and zero percent of the state senate, by 2000 blacks comprised 21% of state representatives and 15% of state senators (Menifield, Shaffer, and Brassell 2005: 169). However, concentrating heavily Democratic African Americans into some districts results in the remaining districts being “whiter” and more Republican, which can contribute to rising GOP legislative electoral fortunes.

That Republicans had now become the ruling party of South Carolina was also shown by their capture of two open U.S. senate seats over two consecutive election years with respectable 55% margins of the two party vote. In the 2002 race to fill Thurmond’s seat, conservative Republican 4-term congressman Lindsey Graham got an early start in organizing and fundraising when two prominent Democrats declined to run (Kuzenski 2003: 47). The forty-seven year old conservative also benefited from his reputation for independence, reflected in his leadership of an abortive effort to depose House Speaker Gingrich and in his support for Senator McCain’s campaign finance measure. Democrats went down to defeat with a 63-year-old former lawmaker, judge, and president of the College of Charleston, who was blasted by Graham as a “liberal” who opposed the death penalty (Hawkings and Nutting 2003: 906-907). Six years later Graham won a landslide reelection over a political unknown, a conservative Republican turned Democrat who had never run for public office before.

Two years later, in 2004 Republicans also picked up the senate seat being vacated by Hollings, as conservative 3-term congressman Jim DeMint beat state education superintendent Inez Tanenbaum. Republicans repeatedly blasted Tanenbaum as an “ultra liberal” who had supported Al Gore and now John Kerry for president, and linked her with Ted Kennedy and Bill and Hillary Clinton (Moreland and Steed 2005: 123). DeMint also ran numerous ads with President Bush endorsing him, and criticized his Democratic opponent’s record as state education superintendent by pointing out the state’s low rating on education indicators (Steed and Moreland 2007: 43). Most troubling for Democrats was that the 2004 senate voting patterns were similar to presidential voting patterns, as Democratic support was strong only among liberals, blacks, Democratic party identifiers, and those with modest incomes. This was not a good sign in a state that has voted Republican for president in every election beginning in 1980 (Moreland and Steed 2005: 125).

Indeed, the Republican strength in presidential elections can often be traced to the more conservative nature of its party’s presidential candidates. South Carolina Republicans aggressively played the “liberal” card in 1988, when Governor Campbell blasted Democratic presidential candidate Dukakis as a “liberal” who was a “card-carrying member of the ACLU” (Moreland, Steed, and Baker 1991b: 128). Recent GOP presidential candidates have also drawn support from South Carolina voters because of their conservative values, with Bush in 2000 receiving the most support from those caring the most about taxes and those wanting government to do less, and Bush in 2004 receiving overwhelming support from those viewing terrorism and moral issues as the most important issues in the election (Moreland and Steed 2002: 122; Moreland and Steed 2005: 121).

The 2010 elections (two years after Obama's presidential victory) were good for Republicans in South Carolina, as they elected a successor to their GOP governor, easily reelected one of their U.S. senators, and swept all subgubernatorial statewide offices for the first time ever. Conservative state representative and Indian-American Nikki Haley narrowly defeated pragmatic state senator Vincent Sheheen for governor (http://www.thestate.com/2010/10/24/1525762/vision-integrity-record-make-sheheen.html#). Exit polls showed Republicans outnumbering Democrats by a 43% to 35% margin and conservative self-identifiers comprising 48% of voters, a clear advantage for Haley who won the support of over three-fourths of both groups (http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2010/results/polls/#val=SCG00p1). Republican senator Jim DeMint coasted to a landslide victory after Democrats nominated a political unknown who was indicted on an alleged "obscenity" charge (Anderson 2010). Republicans swept every statewide subgubernatorial office, even the open contest for education superintendent. Republicans maintained their strong position in the 2012 elections, not only carrying the state for Romney but also exceeding the 60% margin of seats in both chambers of the state legislature for the first time.

The 2014 elections further illustrated how Republicans had become the new dominant party in South Carolina, as the party offered strong candidates and swept the governorship and both U.S. senate seats. Senator DeMint's early retirement prompted Governor Haley to appoint African American GOP conservative congressman Tim Scott in January 2013, setting up a special senate election the next year. Scott touted his faith and hard work in helping him while growing up poor in a single parent household. After serving for 12 years on Charleston's county council and then two years in the state house, Scott was elected to Congress in 2010 after beating Strom Thurmond and Carroll Campbell's sons in the GOP primary with Tea Party and Sarah Palin backing (Jackson 2014). Governor Haley's campaign boasted "56,000 new jobs and more than $13.2 billion in new investments" in the state, as well as endorsements from the state Chamber of Commerce and the National Federation of Independent Business (Gaskins 2014). Both Republican nominees as well as Senator Lindsey Graham (facing a regular election bid) benefitted from an Obama disapproval rate of 59% and a GOP advantage of 10 points among voters (44% were Republican versus 34% Democratic). Facing Scott, Haley, and Graham, Democrats offered (respectively) a 68-year-old African American Richland county councilwoman, a state legislator who had lost the same race four years earlier, and another state legislator. While all three Republicans won majorities even among Independents, freshman Scott's victory was especially impressive, as he won 67% of the Independents and a nearly unanimous 98% of Republicans (CNN exit polls).

Republican dominance was further illustrated in the 2016-17 period, as Senator Tim Scott won a landslide reelection, Governor Nikki Haley became President Trump's U.N. Ambassador, and lieutenant governor Henry McMaster succeeded to the governorship. Scott as senator had combined his conservative philosophy with concern over the injustice of racial profiling, recounting in an emotional floor speech the numerous times he had been targeted by the police (even on Capitol Hill), and offering ideas for better police training and more use of body cameras. Scott won 59% of Independents (in an exit poll) along with 95% of GOP voters, easily beating Democrat pastor and community activist Thomas Dixon. Especially disheartening for Democrats was that Republicans now outnumbered Democrats by 46-28% among voters (http://www.cnn.com/election/results/states/south-carolina#senate). The importance of having a farm team of non-gubernatorial statewide officials was shown in January 2017, as McMaster succeeded Haley as governor. Elected lieutenant governor in 2010, McMaster had been state attorney general for two terms before that, and had been state GOP chairman for nine years before running for office.

Republicans continued to dominate in 2018 and 2020, reelecting McMaster as governor in 2018 and sweeping all statewide offices for a third time. McMaster campaigned as the "Jobs governor" citing companies' promises "to add some 24,000 new jobs and invest $8 billion" in the state. With his "deep southern drawl," McMaster was viewed as a "likeable, sensible guy" who was "a true gentleman" who "offends nobody" (Barton 2018, all quotes). The Democratic state house member opposing him proceeded to be outspent by $4.4 million. In 2020, Senator Lindsey Graham won re-election despite sagging popularity and a well-funded Democrat, Jaime Harrison, who had been the first African-American chair of the state Democratic Party. Graham's 55-45% margin of victory was virtually identical to the 11% advantage that Republicans held over Democrats in exit polls. Reflecting his liberalism, Harrison was promptly named the Chair of the Democratic National Committee, where he blasted Virginia GOP gubernatorial candidate later that year for using the "racist dog whistle" of opposing critical race theory, and dubbed the Republican Party the "party of fascism and fear" (O'Brien, 2021).

Republicans continued to dominate state politics in 2022, reelecting both Republicans to the governorship and senate, not too surprising as an exit poll two years earlier had shown Republicans comprising 59% of the two major parties' exit poll voters. Governor Henry McMaster won that exact percentage as he beat former Congressman Joe Cunningham. Stressing his leadership accomplishments, McMaster even ran an ad where the Congressman had praised the governor for opposing offshore oil drilling, with the Democrat admitting: "You said 'To hell with politics. I'm going to do what's right for my state.'" (Byrd 2022). Senator Tim Scott won an even more impressive victory over an African American state representative Krystle Matthews. Scott's first ad was labeled "Cotton to Congress," as it related how his grandfather despite his humble work had taught him "about faith and hard work," and to "love America because of the promise of our future" in this "amazing land of opportunity." Scott concluded: "That is why I will never back down, and never apologize, in defense of America and the conservative values that make us exceptional" (Spady 2022).

Republican Dominance in 21^st Century South Carolina

Unlike the other Deep South states of Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Georgia, Republicans gained an early foothold in South Carolina in their bid to challenge the electorally dominant Democrats. The realignment of conservative whites to the Republican Party was led by Senator Strom Thurmond’s switch to the GOP in 1964 during Barry Goldwater’s presidential campaign. By the 1980s Republicans became competitive in terms of the public’s partisan identifications, and in 1986 the GOP won the first of three consecutive gubernatorial contests. Among Republican breakthroughs in the Deep South states, South Carolina was first to experience a GOP-controlled legislative chamber (1994), first for Republicans to gain control of a majority of sub-gubernatorial statewide offices (1994), and first to see the GOP gain control of both state legislative chambers (2000). With the retirement of both longtime U.S. senators, the early years of the 21^st century have witnessed Republicans holding both of the state’s senate seats.

South Carolina Democrats had historically been the ruling party by maintaining an ideologically diverse governing coalition. The party's broad tent harbored not only racially moderate governors such as Fritz Hollings, Donald Russell, and Robert McNair, but also segregationist States’ Rights’ leader Strom Thurmond. Such Democratic ideological pragmatism and diversity continued into the 1960s and 1970s. Senator Fritz Hollings voted against confirming Thurgood Marshall, the first African American on the U.S. Supreme Court, while showing concern over poverty and backing the food stamp program (Table 8-4). Governor John West promoted industrial development while also hiring more black state workers and backing food stamps and low and middle-income housing. Governor Richard Riley united blacks and businessmen with such policies as enhanced funding for public education.

During the era of Democratic political dominance, the party’s candidates were often able to boast impressive resumes that further established their legitimacy in the eyes of voters. Before becoming U.S. Senator, Fritz Hollings had served as governor, lieutenant governor, and speaker pro tempore of the state house. Even as late as the 1970s, before becoming governors John West had served as state senator for 12 years and as lieutenant governor for 4 years, while Richard Riley had served in the state senate for 10 years and the state house for 4 years. Divisive campaign tactics associated with ideological extremism were more associated with candidates from the minority Republican party, such as by former Democrats Strom Thurmond in his 1966 reelection race and Albert Watson in his unsuccessful 1970 gubernatorial campaign. During this period, except for Thurmond’s party switch, Democrats lost only one major race for governor or U.S. senator, and that was because of a split within their own ranks, which produced James Edwards’ 1974 election as the first GOP governor since Reconstruction (Table 8-3).

Democratic hegemony in South Carolina was shattered by the increasingly liberal drift of the national Democratic Party. Certainly Strom Thurmond’s defection to the GOP in 1964 was precipitated by his racially conservative and segregationist beliefs, but his consistently conservative roll call voting record as a Republican Senator on a diversity of issues ranging from crime to lifestyle to national defense concerns was a better fit with the national Republican party in any case (Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews 1972: 736). Meanwhile, the roll call voting record of a “conservative” U.S. senator who remained a Democrat, Fritz Hollings, drifted leftward to become more consistent with his “liberal” national party. From a moderate conservative posture in the late 1960s (Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews 1972: 737), Hollings began to occupy the political center in the 1970s and 1980s, and by the 1990s he had moved to a moderate liberal position. Though Republicans were not able to unseat him while he wielded the power of incumbency, his retirement as a left-of-center Democrat may have given some credence to the Republican claim that his potential successor would govern as a liberal. Republican claims of Democratic party liberalism are further bolstered by a 2001 survey of state party activists, which found strong majorities of Democrats favoring personal choice of abortion, stricter handgun control, job protection for gays, government aid to minorities, and opposing the death penalty with a majority of Republicans taking the exactly opposite view on each issue (Steed and Moreland 2007: 38).

In the modern era of GOP political dominance, Republicans have been eager to make elections referenda on ideology, and Democrats have sometimes helped them by appearing to fit the “liberal” mold. With the retirement of both of the state’s veteran U.S. senators, conservative Republicans have replaced them (Table 8-4). Both Graham and DeMint have shown their social and economic conservatism by opposing partial birth abortion and same-sex marriage, supporting tax cuts and opposing Bush’s prescription drug plan for the elderly (Koszczuk and Stern 2005: 918, 920). Both benefited by having Democratic opponents who could be tagged as “liberals.” Graham’s Democratic opponent was known for opposing the death penalty, while DeMint denounced his Democratic opponent for supporting Gore and Kerry’s presidential bids. In a similar vein, Carroll Campbell had been easily reelected governor in 1990 after his African American challenger questioned the racial loyalty of blacks who dared to vote Republican.

As in other Deep South states such as Georgia, South Carolina Republicans have shown some inclination to govern in an ideologically inclusive manner, despite their overall conservative values. While Governor Edwards was most known for reinstating the death penalty and establishing a state reserve fund and Governor Sanford was a staunch fiscal conservative, Governor Carroll Campbell made education a budget priority and attracted a lucrative BMW auto plant to the state. Governor Beasley even used his conservative religious beliefs as justification for his fruitless attempt to remove the Confederate battle flag from the statehouse. Among many state voters, Strom Thurmond was known more for his assiduous constituency service and his delivery of federal grants to South Carolina than for his strict conservatism. While voting consistently conservative, Congressman and soon-to-be senator Jim DeMint supported giving the president fast-track trade authority, but negotiated “some explicit protections” for South Carolina’s textile industry with the Bush White House (Glaser 2005: 178). Even Lindsey Graham has shown some streak of independence, blasting the Bush administration for the Iraqi prisoner abuse scandal.

In the early years of the 21^st century, Republicans have the advantage in electoral contests in South Carolina, as they do in Georgia. As in the Peach State, Democrats would benefit from taking a page from their recent governors. Each Democratic governor assembled a broad coalition by stressing such popular issues as education and economic development. John West was heralded for promoting industrial development, Richard Riley backed a tax increase to raise more money for public education, and Jim Hodges established a state lottery to increase funding for elementary, secondary, and higher education, which included creation of the HOPE Scholarship for college students. Highlighting the party’s popular positions on such domestic concerns as education, health care, and Social Security is politically easy to accomplish given that large majorities of state Democratic party activists favor more spending on these issues, issues on which Republican activists are much more conservative (Steed and Moreland 2007: 38). Democrats would also be well advised to avoid appearing to be too subservient on issues of political correctness. Jim Hodges may have lost the governorship because of his support for removing the Confederate flag from the top of the statehouse, a fate also suffered by his Republican predecessor David Beasley. Facing a ruling Republican party with strong candidates, Democrats should strive to avoid offering “fringe” candidates who propose ideological litmus tests for their party supporters, or they risk repeating their 1990 gubernatorial fiasco.

Table 8-1

Governors and U.S. Senators and Their Parties in Modern South Carolina

	Democrats			Republicans
	Governors	Senators	Senators	Governors	Senators	Senators
1970	West*		Hollings		Thurmond
1972	West		Hollings		Thurmond*
1974			Hollings*	Edwards*	Thurmond
1976			Hollings	Edwards	Thurmond
1978	Riley*		Hollings		Thurmond*
1980	Riley		Hollings*		Thurmond
1982	Riley*		Hollings		Thurmond
1984	Riley		Hollings		Thurmond*
1986			Hollings*	Campbell*	Thurmond
1988			Hollings	Campbell	Thurmond
1990			Hollings	Campbell*	Thurmond*
1992			Hollings*	Campbell	Thurmond
1994			Hollings	Beasley*	Thurmond
1996			Hollings	Beasley	Thurmond*
1998	Hodges*		Hollings*		Thurmond
2000	Hodges		Hollings		Thurmond
2002			Hollings	Sanford*	Graham*
2004				Sanford	Graham	DeMint*
2006				Sanford*	Graham	DeMint
2008				Sanford	Graham*	DeMint
2010				Haley*	Graham	DeMint*
2012				Haley	Graham	DeMint
2014				Haley*	Graham*	Scott*
2016				McMaster+	Graham	Scott*
2018				McMaster*	Graham	Scott
2020				McMaster	Graham*	Scott
2022				McMaster*	Graham	Scott*

Note: Cell entries indicate the governors and U.S. Senators elected in or serving during the years listed at the left.

* Indicates that the officeholder was elected in that year.

+ Indicates that lieutenant governor McMaster became governor in January 2017 after Haley was appointed U.N. Ambassador.

Table 8-2. Republican Growth in South Carolina

Year of Election	Pres. Vote (% Rep)	U.S. Senate Seats* (% Rep)	Gov. Pty.*	Party Ident. (% Rep of 2 pty.)	U.S. House Seats (% Rep)	State Senate Seats (% Rep)	State House Seats (% Rep)	Sub-Gov. Office (% Rep)
1970	NA	50	D-47	NA	17	4	9	0
1972	72	50 (63)	Dem	NA	33	7	17	0
1974	NA	50 (29)	R-52	NA	17	4	14	0
1976	43	50	Rep	NA	17	7	10	13
1978	NA	50 (56)	D-38	31	33	7	13	13
1980	51	50 (30)	Dem	45	67	11	14	13
1982	NA	50	D-30	NA	50	13	16	0
1984	64	50 (68)	Dem	NA	50	22	22	0
1986	NA	50 (36)	R-52	42	33	21	26	0
1988	62	50	Rep	NA	33	24	30	0
1990	NA	50 (66)	R-71	52	33	24	36	38
1992	55	50 (48)	Rep	52	50	35	41	38
1994	NA	50	R-51	54	67	43*	52*	75
1996	53	50 (55)	Rep	51	67	43	57	88
1998	NA	50 (46)	D-46	NA	67	48	55	63
2000	58	50	Dem	54**	67	52*	56	63
2002	NA	50 (55)	R-53	NA	67	53	59	75
2004	59	100 (55)	Rep	57**	67	57	60	75
2006	NA	100	R-55	NA	67	57	59	88
2008	55	100 (58)	Rep	52**	67	59	57	88
2010	NA	100 (69)	R-52	53	83	58	61	100
2012	55	100	Rep	52	86	61	63	100
2014	NA	100 (61)	R-58	56**	86	61	63	100
2016	58	100 (63)	Rep	57	86	61	65	100
2018	NA	100	R-54	NA	71	58	65	100
2020	56	100 (55)	Rep	59***	86	65	65	100
2022	NA	100 (63)	R-59	NA	86	67	71	100

Note: NA indicates not available or no election held.

* Entries reflect party switching to GOP immediately after election.

** Reflects exit poll results of voters, not all adults.

*** Fox poll, reported in Buchanan and Kapeluck, The 2020 Presidential Election in the South, p. 11.

Source: The Almanac of American Politics, 1972-1984; CQ=s Politics in America, 1986-2006; Broach and Bandy (1999), Graham (1988), Lamis (1990), Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1985), Steed and Moreland (2007), Bullock and Rozell (2007b), Bullock (2014), Jones (2011, 2017), communication from Professor Glen Broach, and Georgia state government website.

Table 8-3

Factors Affecting Elections of South Carolina Governors and U.S. Senators

Officeholder (party-year 1^st, imp. elections)	Issues	Candidate Attributes	Party/Campaign Factors	Performance Factors
Governors
John West (D-1970)	Race moderate, GOP race card		Speaks to NAACP	Lieut. governor, st. sen. 12 yrs.
James Edwards (R-1974)	GOP anti-food stamps		Dem party split, GOP candid. of change	1^st term state senator
Richard Riley (D-1978,1982)			Dem. unites blacks & busin./	St. sen. 10 yrs., St. rep. 4 yrs./
Carroll Campbell (R-1986, 1990)	GOP pro-flag, anti-taxes, reformist/reform	Dem. bland/ Dem. Wooden	/Black Dem. hurt by playing race card	Congressman 8 years/Dem. black st. senator
David Beasley (R- 1994)	Conser on taxes, crime, welfare		Divided Dems, business for Rep	State house speaker pro tem
Jim Hodges (D- 1998)	Lottery for education, flag hurts GOP		Conser. white turnout decline	State house minority leader
Mark Sanford (R- 2002, 2006)	Conser. GOP, flag hurts Dem/ fiscal conser.	/ courageous Rep leader vs unknown Dem	Rep pty id edge, lo black turnout/ Rep $ advantage	GOP former congressman/ incumbent Gov.
Nikki Haley (R-2010,2014)	Conservative Rep	India-American woman Rep.	Republican party ID advantage	/brought jobs, investments to state
Henry McMaster (R-2018/2022)	jobs, investments delivered/strong economy	very likeable GOP candidate/first female lieut. gov.	ticket with woman lieut. gov./GOP party id advantage	GOP U.S. attorney, party chair, attorney general, lieut gov/ leadership as Gov.
Senators
Strom Thurmond (R- ‘66,’78,’96)	Conservative Rep, Dem-black picture/Dem. “liberal”, age/	War hero, independence, comfort with people//	/Black mayors back Thurmond/	Gov-Sen/ Fed. projects, imp. committees/ constituent serve
Ernest Hollings (D-’68,’92,98)	Anti-Marshall, lib econ/antiwar pro-gay Dem./ Rep too conser.		Not nat’l Dem/Dem ads., spend advant./ camp. $ advant.	Governor, senator//Federal grants attracted, publicized
Lindsey Graham (R- 2002,'08, '20)	Conser. GOP vs. anti-death penalty liberal/	Republican “independent/”	GOP early organizing, fund-raising//GOP exit poll advantage	4 term congressman/Dem pol. unknown/
Jim DeMint (R- 2004)	Conser. GOP vs. Dem. for Gore-Kerry		Vote patterns mirror president level	3 term congressman
Tim Scott (R- 2014,2016,2022)	Conservative Republican//	African American, hard work, grew up poor//optimistic about America	Tea Party support//party identification advantage	16 years as county councilman, legislator, congressman//incumbent Senator

Table 8-4

Programs of South Carolina Governors and U.S. Senators

Officeholder (party-year 1^st elected)	Progressive Policies	Neutral Policies	Conservative Policies
Governors
John West (D-1970)	Affirmative action, food stamp-housing	Promotes industry
James Edwards (R-1974)			Death penalty, state reserve fund est.
Richard Riley (D-1978, 1982)	Pro-education, tax incr. to raise funds
Carroll Campbell (R-1986, 1990)	Education a budget priority	BMW auto plant/ gov’t consolidated
David Beasley (R-1994)	Failed attack on Confederate flag		Welfare reform, cuts taxes
Jim Hodges (D-1998)	Education programs, lottery
Mark Sanford (R- 2002)		Attracts auto and aerospace industry	Fiscal conservative
Nikki Haley (R- 2010)		Attracts jobs, investments to state
Senators
Strom Thurmond (D- 1954-64)			Segregationist
Strom Thurmond (R- 1964 on)	Black staffer appt,, black scholarships	Constituent service, grants statewide	Consistently conservative
Ernest Hollings (D-1966/1970s-80s/1990s)	Anti-poverty/for food stamps, voting rgts/Mod. lib. Votes	/moderate roll calls, protects textile industry/	Anti-Marshall/fiscal restraint, balanced budget/
Lindsey Graham (R- 2002)		Independent in Iraqi prison abuse scandal	Conservative, tax cut, anti-gay marriage, anti-abortion, anti-prescription drugs
Jim DeMint (R- 2004)		Protects state textile industry in trade bill	Conservative, tax cut, anti-gay marriage, anti-abortion, anti-prescription drugs